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While the pervasive notion that reasoning leads to optimal judgments seems commonsensical, 
some research has shown that reasoning sometimes causes suboptimal outcomes, suggesting 
that the relationship between reasons and judgment is more complicated than classically 
assumed. While cognitive theories ascribe the mechanisms of reasoned judgment to the 
reason content (e.g., quality and number), “ease of retrieval” research reveals an important 
role of reasoning experience; however, neither provides a complete account, hinting at 
missing links among cognitive and experiential factors. In this thesis, I report eight studies 
examining the relationships between reason quality and reasoning difficulty, and the 
conditions under which they predict attitudes and decisional satisfaction. Chapter 2 reports 
three studies showing that reasoning difficulty and perceived reason quality covary in the 
ease of retrieval paradigm: increasing numbers of reasons get increasingly difficult to 
generate, but also decrease in perceived quality, and it is quality rather than difficulty that 
uniquely predicts attitudes. Chapters 3 and 4 consider the causal relationship between 
difficulty and quality, and their downstream effect on attitude change. The results of four 
studies are most consistent with an interference hypothesis, such that experienced effort 
disrupts participants’ ability to cognitively elaborate on reasons, causing strong reasons to be 
judged as less persuasive, and weak reasons as more persuasive. The disrupting effects on 
perceived quality and attitude change are mitigated when people are highly motivated. 
Finally, Chapter 5 applies these insights to the issue of choice satisfaction, showing higher 
satisfaction after reasoning with ease, but adding more reasons neither increases nor 
decreases it. In sum, the findings show how the impacts of reasoning involve a complicated 
interplay among cognitive and experiential factors, ability and motivation to reason, and the 
contexts in which they are applied. Implications and applications of the findings, e.g., in 





This thesis is written in the “hybrid” format encouraged by the University of Otago: a 
collection of thematically related, standalone manuscripts linked by additional introductory 
and discussion chapters (https://www.otago.ac.nz/graduate-research/current-
students/otago662261.html). All manuscripts are written by me with advice from my 
supervisor and co-author, Professor Jamin Halberstadt. The publication status of the 
manuscripts is as follows.  
Chapter 2, entitled “Too Much Information! The Interplay of Argument Quality and 
Subjective Difficulty in Attitude Judgment,” is under revision at Social Cognition. The data 
have been made publicly available via OSF (https://osf.io/h98st/).  
Chapter 3, entitled “Difficulty Disrupts the Detection of Argument Quality,” is under 
review at Applied Cognitive Psychology. The data have been made publicly available via 
OSF (https://osf.io/9euvm/). 
Chapter 4, entitled “This is Important! Motivation Mitigates the Effect of Processing 
Difficulty on Persuasiveness,” is under review at Motivation and Emotion. The data has been 
made publicly available via OSF (https://osf.io/3uxbg/).   
Chapter 5 is in preparation for submission as a Brief Report to International Journal 
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Chapter 1: Thinking about Reasons 
 
 To Joseph Priestley 
London, September 19, 1772 
Dear Sir, 
In the Affair of so much Importance to you, wherein you ask my Advice, I cannot for 
want of sufficient Premises, advise you what to determine, but if you please I will tell 
you how… My Way is, to divide half a Sheet of Paper by a Line into two Columns, 
writing over the one Pro, and over the other Con. Then during three or four Days 
Consideration I put down under the different Heads short Hints of the different 
Motives that at different Times occur to me for or against the Measure. When I have 
thus got them all together in one View, I endeavour to estimate their respective 
Weights; and where I find two, one on each side, that seem equal, I strike them both 
out: If I find a Reason pro equal to some two Reasons con, I strike out the three. If I 
judge some two Reasons con equal to some three Reasons pro, I strike out the five; 
and thus proceeding I find at length where the Ballance lies… And tho’ the Weight of 
Reasons cannot be taken with the Precision of Algebraic Quantities, yet when each is 
thus considered separately and comparatively, and the whole lies before me, I think I 
can judge better, and am less likely to take a rash Step.  
(Benjamin Franklin, 1772 from Labaree & Bell, 1956) 
 
Reverence for Reasons 
This famous letter from Benjamin Franklin, to the British scientist Joseph Priestley, 
captures a pervasive assumption central to many scientific inquiries and theoretical 




even optimal judgments (e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977; Koriat et al., 1980; Slovic, 1982). 
Aristotle, for example, characterized reason as a uniquely human characteristic, and further 
suggested in his ethical theory that the highest happiness (eudaimon), the ultimate goal in 
human life and virtue, is only achieved by consistently guiding our actions in accordance 
with reasons (Aristotle, ca. 350 B.C.E./1925). In psychology, this quasi-moral belief about 
reasoned judgment is widely embedded in theories of decision making and attitudes (see e.g., 
Anderson, 1971; Kunda, 1990; Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002; Shafir et al., 1993), among other 
domains. For example, in a theoretical instantiation of Franklin’s suggestion, Anderson 
(1971)’s information integration theory suggests that individuals construct their attitudes by 
algebraically evaluating and weighting all available information. In the decision-making 
literature, Shafir et al.’s (1993) reason-based choice account assumes that when individuals 
make decisions under uncertainty and conflict, they look for reasons for and against each 
option to justify their choices, and further that consideration of reasons is a normal and 
natural way people think and converse about decisions.  
Before proceeding, it is important first to clarify the definition of “reason” used 
throughout this thesis. Here, a “reason” is a unit of declarative information, retrieved from 
memory, generated spontaneously, or provided by an external source, which an individual 
consciously recognizes and considers in support of, or in opposition to, a proposition. Note 
that, with its emphasis on consciousness, my definition is a conceptual departure from those 
used in some previous research (e.g., “factors or motives that affect decisions, whether or not 
they can be articulated or recognized by the reasoners”; Shafir et al., 1993, p. 13), and from 
those necessarily characterized by the process of formal logic (see e.g., Stanovich & West, 
2000; Teig & Scherer, 2016). The definition also does not necessarily concern, or invoke, 
questions about individuals’ capacity for logical and natural thoughts (see Halberstadt & 




2002). By my definition, the terms “argument”, “information”, “thought”, and “evidence”, 
for example, may sometimes be used interchangeably, depending on context. 
Early psychological research on attitude formation and persuasion follows the 
normative assumption of reason-based optimality, generally theorizing that individuals 
rationally form their attitudes, and subsequently adjust them, based on the reasons they have 
available, or can construct, to justify them (see Bem, 1972; Higgins, 1989; Maddux & 
Rogers, 1980; Pelham et al., 1994). That is, individuals, in theory, should express stronger, 
more positive attitudes toward a proposition insofar as they can access or generate more good 
(i.e., valid and supportive) reasons for it, whereas they should express weaker, more negative 
attitudes insofar as they have more reasons against it. For example, Maddux and Rogers 
(1980) showed that participants agreed more with a controversial proposal that people should 
sleep less than the usual eight hours when they were provided with supporting reasons than 
when they were not, independent of other variables such as the source’s attractiveness, 
illustrating the importance of reasons in attitudinal calculation. With similar mechanistic, 
monotonic assumptions, Bayesian reasoning provides a formal, probabilistic framework for 
how individuals should revise their beliefs (probabilistically) in light of new information (see 
Hahn & Oaksford, 2006; Howson & Urbach, 1989, 1991); that is, the more evidence one has 
supporting their beliefs, the more confident one can be in one’s positions (with some 
interesting exceptions; e.g., see the “unanimity paradox,” Gunn et al., 2016).  
Is such reverence for reasons always justifiable? As for most, if not all, psychological 
questions, the answer is: it depends. While research on overconfidence (Koriat et al., 1980) 
and analytical judgments (see e.g., Hammond et al., 1987; McMackin & Slovic, 2000), for 
example, has validated the value of analyzing reasons prior to decision making, empirical 
evidence of reasoning superiority is surprisingly limited (see March, 1978), with some 




more accurate or satisfying when based on nonreasoned, or even unconscious, processing 
(e.g., Damasio, 1994; Dijskterhuis, 2004; Gigerenzer, 2000; Gladwell, 2006; Halberstadt, 
2010; Slovic et al., 2002). Given these empirical discrepancies, not to mention the stakes 
involved in many important decisions (typically the ones in which careful reasoning is 
advocated, e.g., policy decision making, Hollis & Smith, 1986; decisions to undergo major 
surgery, Shaw et al., 2020; also see Slovic, 1982, and references therein), it is important to 
understand when and how reasons influence judgments, for better or worse. The primary goal 
of the current thesis is, thus, to examine the mechanisms by which people change their 
attitudes and beliefs in light of reasons, with the longer-term goal of identifying when 
reasoning should be recommended over spontaneous or “intuitive” judgments. To begin, I 
review some of the literature on the limitations and drawbacks of reasoning, as a counterpoint 
to the classical assumptions outlined above. I then explore relevant theories and research on 
cognitive and metacognitive mechanisms that may explain the impacts of reasoning on 
attitudes and decisions, identifying along the way theoretical gaps in the reasons-related 
literature.   
Evidence for Limited Desirability of Reasoning   
Despite the influential and pervasive assumptions reviewed above, evidence from 
several lines of research suggest that careful reasoning does not always improve judgments, 
and in some cases may even impair them (for reviews see Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; 
Halberstadt, 2010; Halberstadt & Wilson, 2008; Wilson et al., 1989). 
Reason Analysis 
Research by Wilson and colleagues has established that thinking about reasons can 
cause attitude change, reduce attitude-behavior consistency, and interfere with decision 
making, potentially leading to suboptimal, or at least subjectively undesirable, judgments (for 




showed that the correlations between participants’ attitudes and behaviors were lower for 
those who reasoned than for those who did not, across different attitude objects. In their first 
study, for instance, participants were asked to rate five different puzzles, and were then given 
the chance to play them freely. Before rating each puzzle, reasoners were asked to provide 
reasons why they liked or disliked each one, while controls completed unrelated 
questionnaires. The results showed reduced correlations between reasoning participants’ 
ratings of the puzzles and the amount of time spent playing them, compared to controls. 
Similar results were found in two subsequent studies involving vacation pictures and 
romantic relationships, respectively: self-reported enjoyment of vacation pictures predicted 
facial expressions, and self-reported relationship quality predicted relationship length, less 
consistently when participants first analyzed the reasons for their attitudes. Wilson and Dunn 
(1986) found that participants’ attitudes toward six different soft drinks were less predictive 
of how much they consumed, when they first analyzed the reasons why they liked each one. 
Given the researchers’ (sometimes implicit or common-sense) assumption that consistency 
among attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors is desirable (Festinger, 1957; Gawronski & Strack, 
2012; Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002), such findings show one way in which reasoning can be 
suboptimal. 
One account of how reasoning disrupts the link between attitudes and behavior is that 
reasons cause momentary attitude change, while leaving default behavioral tendencies intact. 
Wilson and Kraft (1993), for example, asked participants to analyze the reasons for their 
feelings toward their romantic partners over the course of four weeks, or, in a control 
condition, to list the reasons for choosing their major. Relative to controls, reasoners’ post-
experiment attitudes were more inconsistent with their initially reported feelings, with 
attitude change predicted by the reasons brought to mind during the study. In another study, 




(e.g., Water Lilies by Claude Monet) and “humorous” scenes (e.g., a photograph of a kitten 
perched on a rope with the caption “Gimme a Break”) and showed that reasoners reported 
liking the humorous posters more than controls, despite the Impressionist works being the 
overall favorite among participants. Furthermore, reasoners were more likely than controls to 
choose to take the humorous posters home (i.e., as a reward for their participation), but ended 
up reporting lower satisfaction with their choice than controls when asked several weeks 
later. The latter effect is particularly important in the current context, in that it illustrates 
another pitfall of reasons-induced attitude change: when such change is only temporary, it 
increases the likelihood of dissatisfaction with decisions made in the moment. 
Attitudinal inconsistencies and decisional dissatisfaction are only two indices of 
judgment quality, of course (for reviews see Abelson & Levi, 1985; Ajzen, 1996; Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1990; Higgins, 2000). Even decisions individuals later regret are not necessarily 
“worse” short-term decisions. Other studies, however, hint that people who reason about their 
options sometimes choose ones that are suboptimal in a more objective sense. For example, 
Wilson and Schooler (1991) asked half of participants to analyze their reasons for liking or 
disliking five different brands of strawberry jam before indicating their preferences, and then 
compared their ratings to those from trained sensory experts. The researchers found that 
reasoners’ jam ratings corresponded less well to those of experts, compared to controls. 
Similarly, Halberstadt and Levine (1999) reported that self-described basketball experts were 
less likely to correctly pick winning teams, and to predict accurate margins of victory, when 
they provided reasons for their predictions, compared to participants who made spontaneous, 
“intuitive” predictions. Likewise, Halberstadt and Green (2004) found that reasoners’ 
predictions of past Olympic dives’ scores corresponded less well to the actual scores from 




Such disruptive effects are believed to occur because individuals sometimes have 
imperfect access to, or are not aware of, all the factors driving their judgment (see for a 
review Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), and thus reasoning biases them to describe and give greater 
weight to certain factors over others, such as those that are cognitively based, easily 
verbalizable, more accessible, or more subjectively plausible (e.g., Levine et al., 1996), a 
phenomenon Halberstadt and Wilson (2008) term “information shift.” Consequently, attitude 
change occurs temporarily as individuals self-persuade and base their judgments on these 
(biased) reasons, discounting other factors that may be more valuable but less likely to come 
to mind. Thus, when thinking about reasons, individuals may temporarily shift away from 
their initial judgments, particularly when attitudes are predominantly affectively based 
(Millar & Tesser, 1986) and/or are difficult to explain (Wilson et al., 1989, p. 308).  
Unconscious Thoughts 
Another line of research provides a different perspective on the arguably limited 
benefit of reasoning on judgment quality. Unconscious thought theory (UTT; Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006), inspired by Wilson and colleagues’ reasons analysis research, posits that 
while conscious thinking demands attention and is limited in its cognitive resources, 
unconscious processing, defined as “thought without attention” (p. 96), can operate outside of 
awareness, and often more efficiently, than conscious analysis (the notion that has been 
challenged by subsequent research; see Acker, 2008; Nieuwenstein et al., 2015; for a review 
Newell & Shanks, 2014). Thus, although conscious deliberation may lead to good judgments, 
it only does so when those judgments involve relatively limited information. When good 
judgments require effective processing of more complex information, “unconscious thought” 
is more suitable. Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2006), for example, found that although 
reasoners were more likely to select the best cars in simple decisions (choosing among 




(alternatives with twelve attributes) than those who were distracted from thinking about their 
decisions as they solved anagrams. They found similar results when asking participants about 
attitudes toward each car: conscious thinkers better differentiated the quality of the cars in the 
simple condition, as indicated by a larger difference in their attitudes toward the best and 
worst cars, whereas unconscious thinkers reported larger attitude discrepancy under the 
complex condition. In that paradigm, however, while reasoners are asked to deliberate on 
their justifications, they are not required to provide them explicitly, and thus it is less clear 
what information they attend to, or how they weight them (less effectively). The process is 
even more opaque for unconscious thinkers who presumably engage in their judgmental 
calculations unconsciously. Despite these ambiguities, those findings suggest important 
limitations of conscious, reasoned judgment, in terms of its bounded, less effective capability 
(Newell & Shanks, 2014).     
Heuristics  
While both lines of research above illustrate that reasoning has limited benefits, 
relative to intuitive, nonreasoned judgments, they differ in terms of the source of the 
(dis)advantages. The reasons analysis research proposes that reasoning changes attitudes and 
leads to judgmental inconsistencies because it biases the information on which individuals 
rely to inform their judgments, disrupting their chronic, default weighting scheme and 
prompting poorer, inconsistent evaluation depending on what reasons are accessible at a 
particular time. UTT has a similar take on the suboptimality of conscious analysis but 
proposes further that the unconscious processing realizes (unconsciously, of course) the 
natural and optimal weighting of different attributes and can effectively integrate complex 
and large amounts of information into a sensible summary for final judgments. One of the 




during unconscious thinking, and specifically how unconscious thought can organize and 
compute available information in memory outside of awareness.  
One possible explanation, derived from research on heuristics, is that individuals 
acquire and develop cognitive proxies that can provide quick, sufficient approximations for 
making judgments, which sometimes are even better than ones following analytical thinking 
(Damasio, 1994; Halberstadt, 2010; Slovic et al., 2002; Slovic et al., 2007). Damsio’s (1994) 
“somatic marker” account, for example, posits that individuals learn and associate decisional 
outcomes (or states of the world) with positive or negative affective responses and 
physiological states, and can use them to quickly guide their choices. In an empirical 
demonstration of such “affect heuristics,” Bechara et al. (1994) showed that patients with 
damage to their ventromedial prefrontal cortex (a brain area associated with links between 
affective responses and declarative knowledge) made worse decisions in a gambling task 
(i.e., options with immediate gains but severe delayed losses) than normal individuals. 
Bechara et al. (1997) further showed, in the same task, that normal individuals chose the 
more advantageous strategy and showed corresponding anticipatory physiological responses, 
even before they could explicitly explain reasons for their decisions, whereas patients with 
prefrontal cortex damage continued to use a disadvantageous strategy and also showed no 
anticipatory responses.  
In a similar vein, Gigerenzer (2007, 2008) has argued that “gut feelings” and other 
“fast and frugal” heuristics can lead to good judgments, because our cognitive systems 
evolved an “adaptive toolbox” that can exploit natural covariations between simple cues and 
specific outcomes in complex environment (also see Halberstadt & Wilson, 2008). Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer (2002), for example, showed that participants could correctly judge which of 
two cities has a larger population when they based their choices on the cities they recognized 




the benefits of this “recognition heuristic,” finding that people better predicted the match 
outcomes at Wimbledon 2003 when they picked players they recognized, than when they 
relied on the players’ official rankings.  
In another example of how fast-and-frugal heuristics can match, and sometimes 
exceed, the accuracy of analytic thinking, Czerlinski et al. (1999) examined the predictions 
made by the so-called “take-the-best” heuristic (i.e., choosing based on only the first cue or 
attribute that effectively discriminates between options) on 20 different issues across 
disciplines (such as  homelessness, house prices, fuel consumption, and fish fertility, among 
others) and found that judgments based on heuristics were more accurate than those predicted 
by multiple linear regression. These findings illustrate that, contrary to the classical 
assumption that good judgments require well-thought-out reasoning, reliance on quick, 
nonreasoned strategy can be effective or even superior to normative models under some 
conditions.  
Fast and frugal heuristics provide prima facie examples of how seemingly complex 
judgments need not require complex mechanisms, lending plausibility to the claim that such 
judgments might be made effectively without conscious thought and analysis. Why, however, 
would conscious reasoning impair the use of these heuristics? One possibility, according to 
Halberstadt and Wilson (2008), is that reasoning itself elicits affect, depending on what 
reasons come to mind, which can interfere with the use of the affective and experiential cues 
on which heuristics are sometimes based (the “affect disruption hypothesis”). Alternatively, 
interference may occur because people try to provide reasons that focus on “rational” 
attributes rather than affective ones, and consequently base their attitude on those more 
accessible reasons, at the expense of factors that may be less salient but more predictive of 




As a result, Halberstadt and Wilson posit, decisions and attitudes based on reasoning 
will be somewhat incompatible with affect-based decisions, including those based on a direct 
inference or a meta-cognitive interpretation of emotional reactions (also see Halberstadt, 
2010). Halberstadt and Hooton (2008), for example, showed that participants’ liking of 
abstract art corresponded well with the art’s cognitive fluency, a measure of processing ease, 
associated with positive affect (e.g., Reber et al., 2004), and indexed by the speed with which 
participants could associate an artwork with the artist who painted it. When participants 
supported their liking judgments with reasons, however, their liking of the artworks was no 
longer predicted well by such experiential information. To the extent that affective cues 
correctly predict a judgment of interest, then, reasoning will reduce accuracy. Indeed, Catty 
and Halberstadt (2008) showed that participants who reasoned were less likely to judge 
which of two songs was more popular, compared to participants who chose songs based on 
their own familiarity with them. In terms of Halberstadt and Wilson’s affect disruption 
account, this was because familiarity was an accurate heuristic cue to popularity, as popular 
songs had greater sales and more exposure, and so reasons-based interference impaired 
judgment accuracy. 
It is important to note, however, that the research reviewed above neither implies a 
general criticism of reasoning nor establishes that reasoning about attitudes and decisions 
should always be avoided. In fact, Wilson and colleagues (1989) acknowledged that whether 
reasoning is beneficial or harmful depends on other factors, including the nature of attitude 
being analyzed and the reasons that come to mind (e.g., Briñol et al., 2012). Tesser et al. 
(1978), for example, showed that people who thought about reasons for their fear of public 
speaking felt less anxious giving a speech afterwards than when they did not. In this case, 
since the attitude being disrupted is undesirable to begin with, reasoning leads to a better 




when prompted to think about their alcohol consumption (“Why do you have to drink less 
alcohol?”) than those who were not, or those merely exposed to an anti-alcohol message 
(“You have to drink less alcohol!”). More generally, the changes that reasoning produces in 
attitudes and beliefs can be dissociated from the impact of those changes, and even 
objectively erroneous judgments may, in some contexts, represent subjectively better 
outcomes (such as choices with immediate satisfaction, but long-term regret).  
Considerations about the meaning of good judgment aside, the literature reviewed 
above illustrates, at least, that the relationship between reasons and judgments is not 
monotonic and more complicated than classically assumed; providing reasons for an attitude 
does not always increase confidence in it, or necessarily improve decisions that follow. 
Reasoning, for example, can change attitudes momentarily, precipitating choices that are later 
regretted, or that correspond less well with experts’ opinions. The mechanisms of such 
disruption are not fully understood, and are likely multi-faceted. One factor appears to be 
that, contrary to the classical assumption that individuals can and do weight all plausible 
information optimally to reach the best judgments (e.g., Anderson, 1971; Montgomery, 1983; 
Slovic, 1975), reasoners tend to overweight some types of information, such as cognitive-
oriented reasons, information that is easy to verbalize or accessible at the time, and/or content 
that provides a “good story” (Wilson et al., 1989, p. 298). Moreover, reasoned attitudes and 
judgments may sometimes suffer because they strain the limits of humans’ processing 
capacity (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), or because they interfere with the reliance on other 
ecologically valid cues (e.g., heuristics and fluency) that our cognition has learned and taken 
advantage of (Damasio, 1994; Gigerenzer, 2007, 2008; Halberstadt, 2010; Halberstadt & 
Wilson, 2008).  
Perhaps the most important implication from the research reviewed is that a full 




cognitive computations. There is also a role for affective and meta-cognitive information, 
which are not usually considered in classical models (Slovic et al., 2002; Slovic et al., 2007). 
Attitudes, and the decisions that rely on them, are not only products of the supporting, or 
opposing, evidence that individuals have available; they are also the products of the affect 
and experience associated with generating or processing that information, and the meaning 
attached to them. To begin to understand the consequences of reasoning, I first consider the 
cognitive models that explain what happens when individuals consider reasons, and the 
mechanisms by which reasoning changes attitudes.  
Processing Reasons and its Influence on Judgments 
How do reasons change attitudes? Attitude change has been often described by one of 
two “dual-process” models of persuasion: The Elaboration Likelihood model (ELM, Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic-Systematic model (HSM, Chaiken et al., 1989), which 
share similar assumptions and constructs (see Petty, 1994). Both models assume that 
individuals are cognitive strategists who expend their limited cognitive resources only to the 
extent that the situation requires. For example, individuals will likely spend more cognitive 
effort to process reasons when the advocated proposition is relevant to them (e.g., Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1979), than when it is irrelevant. According to both models, depending on 
individuals’ motivation and cognitive resources, there are two different routes by which 
reasons influence attitudes: one relying on relatively effortful, deep consideration of reason 
quality, the other relying on superficial cues related to those reasons, such as the number of 
reasons and reasoners’ characteristics (also see Hogg & Vaughan, 1995). 
In the “central” (ELM) and “systematic” (HSM) routes, individuals are motivated 
and/or able to exert cognitive effort to deeply engage and scrutinize the content and quality of 
reasons, and, according to the ELM in particular, their judgments are predicted by the 




the elaboration of those reasons. When this route is employed, processing “strong” reasons – 
those that are logically sound, defensible, and difficult to counterargue – will elicit more 
positive thoughts toward a proposition, and thus will likely lead to more favorable attitudes. 
However, exposure to “weak” reasons – those based on feelings or opinions and are easy to 
counterargue – will elicit more negative thoughts, despite ostensibly supporting the 
proposition, leading to unfavorable attitudes, or even a “boomerang” effect (see e.g., Petty & 
Cacioppo, 2012). 
Though not initially described in terms of dual process models, the classic literature 
on “attitude inoculation” – a technique for building resistance to strong counter-attitudinal 
arguments by introducing individuals to weak ones with rebuttals (McGuire, 1964) – 
illustrates the important mediating effect of cognition in attitude change. McGuire and 
Papageorgis (1961), for example, demonstrated that when students were given weak reasons 
for why their commonly held attitudes (e.g., that brushing one’s teeth after every meal is 
beneficial) were wrong, they were less convinced by stronger reasons presented later, 
compared to participants not “inoculated.” Theoretically, protection comes from the 
opportunity to generate counterarguments against attitudinal challenges, an example of how 
reasons ostensibly opposed to a proposition can have the opposite effect. More recently, these 
mechanisms have been utilized, for example, in political campaigns (for a review, Compton 
& Ivanov, 2012), prevention of unhealthy behaviors (for a review, Compton et al., 2012), and 
as a counter to science denialism (e.g., Cook et al., 2017; Van der Linden et al., 2017). Cook 
and colleagues (2017), for example, presented participants with explanations of how “false-
balance” media coverage – presenting mainstream scientific perspectives on anthropogenic 
global warming (AGW) together with contrarian scientists’ views – can be misleading, before 
exposing them to misinformation on AGW. The researchers found that inoculation mitigated 




those who were not inoculated (though only for political conservatives). These findings again 
illustrate how reasons, even in favor of a proposition, do not have a straightforward, 
monotonic effect on attitude change, and understanding the relation between evidence, 
attitudes, and judgments requires understanding the cognitive mediators of the reasoning 
process. 
Reasons, however, are not always processed in terms of their validity. According to 
both the ELM and the HSM, when cognitive resources are compromised and/or motivation is 
low, individuals are less likely to consider reasons’ content, and more likely to employ 
heuristics and other quick, superficial cues to evaluate the implications of the reasons for 
their attitudes. Thus, the influence of reasons in the “peripheral” (ELM) and “heuristic” 
(HSM) routes depends primarily not on their content, but on the presence or absence of 
superficial, persuasive cues, such as the persuader’s attractiveness (e.g., Pallak et al., 1983; 
Puckett et al., 1983), expertise (e.g., Hovland et al., 1953; Petty et al., 1981), likability (e.g., 
Petty et al., 1983), and number of reasons presented (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). This type 
of processing is exploited, for example, by television commercials, which, due to their cost, 
have limited time for quality argumentation, and instead rely on simple cues (e.g., by using 
attractive, likeable models, see Agrawal & Kamakura, 1995; Choi et al., 2005). Political 
propaganda, especially negative attacks, also rely on easily remembered, heuristic cues, such 
as discrediting advertisements (e.g., Lariscy & Tinkham, 1999) and ad hominem arguments 
(e.g., Walton, 2000). 
As mentioned above, the motivation and ability to process reasons are central to the 
dual process models’ continuum, and there are several individual differences that determine 
which processing route is more likely, such as personal relevance (e.g., Grayson & Schwarz, 
1999; Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998), 




al., 1992), attitude extremity (Haddock et al., 1999; Haddock, 2000), personal interest 
(Haddock, 2002), and Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), among others. For 
example, Petty and Cacioppo (1979) presented undergraduate students with either strong or 
weak reasons why comprehensive exams – a policy that requires senior undergraduate 
students to pass a general exam, on top of completing their individual courses, in their major 
area before they can graduate – should be instituted at either a distant university (low 
personal relevance) or at their own university (high personal relevance). The results showed 
that participants in the high personal relevance condition reported elaborating more on the 
reasons and, in line with central processing predictions, were more persuaded by strong than 
weak reasons, compared to those in the low personal relevance condition. 
In sum, according to the most popular dual-process models of attitude change, the 
impact of reasoning on judgments depends on the extent to which individuals utilize their 
cognitive resources. When individuals are motivated and able to carefully attend and 
elaborate on reasons, their judgments are based on elicited cognitive outputs. Consequently, 
“good” reasons should produce positive attitude change, while “bad” reasons should produce 
counter-attitudinal change, even if the reasons are ostensibly supporting a proposition. In 
contrast, when individuals are unwilling and/or unable to devote cognitive resources to 
processing the reasons, attitude change depends on superficial information, rather than the 
validity of the reasons themselves. 
Beyond Reasons: Subjective Experience of Difficulty in Reasoning 
While these well-established dual-process models explain the attitude change in terms 
of the characteristics of incoming information, and an individual’s ability and motivation to 
process it, a more recent approach has been to consider also the subjective experience of that 
individual (see Bless & Forgas, 2000). For example, any cognitive or social task is associated 




metacognitive feeling of difficulty has been shown to inform judgments (see Schwarz, 1998, 
2004, 2018).  
The idea that subjective experience serves as a source of information in judgments 
was first introduced in the modern psychological literature via Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1973) work on the “availability heuristic.” In a series of studies, they demonstrated that 
individuals estimated the frequency or probability of an event by relying on “the ease with 
which instances or associations come to mind” (p. 208). For example, in their Study 3, 
participants overestimated the frequency of words starting with the letter “r” and 
underestimated the number of words with r in the third position, presumably because they 
found it more difficult to generate words that have that letter in the third position than words 
beginning with that letter. In another study, participants were presented with two lists of 
names of known personalities, one with 19 famous men and 20 less famous women and 
another with 19 famous women and 20 less famous men. Participants erroneously judged that 
the first list had more men and the second list more women, presumably because less famous 
names on each list were difficult to recall.  
These findings are thought to reflect that individuals consider the ease with which 
information comes to mind when estimating frequency. However, there are in fact two types 
of evidence, and sources, of “ease” in this paradigm – the amount of information recalled and 
subjective experience of recalling it – and because they are confounded, the underlying 
mechanism of the availability heuristic in these early studies is unclear (Schwarz et al., 1991; 
Schwarz, 2004). That is, because recall feels easy when many instances of the to-be-recalled 
category are available (and vice versa), reliance on “ease”, the feeling state, makes the same 
predictions as reliance on the accessible information itself. For example, in Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973)’s Study 3, described above, fewer words that have r in the third position 




as Schwarz (2004) has argued, “renders it difficult to determine whether the obtained 
estimates of frequency, likelihood, or typicality are based on individual’s recall experiences 
or on a biased sample of recalled information” (p. 88). 
Schwarz et al. (1991) attempted to resolve this ambiguity by pitting the two sources of 
information against each other. The researchers asked participants to generate either six or 
twelve instances of their assertive or unassertive behaviors, and then to rate their level of 
assertiveness. In this paradigm, if participants rely on the content of their recall, they should 
rate themselves as more assertive after generating twelve than six instances of assertiveness 
(because there is twice as much evidence for their assertiveness), but if they rely on the 
experience of recalling those instances, the reverse should be true (because it is more difficult 
to generate twelve than six instances of behavior). In fact, Schwarz and colleagues found that 
participants rated themselves as less assertive after generating twelve instances of their 
assertiveness (and more assertive after generating twelve instances of unassertiveness), than 
when generating six, supporting the experiential interpretation of the availability heuristic. 
Subsequent research has replicated and extended this “ease of retrieval” effect to other 
judgment domains, including frequency estimates (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999), attitudes 
(Briñol et al., 2006; Haddock, 2002; Haddock et al., 1999; Haddock et al., 1996; Tormala et 
al., 2002; Wänke et al., 1996), product evaluation (Wänke & Bless, 2000; Wänke et al., 
1997), risk assessment (Grayson & Schwarz, 1999; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998), and 
religious belief (Jackson et al., 2017; Preston & Epley, 2005), among others. For example, 
Aarts and Dijksterhuis (1999, Study 1) asked Dutch students to list three versus eight 
instances of their bicycle usage and found that participants estimated more frequent bicycle 
usage after generating three, than after generating eight instances. Of particular relevance in 
the current context, Haddock et al. (1996) found that participants reported more positive 




arguments, and less positive attitudes after generating three versus seven opposing 
arguments. The effect holds even when participants do not explicitly verbalize their reasons; 
Wänke et al. (1997) presented participants with different advertisements for luxury cars 
(BMW and Mercedes) and prompted them to imagine either one or ten reasons to justify 
choosing a particular car. They found that participants reported more positive attitudes 
toward a target car when prompted to think of one reason to choose it, than to think of ten 
reasons.  
Together, these studies suggest that although generating (presumably good) reasons to 
support a proposition (e.g., I am assertive; BMW is better than Mercedes) will tend to 
increase support for the proposition, the reasoners’ experience of generating those reasons 
needs to be taken into account. When generating reasons for a proposition feels difficult, 
individuals reduce their support for it, despite having more evidence in favor of it (see 
Schwarz, 1998, 2004, 2018). These findings provide a counterpoint to the classical 
assumption that individuals monotonically hold beliefs to the extent they can generate good 
reasons for them, discussed above, suggesting a possible boundary beyond which reasoning 
becomes counterproductive. 
Reason Quality 
The previous section illustrated, at least under some conditions, how individuals will 
rely not only the quantity of evidence for a proposition, but also on the effort expended to 
acquire that evidence. However, there is yet another potential confound of both sources of 
attitudinal influence: as individuals bring to mind more information, and assuming that they 
bring the best evidence to mind first (e.g., Silvera et al., 2002; see Wänke, 2013, p. 160), the 
quality of retrieved information should decline. If so, when reasoning about a proposition, 
later-generated reasons should tend to be less valid reasons, which could influence judgments 




and therefore weighted more heavily than earlier, better reasons (i.e., a recency effect, e.g., 
Insko, 1964). Second, the addition of specious reasons could reduce the evidentiary impact of 
cogent ones by weakening the implications of those reasons, or simply by reducing the 
overall average quality of the reasons (i.e., a dilution effect, Nisbett et al., 1981). Assuming 
that individuals consider the quality of reasons in their judgments, through either mechanism, 
the addition of weaker reasons should produce counter-attitudinal change, in the same 
direction as effects of subjective difficulty. This possibility makes it difficult to determine if 
the “ease of retrieval” effect is due to reliance on experienced difficulty, or consideration of 
the quality of the evidence.  
Other researchers have noted this ambiguity, and some have tried to address it (e.g., 
Briñol et al., 2006; Hansen & Wänke, 2008; Schwarz et al., 1991; Tormala et al., 2007; 
Tormala et al., 2002; Wänke et al., 1996; Weick & Guinote, 2008). For example, Schwarz et 
al. (1991, Study 1) asked two independent judges to rate the extremity (and therefore, they 
reasoned, the typicality) of the last two behavioral instances from five randomly selected 
participants in each condition (i.e., generating assertive or unassertive behavior). In a more 
thorough test, Wänke and colleagues (1996) asked participants to generate three or seven 
reasons, either in support of or against the use of public transportation, while a second, yoked 
group, read those reasons and rated their quality. In another version, Briñol et al. (2006) 
asked two external judges to rate the quality of four reasons against comprehensive exams, 
which students generated under easy, “fluent” conditions (black text on a white background) 
or difficult, disfluent conditions (pink text on a yellow background). None of these studies 
reported differences in judged quality of reasons between the easy and difficult conditions, 





However, the fact that judges perceive reasons generated by participants as equivalent 
in quality does not mean that the participants themselves view them this way. Most obviously, 
participants are committed to the validity of their own reasons in ways that external judges 
are not, which likely affect the perceived quality of the reasons they offer. For example, 
people remembered their own reasons better, and rated them as more original (Greenwald, 
1968) and compelling (Greenwald & Albert, 1968), compared to those of others. They were 
also more persuaded by reasons they themselves generated than by reasons encountered 
passively (e.g., via reading or listening, Watts, 1967). Therefore, judges’ perceived reason 
quality does not necessarily correspond with the perceptions of participants themselves 
(Shafir et al., 1993), and it is the latter that is relevant to predicting the effect of those reasons 
on participants’ judgments. 
In sum, research on the ease of retrieval effect generally treats accessible information 
and subjective experience as two alternative, competing factors predicting attitudes and 
judgments, but their relative influence is complicated by an additional co-variate: as more 
evidence or reasons for a proposition are generated or recalled, the quality of that information 
may decline. The first goal of this thesis, therefore, is to investigate whether participants’ 
reasons indeed decline in (self-perceived) quality as more reasons are generated, and to 
consider the explanatory role of reason quality, in parallel with experiential difficulty, on 
attitude judgments. If, as predicted, subjective quality declines as evidence accumulates, this 
effect poses an interesting question about the benefits of adding more information to support 
one’s attitude: extra evidence may create diminishing, and eventually, declining, returns. I 
address these issues in Chapter 2. 
Difficulty and Quality: A Causal Relationship? 
To make matters more complicated, several lines of evidence suggest that the 




more of several mechanisms. First, according to the ELM, the assessment of reason validity 
in persuasive messages depends on individuals’ ability, and motivation, to scrutinize it, and 
so the experienced difficulty of generating or processing reasons might disrupt the efficacy of 
that assessment. This account, of course, assumes that reason processing, and hence 
elaboration, is possible. (One can imagine exceptional cases where people are not able to 
scrutinize reasons at all, even if they are motivated to do so, such as when the reasons are 
written in a language they do not understand.) Several previous studies that manipulate 
processing difficulty independent of reason content (e.g., via reduced readability or enhanced 
complexity of text) have reported findings consistent with a reduced ability to discriminate 
reason quality (e.g., Chebat et al., 2003; Eagly, 1974; see Petty & Cacioppo, 2012, p. 76; 
Petty et al., 1976; Regan & Cheng, 1973). For example, Petty and colleagues (1976) 
presented university students with pretested strong and weak reasons supporting a tuition 
increase (Study 1) and a tuition decrease (Study 2), while manipulating distraction (by 
flashing the letter “X” on the computer screen). Distracted participants reported fewer 
positive thoughts about strong reasons, as well as fewer negative thoughts about weak 
reasons, compared to controls. 
Second, a different line of research suggests the opposite effect: difficulty might 
heighten an individual’s ability and/or motivation to think of and attend to reasons, because 
difficulty signals that more careful information processing (i.e., the central/systematic route) 
is required (e.g., Alter et al., 2007; Hernandez & Preston, 2013; Song & Schwarz, 2008; 
Yang et al., 2013). For example, Alter et al. (2007, Study 2) presented participants with a 
fake review of a new MP3 player, containing either highly relevant (e.g., price) or irrelevant 
(e.g., popularity with celebrities) features, together with either a picture of a competent-
looking or incompetent-looking person presenting them. When the review was written in a 




indicating reliance on more careful processing. In contrast, when the review was written in a 
fluent, easy-to-read font, participants preferred the MP3 player reviewed by the competent-
looking presenter. If the difficulty of associated with reasoning prompts more systematic and 
effortful consideration of the reasons, quality should become a more important factor in 
judgment. 
Third, rather than affecting the way reasons are processed, experiential difficulty 
might serve as a heuristic cue directly via a misattribution of fluency-related affect. The 
adverse effects of difficult processing are evident in the literature on cognitive fluency (for 
reviews, see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Oppenheimer, 2008). For example, Oppenheimer 
(2006) asked participants to read and evaluate essays (e.g., personal statements for graduate 
school admission) written with either simple or complex vocabularies. The researchers found 
that participants judged the authors of the essays to be less intelligent, and gave the essays 
lower ratings, when they were difficult versus easy to read. In a modified version of the ease 
of retrieval paradigm, Wänke and Bless (2000) presented participants with an advertisement 
containing features of a coffeemaker, and then asked to recall these features with an aid of 
helpful or unhelpful cues (an easy or difficult task, respectively). They found that even 
though participants had already seen all the features earlier in the study, participants rated 
them as less convincing when they were difficult to recall than when they were easy.  
In sum, these findings provide support for the notion that experience of difficulty may 
causally influence the perceived quality of reasons. However, as Wänke and Bless (2000) 
concluded, “despite the considerable evidence…, the exact nature of this causality has not 
been sufficiently investigated” (p. 159). Thus, the second goal of the thesis is to examine 
whether and how difficulty might influence the perception of reason quality, which I address 





Conditions for Mechanisms of Difficulty-driven Reason Quality 
The previous sections outlined three mechanisms by which the experience of 
difficulty might influence the perception of reason quality. In theory, these mechanisms are 
not mutually exclusive, but the likelihood of their operation will depend on a number of 
factors. Considering the situations under which each should operate, then, may help clarify 
how and when attitudes will change under difficult processing conditions.  
First, if difficulty interferes with the extent to which individuals can elaborate on 
reason quality, preventing appropriate spontaneous thought generation (e.g., Petty et al., 
1976), the disruptive effect should depend on how motivated individuals are to assess reason 
quality. As reviewed above, the ELM posits that the likelihood of elaboration depends on 
reasoners’ ability and motivation to process reasons. Petty et al. (1980), for example, showed 
that motivation dictates the extent of reason elaboration, and hence thought production. The 
researchers led participants to believe that they were either the only person (high personal 
responsibility) or one of the ten people (low personal responsibility) responsible for 
evaluating strong, mixed, or weak reasons supporting comprehensive exams, and found that 
participants put more effort into reason evaluation when participants’ responsibility was high 
(high motivation), compared to when their responsibility was low, resulting in more favorable 
(unfavorable) thoughts elicited from strong (weak) reasons, respectively. Thus, the extent to 
which difficulty disrupts elaboration and reduces spontaneous thought production might be 
reduced when reasoners are more motivated.  
In contrast, if difficulty serves directly as a judgmental cue (Alter & Oppenheimer, 
2009) or indirectly as a signal that greater scrutiny is required (Alter et al., 2007), its effect on 
perceived reason quality and subsequent judgments should be conditioned on its perceived 
informational value (for a review, see Schwarz & Clore, 2007). For example, in a 




music while listing the instances of their assertive or unassertive behaviors. They 
manipulated the diagnostic value of difficulty by informing participants that this music either 
helped facilitate the recall of their assertive behaviors or the recall of their unassertive 
behaviors. When participants could attribute reasoning difficulty to the alleged impact of 
music, they no longer relied on their experience to inform their judgments. In another study, 
Rothman and Schwarz (1998) asked male participants with or without a family history of 
heart disease to list either three or eight instances of their behaviors that increase or reduce 
their risk of heart disease, and then to rate their own risk. They found that participants 
without a family history of heart disease reported higher vulnerability when generating three 
instances of risk-inducing behaviors than eight instances, but lower vulnerability when 
generating three risk-reducing behaviors than eight, indicating reliance on an experiential 
cue. In contrast, the opposite pattern was found for participants with a family history of heart 
disease, presumably because they were more motivated to attend to and rely on their recall 
instances and thus the subjective experience of recall was less informative to them. In sum, 
different conditions foster, and potentially reveal, different causal relationships among 
difficulty, quality, and attitudes. A third goal of this thesis is, therefore, to further examine if 
and how the relationship between difficulty and perceived reason quality influences 
subsequent judgments and the condition(s) in which this causality occurs. I address these 
issues in Chapter 4. 
The Structure of the Thesis 
In sum, the primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationships between 
experiential and cognitive factors in reasoned attitudes, as well as the conditions under which 
they influence judgments. Building on the influential work on the availability heuristic 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and the ease of retrieval effect (Schwarz et al., 1991), Chapter 




reasons declines. I present three studies to examine the covariation between experiential 
difficulty of generating reasons and perceived reason quality and consider their independent 
impacts on attitude judgment. To foreshadow: I find that self-perceived reason quality 
declines as more reasons are required for individuals to justify their belief, and also that 
quality, rather than self-perceived difficulty, uniquely predicts attitudes. 
In Chapter 3 I conduct two studies to examine the possible causal relationship 
between difficulty and perceived quality, drawing predictions from the ELM (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986) and research on cognitive fluency (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; 
Oppenheimer, 2008). I attempt to circumvent the unavoidable dependency among the number 
of reasons, experienced difficulty, and perceived reason quality in the typical ease of retrieval 
paradigm by inducing experiential difficulty via language complexity (Oppenheimer, 2006) – 
a manipulation commonly used in fluency research. I find that difficulty in reason processing 
interferes with cognitive elaboration, thereby presumably disrupting the elicited positive and 
negative thoughts, and consequently participants’ ability to differentiate good and bad 
reasons. 
Chapter 4 builds on these results and investigates the cascading effect of this causal 
relationship between difficulty and reason quality onto attitude change, as well as further tests 
a potential moderator – motivation – that influences the emergence of this difficulty-driven 
effect. The results are consistent with those from Chapter 3: difficulty impaired judgments of 
reason quality and subsequent attitude change, presumably via a thought disruption 
mechanism, but only when motivation was relatively low. 
In Chapter 5, I apply the insights discovered in previous chapters to examine the 
practical implications of these reason-related effects on a criterion of decision quality: 
subjective satisfaction. I predict that although research suggests that people tend to become 




Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002), this effect would be reversed when people struggle 
to provide reasons for their decisions, as a result of subjective difficulty and/or poor reason 
quality. The results partially supported this prediction and showed that people found it more 
difficult to explain more reasons than they were initially inclined to, and that they perceived 
those reasons as worse, despite generating more supportive reasons overall, than when they 
could freely reason about their choice. Furthermore, although reasoners were more satisfied 
with their decisions after freely explaining them, compared to those who did not reason, their 
satisfaction did not increase further after being asked to generate further reasons, though it 
did not decrease (as predicted) relative to free reasoners or controls.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, I summarize the findings from Chapters 2 - 5, discuss their 
implications, and consider the applications of these findings and how they might, in turn, 
influence how individuals utilize reasoning. I also discuss the scope of limitations and 
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Chapter 2: Too Much Information! The Interplay of Argument Quality and Subjective 
Difficulty in Attitude Judgment 



























Paradoxically, people sometimes express less extreme attitudes after generating more 
supporting arguments, a phenomenon usually attributed to the subjective difficulty of 
generating those arguments. We propose, however, that generating too many arguments 
compromises their evidentiary quality, which also causes attitude change, independent of 
difficulty. In Studies 1 (N = 220) and 2 (N = 111), Mechanical Turk participants generated 
twelve arguments supporting social issues. The results showed that, as more arguments were 
generated, the time and difficulty of generating them increased, but the self-perceived 
argument quality also declined, and although both correlated with attitudes, only argument 
quality uniquely predicted attitudes. Study 3 (N = 329) applied these insights to the “ease-of-
retrieval paradigm,” showing that attitude change associated with generating twelve (versus 
three) arguments was mediated by argument quality, not difficulty. The results show how 
reasoning involves an interplay of cognitive and metacognitive dynamics that produce self-
generated attitude change in counterintuitive ways. 






There is hardly a more fundamental social psychological question than the origin of 
beliefs and attitudes. How does one decide, for example, that assisted suicide is good or bad, 
that one is assertive, or that God exists? Normative models, not to mention common sense, 
implicate the number and quality of reasons for a proposition (Bem, 1972; Higgins, 1989; 
Maddux & Rogers, 1980; Pelham et al., 1994): one favors assisted suicide to the extent that 
one has (or can generate) good arguments that assisted suicide is a good idea.   
As so often happens, however, humans do not always conform to normative 
expectations: people sometimes report less support for a proposition after generating reasons 
supporting it. In the seminal demonstration of this paradox, Schwarz et al. (1991) found that 
participants rated themselves as less assertive after generating twelve (versus six) instances of 
their assertiveness. The researchers attributed the effect to the role of subjective experience. 
Retrieving twelve assertive behaviors feels (and is) difficult, and participants inferred from 
this difficulty that they were relatively unassertive, compared to participants in the six-
instance condition, who found the task easier. Subsequent research has replicated and 
extended this “ease of retrieval effect” to other judgment domains, including attitudes (e.g., 
Briñol et al., 2006; Haddock, 2002), product evaluations (Wänke & Bless, 2000; Wänke et 
al., 1997), and risk assessments (Grayson & Schwarz, 1999; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998), 
among others.  
There is another explanation, however, for these effects: to the extent that retrieving 
many arguments is difficult, it is possible that, as the number of retrieved arguments 
increases, the evidentiary quality of those arguments decreases, possibly because participants 
are forced to invent and include new, ill-considered, and less convincing arguments for their 
beliefs (see also Schwarz, 1998, 2004). Furthermore, there are (at least) two possible 
mechanisms by which those later-generated, less persuasive arguments could systematically 




beliefs are queried, and therefore weighted more heavily than earlier, better arguments (i.e., a 
recency effect, e.g., Insko, 1964). Second, the addition of poor quality arguments could 
reduce the evidentiary impact of high quality ones by weakening the implications of those 
high quality arguments, or simply by dragging down the average quality of the arguments as 
a whole (i.e., a dilution effect, Nisbett et al., 1981). Through either mechanism, a reasoner’s 
support for an attitudinal position would change due to the perceived quality of the arguments 
for an issue, rather than (or in addition to) the difficulty involved in generating them, per se.  
Several studies have attempted to rule out such “content” effects in the ease of 
retrieval paradigm by establishing the quality of participants’ arguments using independent 
judges (Briñol et al., 2006; Hansen & Wänke, 2010; Schwarz et al., 1991; Tormala et al., 
2007; Tormala et al., 2002; Wänke et al., 1996; Weick & Guinote, 2008). For example, 
Wänke and colleagues (1996) asked participants to generate 3 or 7 reasons, either in support 
of or against the use of public transportation, while a second, yoked group, read those reasons 
and rated their quality. In another version, Briñol et al. (2006) asked two external judges to 
rate the quality of four reasons against comprehensive exams, which students generated under 
easy conditions (black text on a white background) or difficult conditions (pink text on a 
yellow background). Neither number of reasons generated nor manipulated difficulty 
detectably affected the judged quality of the arguments.  
However, the fact that judges rate participants’ arguments, generated under easy and 
difficult conditions, as equivalent in quality, does not mean that the participants themselves 
view them this way, and there are a number of reasons why participants’ perceptions of 
quality would differ from observers, especially when they self-generate the arguments. Most 
obviously, participants are committed to the validity of their own arguments in a way that 
observers are not, which might affect the perceived quality of the arguments they offer. For 




compared to those of others (Greenwald, 1968). They are also more persuaded by arguments 
they self-generate than by arguments received passively (e.g., via reading or listening; Watts, 
1967). 
Only two studies have considered participants’ perceptions of the quality of their own 
arguments in the ease of retrieval paradigm: Haddock et al. (1996) and Haddock et al. (1999). 
In both studies, researchers asked participants to rate the quality of their last two arguments 
(of either three or seven arguments), supporting or opposing their attitude toward doctor-
assisted suicide. In both, although the ease of retrieval effect was observed, the self-perceived 
quality of the last two arguments did not differ between the three-argument and seven-
argument conditions. However, this analysis rules out content effects only if (1) participants’ 
last two arguments, and no other arguments, influence their final reported attitude; and (2) if 
the manipulation does not affect the quality of other arguments generated; both are untested 
assumptions. It is also possible, for example, that participants who anticipate having to 
provide a lengthy justification for their attitudes, list weaker ideas first, or that the different 
cognitive demands of the task change the way early and later arguments are weighted (e.g., a 
recency effect).   
In sum, while arguments become increasingly difficult to retrieve and generate in the 
ease of retrieval paradigm, the fact that their difficulty likely co-varies with their evidentiary 
quality has left the relative contribution of these two sources of information unclear. The goal 
of the current studies was to map, for the first time, the relationship between the number and 
perceived quality of arguments (Studies 1 and 2), and to examine the relative contributions of 
subjective experience and evidentiary quality to the attitudes participants subsequently report 
(Study 3). We predicted a linear increase in the difficulty of generating arguments (measured 




quality, as a function of argument number. We make no a priori prediction about the relative 




Two hundred and twenty residents of the United States completed the study via 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (M age = 37.46, SD age = 10.34; 112 females, 107 males, 1 other). 
All participants had a history of providing good-quality responses (i.e., had MTurk approval 
rate > 99%). Data from participants who did not complete the entire study were discarded 
prior to all analyses. The sample size was determined by requirements of a second, unrelated, 
study, which was run at the same time, but subsequent sensitivity analyses, reported below, 
confirmed that the studies were sufficiently powered. 
Procedure  
All participants were informed of our interest in their ability “to generate arguments 
for or against [your] belief.” They were randomly presented with one of three propositions: 
“Assisted suicide should be legalized” (as in Haddock et al., 1996; Haddock et al., 1999); 
“Single-sex schools are good for education”; and “Social media does more harm than good.” 
All participants first indicated their agreement with the statement (Yes or No), and then were 
asked to provide 12 arguments in support of the statement (i.e., regardless of their agreement 
with it). Thus, participants generated de facto pro- or counter-attitudinal arguments, 
depending on whether the generated arguments were congruent with their initial agreement 
with the proposition (cf. Clark & Wegener, 2013). 
Next, participants were presented with their own arguments, verbatim, in a random 
order, and were asked to rate the quality of each argument, using a 9-point scale anchored at 




generating each of their arguments was also recorded as a proxy for the idiosyncratic 
difficulty of generating it. At the end of experiment, participants answered a few questions to 
assess data quality (e.g., “Did you honestly answer the questions in this survey?”) before 
being debriefed. 
Results 
Thirty-four participants were excluded from the analyses, 33 who did not pass the 
data quality check and/or failed to generate 12 arguments, and 1 who took the survey twice 
(only the second response was excluded), leaving 186 participants (M age = 37.37, SD age = 
10.32; 93 females, 92 males, 1 other) for analysis. The number of participants reasoning 
about each social issue and their initial agreement appear in Table 1. For ease of analysis and 
interpretation, participants’ quality ratings were binned into four quartiles of three 
arguments1. Quality ratings were analyzed in a 4 (Argument quartile: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th) × 3 
(Issue: “Single-sex School”, “Social Media”, or “Assisted Suicide”) × 2 (Argument 
congruency: Pro-attitudinal versus Counter-attitudinal) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with 
the first factor treated as a repeated measure. Mauchly’s test indicated a violation of the 
assumption of sphericity, χ2(5) = 22.38, p < .001, and the degrees of freedom were 
consequently corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates (ε = 0.92). Results revealed a 
main effect of issue, F(2, 180) = 5.98, p = .003, partial η2 = .06, reflecting differential 
argument quality across the three propositions. A main effect of argument congruency was 
also observed, F(1, 180) = 5.91, p = .016, partial η2 = .03. However, these main effects were 
conditioned on a significant interaction between argument congruency and issue, F(2, 180) = 
5.28, p = .006, partial η2 = .06. Pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction in turn 
 
1 Binning has the added benefit of reducing error variance (e.g., there is likely little 
meaningful variance between a participant’s 7th argument and their 8th argument). The results 
remain qualitatively unchanged when the data was analyzed using a linear mixed-effects 





revealed that participants who agreed that “assisted suicide should be legalized” thought the 
arguments they generated for that proposition were of higher quality than those who 
disagreed with it (Mean difference = 1.68, p < .001); arguments generated for the other 
propositions did not differ as a function of argument congruency (see Table 1).  
Of most relevance to our hypotheses, the results showed a predicted effect of 
argument quartile, F(2.75, 495.54) = 13.65, p < .001, partial η2 = .07, which did not interact 
with any other variable. Follow-up polynomial contrasts clarified that the trend was linear, 
F(1, 180) = 29.03, p < .001, partial η2 = .14, such that participants consistently judged later-
generated arguments as worse than earlier-generated ones (Figure 1a). A sensitivity analysis 
performed in G-Power (Erdfelder et al., 1996) indicated that our design permitted the 
detection of a minimum effect size of partial η2 = .01 (assuming N = 186, α = .05, power = 
.80, a correlation among repeated measures of .61 (the smallest and most conservative 
correlation among the four quartiles), and a nonsphericity correction (ε) of .92), suggesting 
















Descriptive Statistics of Argument Quality Depending on Each Social Issue and their Initial 
Agreement 
  Argument Quality 
Social Issue Argument Congruency M SD n 
Assisted suicide should be legalized Pro-attitudinal 7.11 1.30 41 
 Counter-attitudinal 5.43 2.34 19 
Single-sex schools are good for education Pro-attitudinal 6.50 1.21 17 
 Counter-attitudinal 5.96 2.03 39 
Social media does more harm than good Pro-attitudinal 7.01 1.49 48 
 Counter-attitudinal 7.34 1.23 22 
 
A similar analytic approach was taken with argument generation times. Mauchly’s 
test again failed to confirm the assumption of sphericity, χ2(5) = 13.66, p = .018, and degrees 
of freedom were again corrected (ε = 0.95). The only significant result was a main effect of 
argument quartile, F(2.84, 511.99) = 12.12, p < .001, partial η2 = .06. Follow-up polynomial 
contrasts again revealed a linear effect, F(1, 180) = 31.82, p < .001, partial η2 = .15, as well as 
a weaker quadratic effect, F(1, 180) = 4.42, p = .037, partial η2 = .02 (Figure 1b). Independent 
of issue or argument congruency, participants spent more time generating later arguments 
than earlier ones. A sensitivity analysis indicated power to detect a minimum effect size of 
partial η2 = .01 (with N = 186, α = .05, power = .80, a correlation among repeated measures 






Argument Quality Ratings and Argument Generation Time as a Function of Argument 
Quartile and Argument Congruency in Study 1 
 
Note. Error bars show standard errors. 
In sum, the subjective quality of participants’ arguments for all three propositions 
declined as they generated more arguments, independent of participants’ initial agreement 
toward them. Although not the main focus of our studies, there was evidence for a bias 
toward attitude-congruent arguments only for the issue of assisted suicide, such that pro-
attitudinal arguments were judged as better than counter-attitudinal arguments (as in Haddock 
et al., 1999). However, this effect should be interpreted with caution as the related sample 
size was small and unevenly distributed. Finally, there was evidence for the increasing 
difficulty of later-generated arguments, which took longer to generate than early arguments, 







Study 2 was designed to replicate the relationships among argument order, subjective 
quality, and difficulty – with two important additions. First, as a convergent, and arguably 
more relevant measure of difficulty, participants were asked to self-report how difficult it was 
for them to generate each argument (argument generation times were measured as well). 
Second, after providing their subjective difficulty and quality judgments, participants rated 
their current attitude toward the topic, allowing us to partial out the effects of the two 
predictors. This design also permits a preliminary test of how the quality of later-generated 
arguments might influence attitudes. Two accounts were considered. First, participants may 
weight later arguments more heavily than earlier arguments (i.e., a recency effect), because 
they are more accessible at the time of judgment (e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991; Schwarz, 1998). 
Second, individuals may give equal weight to all generated arguments (Nisbett et al., 1981, p. 
274), such that the average quality of arguments declines as more arguments are added (a 
dilution effect).  
Method 
Participants  
One hundred and eleven residents of the United States completed the study via 
Mechanical Turk (M age = 35.21, SD age = 10.69; 44 females, 66 males, 1 “other”). All 
participants had a history of providing high-quality responses (MTurk approval rate > 99%). 
Data from participants who did not complete the entire study were discarded prior to all 
analyses. The sample size was based on our laboratory’s minimum standard of 100 per 
condition (also see https://sometimesimwrong.typepad.com/wrong/2014/10/open-letter-to-
editors.html), but exceeded the sample size required to detect Study 1’s within-participant 
effect, based on a priori power analysis. 





The procedure was similar to that of Study 1, except where indicated. As in that study, 
participants first indicated their agreement (Yes or No) with a proposition supporting assisted 
suicide (given similar results across issues in Study 1, only one issue was used), and then 
listed 12 arguments supporting the proposition, regardless of their initial agreement. 
Participants were then presented with their own arguments in separate random orders, first 
evaluating “how difficult it was to generate” each argument, using a 9-point scale anchored at 
“extremely easy” and “extremely difficult”, and then how “good” each argument was, as in 
Study 1. Next, participants rated their agreement with the proposition using a 9-point scale 
anchored at 1 (“strongly disagree”), 5 (“neither agree nor disagree”), and 9 (“strongly 
agree”). As additional, exploratory measures, participants answered two general questions 
asking “overall” how difficult they found argument generation, and the quality of those 
arguments, using the scales described above (the data were not analyzed as part of this study). 
Finally, participants answered two questions to assess data quality: “Did you honestly answer 
the questions in this survey?” and “Were you instructed to provide reasons in support of, or 
against, the claim?”.  
Results 
Eighteen participants were excluded from the analyses, 16 who either failed the data 
quality checks or failed to generate 12 arguments, and 1 who provided arguments against 
assisted suicide, rather than in favor of it, and 1 who participated twice (only their second 
responses were excluded). Thus, 93 participants (M age = 35.80, SD age = 11.17; 41 females, 
51 males, 1 other) were included in the analyses. As in Study 1, the majority of participants 
(n = 73) initially supported the proposition. 
Subjective argument quality ratings, argument generation time, and the new measure 




(argument congruency) ANOVAs, with the first factor treated as a repeated measure2. All 
three analyses revealed main effects of both variables, and no interactions (Fs < 1). 
Replicating Study 1, there was a main effect of argument quartile on subjective quality 
ratings, F(3, 273) = 9.14, p < .001, partial η2 = .09. A sensitivity analysis for this effect 
indicated a minimum detectable effect size of partial η2 = .02 (assuming a correlation among 
repeated measures of .47 and ε = 1.00). Follow-up polynomial contrasts revealed that 
participants judged their arguments to be of poorer quality as a linear function of the quartile 
in which they were generated, F(1, 91) = 22.96, p < .001, partial η2 = .20 (Figure 2a). Also, 
participants generating pro-attitudinal arguments (i.e., those who were initially in favor of 
assisted suicide) judged their own arguments to be of higher quality than did participants 
generating counter-attitudinal arguments, F(1, 91) = 27.97, p < .001, partial η2 = .24. There 
was no nonlinear component in any of the analyses reported in this section. 
An analysis of argument generation times was also consistent with the results in Study 
1, with a main effect of argument quartile, F(2.61, 237.90) = 5.35, p = .002, partial η2 = .06. 
A sensitivity analysis indicated a minimum detectable effect size of partial η2 = .01 (assuming 
a correlation among repeated measures of .60 and ε = .87). Follow-up polynomial contrasts 
revealed a significant linear trend, F(1, 91) = 10.21, p = .002, partial η2 = .10; participants 
spent increasingly more time generating later arguments (Figure 2b). Participants also spent 
more time generating arguments against, than in support of, their initial attitude position, F(1, 
91) = 10.17, p = .002, partial η2 = .10.  
For the analysis of subjective difficulty, there was a significant argument quartile 
effect, F(3, 273) = 36.98, p < .001, partial η2 = .29. A sensitivity analysis indicated a 
minimum detectable effect size of partial η2 = .02 (assuming a correlation among repeated 
 
2 Like Study 1, all the results were similar when the data was analyzed using a linear mixed-





measures of .47 and ε = 1.00). Follow-up polynomial contrasts revealed a significant linear 
trend, F(1, 91) = 88.80, p < .001, partial η2 = .49, such that it was increasingly difficult to 
generate arguments (Figure 2c). There was also an argument congruency effect, F(1, 91) = 
7.18, p = .009, partial η2 = .07. Consistent with the time participant used to generate 
arguments, participants found it subjectively more difficult to generate arguments against, 
than in support of, their initial attitude. 
Figure 2 
Argument Quality Ratings, Argument Generation Time and Subjective Experience of 
Difficulty as a Function of Argument Quartile and Argument Congruency in Study 2 
 
Note. Error bars show standard errors. 
Posttest attitudes 
Two regression analyses were run to examine the relative contribution of subjective 
difficulty and subjective quality to posttest attitudes, controlling for participants’ initially 
stated position (in favor of, or opposed to, assisted suicide, dummy coded). The first, 
“average” model assumes that participants consider and weight all arguments equally, and so 
uses the unweighted average difficulty and quality ratings as predictors. The second, 
“recency” model assumes that participants weight arguments as a linear function of their 




Weighted argument quality/difficulty = ∑ 𝑤′𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , 
where n = 12, i is the order of the argument, 𝑥𝑖 is the argument quality/difficulty rating of 
argument i, and 𝑤′𝑖 is a weighting function such that ∑ 𝑤′𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1.  
The average model accounted for 68% of the variance in posttest attitudes, F(3, 92) = 
63.98, p < .001. As shown in Table 2, posttest attitudes were, unsurprisingly, most strongly 
predicted by participants’ initial attitude position, and, independently, by argument quality; 
subjective difficulty, however, did not predict posttest attitudes. The recency model produced 
very similar results, accounting for 67% of the variance, F(3, 92) = 60.45, p < .001 (see Table 
2). Thus, in both models, when subjective difficulty and quality were simultaneously 
considered, only argument quality predicted attitudes, although all three zero-order 
correlations with attitudes were significant (average subjective difficulty; r = –.32, p = .002; 
average argument quality; r = .57, p < .001; weighted subjective difficulty; r = –.31, p = .002; 
weighted argument quality; r = .52, p < .001). Furthermore, Hotelling’s t-test comparing non-
nested regression models showed that the recency model did not provide a better fit than the 
average model; in fact, the average model fit the data marginally better than the recency 
model, t(90) = 1.76, p = .082 (two-tailed).  
In sum, Study 2 closely replicated the results in Study 1. Compared to arguments 
generated earlier, arguments generated later were judged as both more difficult to generate, 
and of poorer quality. Furthermore, although both variables correlated with final attitudes, 
suggesting participants’ reliance on subjective difficulty as well as argument quality in their 
attitude judgments, only argument quality was a unique predictor of attitudes. Part of the 
statistical advantage of quality in the models may be due to its having been rated second, but 
we found no evidence for a recency effect, at least within ratings: a model weighting recently 
generated arguments more heavily in attitude judgments provided, if anything, a worse fit 




Table 2  
Two Regression Models of Initial Attitude Position, Argument Quality and Subjective Difficulty Effects on Posttest Attitudes 
 Regression Coefficient and Statistics  Correlations  Collinearity 
Model/Variable B SE B β t p 95% CI of B  Zero-order Partial Part  Tolerance VIF 
Average model              
     Initial attitude position 3.99 .41 .67 9.72 <.001 [3.17, 4.80]  .80 .72 .58  .75 1.34 
     Subjective difficulty –.11 .10 –.07 –1.06 .291 [–.32, .10]  –.32 –.11 –.06  .89 1.12 
     Average quality .37 .11 .22 3.22 .002 [.14, .60]  .57 .32 .19  .74 1.36 
Recency model              
     Initial attitude position 4.14 .41 .70 10.08 <.001 [3.33, 4.96]  .80 .73 .61  .78 1.29 
     Weighted difficulty –.10 .10 –.06 –.98 .332 [–.31, .10]  –.31 –.10 –.06  .88 1.36 





Studies 1 and 2 showed that later-generated arguments were perceived by participants 
themselves not only as more difficult to generate, but also of poorer quality, and that it was 
the latter effect that accounted for posttest attitudes. Study 3 applied these insights to the ease 
of retrieval paradigm itself. We expected, consistent with Studies 1 and 2, that participants 
listing few arguments would judge their task as easier overall, and the quality of their 
generated arguments as better, than those listing many arguments. We also expected, 
consistent with previous research, that participants would report more supportive attitudes 
toward the proposition after listing few (3) rather than many (12) arguments, and made the 
novel prediction that quality, independent of difficulty, would mediate the effects of 
argument number.  
Method 
Participants 
Three hundred and twenty-nine residents of the United States completed the study via 
Mechanical Turk (M age = 38.23, SD age = 12.11; 135 females, 193 males, 1 “other”). All 
participants had a history of providing high-quality data (MTurk approval rate > 99%). Data 
from participants who did not complete the entire study were discarded prior to any analyses. 
The data were collected until the final number of participants in the 12-argument condition 
exceeded 100 participants, as it was expected that more participants would drop out of the 12-
argument condition, which was designed to be more difficult than the 3-argument condition.  
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that of Study 2, except that participants were randomly 







Fifty-five participants’ data were excluded from the analyses (26 from the 3-argument 
condition and 29 from the 12-argument condition). Thirty-six failed the data-quality checks, 
16 did not generate the required number of arguments (3 in the 3-argument condition and 12 
in the 12-argument condition), and 3 took the study twice (only their second sets of data were 
excluded). Thus, 274 participants (M age = 38.70, SD age = 11.94; 120 females, 153 males, 1 
other) were included in the final analyses (see Table 3 for the distribution of the sample 
across conditions).  
Subjective difficulty and quality 
Average difficulty ratings were submitted to a 2 (Argument number: 3 or 12) × 2 
(Argument congruency: pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal) ANOVA1. As expected, 
participants generating 12 arguments (M = 3.99, SD = 1.66) perceived the task to be more 
difficult than participants generating 3 arguments (M = 3.07, SD = 2.06), F(1, 270) = 6.12, p 
= .014, partial η2 = .02 (see Table 3). Participants also found it more difficult to generate 
arguments against (M = 4.55, SD = 2.10) than in support of their initial attitude position (M = 
3.05, SD = 1.78), F(1, 273) = 27.09, p < .001, partial η2 = .09 There was also an interaction, 
F(1, 270) = 4.34, p = .038, partial η2 = .02, such that the argument congruency effect was 
stronger in the 3-argument condition (Ms = 2.60 versus 4.51, SDs = 1.72 and 2.34, p < .001), 
than in the 12-argument conditions (Ms = 3.79 versus 4.61; SDs = 1.62 and 1.67, p = .050). 
The results thus indicated that the manipulation of difficulty was effective.  
Quality ratings were subjected to the same analysis. As expected, participants found 
the quality of their self-generated arguments to be better in the 3-argument condition (M = 
7.27, SD = 1.61), than the 12-argument condition (M = 6.56, SD = 1.48), F(1, 270) = 10.61, p 
 
1 Again, the results from Study 3 were similar when the data was analyzed using a linear 




= .001, partial η2 = .04 (see Table 3). Also, participants found the quality of their arguments 
to be better when they initially agreed with the proposition (M = 7.46, SD = 1.21) than when 
they disagreed (M = 5.60, SD = 1.83), F(1, 270) = 87.04, p < .001, partial η2 = .24. The 
interaction was not significant, F < 1.  
To examine the ease of retrieval effect, posttest attitude scores were submitted to the 
same analysis. Unexpectedly, participants did not report more extreme attitudes after 
generating 3 arguments (M = 6.94, SD = 2.82), than 12 arguments (M = 6.90, SD = 2.79), 
F(1, 270) = .06, p = .847, partial η2 < .01 (see Table 3). Also, participants who initially 
agreed with the proposition (M = 8.33, SD = 1.06) had more favorable attitudes than when 
they disagreed (M = 2.57, SD = 1.85), F(1, 270) = 87.04, p < .001, partial η2= .24. 
Replicating Study 2, however, correlations indicated that both subjective difficulty (r = –.37, 
p < .001) and argument quality (r = .62, p < .001) were significantly associated with posttest 
attitudes.  
Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics of Argument Quality and Subjective Difficulty in Study 3 




  Posttest Attitudes 
Argument 
Number 
Argument Congruency M SD n  M SD n   M SD n 
3 Pro-attitudinal 7.76 1.10 129  2.60 1.72 129   8.36 1.09 129 
 Counter-attitudinal 5.78 2.00 42  4.51 2.34 42   2.57 1.84 42 
12 Pro-attitudinal 6.97 1.24 78  3.79 1.62 78   8.29 1.02 78 






To further examine the independent contributions of difficulty and quality to posttest 
attitudes, we conducted a parallel mediation analysis, with argument number (dummy coded) 
as an independent variable, difficulty and quality as simultaneous mediators, and argument 
congruency (whether participants were initially in favor of, or opposed to, assisted suicide) as 
a covariate, using PROCESS v3.3, model 4 (see Hayes, 2017), with 10,000 bootstrap 
resamples. Confidence intervals indicated that only the indirect effect of argument quality 
was significant (B = –.30, SE = .08), 95% CI = [–.47, –.15]; the indirect effect of subjective 
difficulty was not (B = –.05, SE = .04), 95% CI = [–.14, .03], as seen in Figure 3. The direct 
effect of argument number on attitudes was marginal (B = .29, SE = .15), t(269) = 1.93, p = 
.055, although, consistent with the ANOVA result above, the total effect was not significant 
(B = –.05, SE = .16), t(271) = –.03, p = .761. In summary, generating more arguments in 
support of assisted suicide was associated with both greater perceived difficulty, and weaker 
















Mediation of the Effect of Argument Number on Attitudes by Quality and Difficulty in Study 3 
 
Note. The values represent unstandardized regression coefficients obtained through 
bootstrapping using 10,000 resamples. The value in parentheses indicates the total effect 
before controlling for the mediators. ***p < .001. 
General Discussion 
The assumption that individuals rely not only on the content of their thoughts, but also 
on the difficulty of generating them, resolves the paradox of judging a proposition (e.g., “I 
am extraverted”; “I support assisted suicide”) less favorably, despite producing more 
supporting evidence for it. We propose, however, that because “more supporting evidence” 
tends to be poorer quality evidence, effects previously attributed only to difficulty of bringing 
information to mind (e.g., Schwarz, 1998, 2004), may be partially caused by the content of 
that information after all.  
In Studies 1 and 2, we found that, indeed, as participants generated more arguments 
for a proposition, not only did the difficulty of generating them increase, but the self-
perceived quality of those arguments also decreased. Both effects were linear and were 
independent of whether participants agreed with the proposition. Moreover, although both 




latter uniquely predicted posttest attitudes (Study 2), and mediated the ease ofretrieval 
paradigm (Study 3). Together, these findings provided the first evidence of an argument 
quality decline and showed that, at least in the context of our studies, effects need not be 
attributed solely to subjective experience: generating many (versus few) arguments is indeed 
more difficult, but the arguments are also correspondingly worse, and may be less convincing 
for that reason alone.  
Although more research is required to establish precisely how poor arguments change 
attitudes, there was no evidence in our studies for a recency account (e.g., Haddock et al., 
1996; Haddock et al., 1999; Schwarz et al., 1991). In Study 2, attitudes were predicted 
marginally better by a model in which all arguments received equal weight than a model that 
gave more weight to later arguments. Another possible account, not tested here, is that later 
arguments were more likely to prompt spontaneous counterarguments, which ultimately 
compromised their overall persuasiveness (as in Tormala et al., 2007). Spontaneously 
generated thoughts are the primary mechanism of persuasion in Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) 
influential Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), which points toward several possible 
moderators of our effects. For example, personal relevance (e.g., Grayson & Schwarz, 1999; 
Rothman & Schwarz, 1998), motivation (e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Cardwell & 
Halberstadt, 2019; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), processing capacity (e.g., Greifeneder & Bless, 
2007), and individual differences (Florack & Zoabi, 2003) have all been implicated in the 
likelihood of generating counterarguments, and so in theory should moderate the effect of 
reasoning on attitudes. In the current studies, experimenter demand (to list all requested 
arguments), as well as the relevance and emotionality toward assisted suicide, may also have 
facilitated the effects of argument number on persuasion. Subsequent studies should directly 
manipulate these moderators, both to establish the boundaries of the effects and to indirectly 




In addition to the need for replication, the current studies have other limitations. 
Although we have argued for the importance of relying on participants’ own assessments of 
quality (rather than judges’ ratings, or some notion of objective quality), self-assessments 
necessarily introduced a correlational element into the experimental designs. For example, it 
is conceivable that attitude change is a cause rather than a consequence of argument quality, 
although the design of the studies (e.g., the fact that argument ratings preceded attitude 
ratings) make such accounts more awkward than our own. Another caveat to our findings is 
that the seemingly weaker effect of subjective difficulty relative to quality might be, in part, 
an artefact of our experimental design. Quality ratings always followed difficulty ratings, 
potentially rendering the former more salient at the time of judgment. This interpretation is 
less likely, however, when one considers lack of recency effects within quality and difficulty 
judgments: arguments were not detectably more influential when they appeared later in a 
participant’s list.  
Another possibility is that the experience of difficulty caused differences in quality 
(see Wänke, 2013), effectively rendering the latter a full mediator of the former. Indeed, there 
is evidence that arguments are less influential when they are difficult to process, because such 
difficulty impairs perceivers’ ability to generate the internal counterarguments that mediate 
attitude change (e.g., Petty et al., 1976). Wänke and Bless (2000), for example, found that 
participants judged advertisements as less compelling when it was difficult to recall them, 
while other studies on the effects of cognitive fluency on truth judgments (e.g., Reber & 
Schwarz, 1999) hint that arguments may be less persuasive when they are harder to process. 
Future research could manipulate subjective difficulty directly to help clarify the effect of 
difficulty on quality, though the precise causal model is secondary to our concerns here. 
Furthermore, it is also possible that our design, in which participants repeatedly viewed their 




negative effects of difficulty and quality, which led to the absence of the classic ease of 
retrieval effect in Study 3. The experimental, environmental, and personality factors that lead 
reasoners to balance subjective evidence from the number, difficulty, and quality of 
supporting thoughts they generate, will need to be teased apart in subsequent research. It is 
clear, in any case, that the subjective quality of attitudinal reasons declines linearly over time, 
that the individuals generating those reasons are aware of the differences, and that quality 
therefore can play a role in attitude change following reasons analysis. 
In sum, while finding more evidence for one’s belief is important, it is not without its 
cognitive consequences. Here we show that reasoning about an attitudinal position may 
negatively influence it, but not necessarily due to increased difficulty of generating 
arguments. Additional arguments were increasingly difficult to generate, but at least within 
the context of studies’ parameters, it was a covariate of difficulty – the perceived quality of 
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Thirty-four participants were excluded from the analyses, 33 who did not pass the 
data quality check and/or failed to generate 12 arguments, and 1 who took the survey twice 
(only the second response was excluded), leaving 186 participants (M age = 37.37, SD age = 
10.32; 93 females, 92 males, 1 other) for analysis. 
To test our prediction of a linear decline in subjective argument quality, we employed 
a linear mixed-effects (LME) regression using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) and R 
3.6.3 (R Core Team, 2017). Argument order (1st to 12th), issue (“Single-sex School”, “Social 
Media”, versus “Assisted Suicide”), and argument congruency (Pro-attitudinal versus 
Counter-attitudinal) were entered as fixed effects. For random effects, participants were 
entered as a random intercept and argument order was entered as a by-participant random 
slope (see Barr et al., 2013). The fixed effects showed that argument order had a significant 
negative linear relationship with perceived argument quality, confirming a linear decline in 
argument quality (see Table S1 and Figure S1a). In addition, participants generating 
arguments in agreement with their initial position perceived their argument to be better than 
those generating arguments against their initial position. This effect, however, was 
conditioned on the issue, such that it was only true for the issue of assisted suicide. A more 
trivial effect was a significant difference among issues such that the argument quality of the 
legalization of assisted suicide was perceived to be better, compared to the issue of single-sex 
school. 
A similar analytic approach was taken with argument generation times. The fixed 




generation time such that participants spent increasingly more time generating later 
arguments, than earlier ones (see Table S1 and Figure S1b). 
Table S1 
The Effect of Argument Order, Issue, and Argument Congruency on Subjective Argument Quality and 
Argument Generation Time in Study 1 Based on the Linear Mixed Effects Regressions 
  Argument Quality  Argument Generation Time 
Predictors  Estimates CI95% p  Estimates CI95% p 
Fixed Effects     
Intercept (Issue = Single-sex 
School, Argument Congruency = 
Disagree) 
  7.08 [6.10, 6.23] < .001 
 
19.30 [16.93, 21.67] < .001 
Argument Order   –.08 [–.11, –.05] < .001  .75 [.48, 1.02] < .001 
Issue (Social Media)   –.35 [–.78, .09] .116  2.57 [–.88, 6.01] .144 
Issue (Assisted Suicide)   .49 [.08, .90] .018  –1.73 [–4.97, 1.51] .295 
Argument Congruency (Agree)   .40 [.10, .69] .009  .62 [–1.74, 2.99] .606 
Argument Order × Issue (Social 
Media) 
  .00 [–.04, .04] .884 
 
-.30 [–.70, .09] .135 
Argument Order × Issue 
(Assisted Suicide) 
  .02 [–.02, .06] .330 
 




Argument Order × Argument 
Congruency (Agree) 
  –.01 [–.04, .02] .394 
 
.07 [–.20, .34] .625 
Issue (Social Media) × 
Argument Congruency (Agree)  
  –.00 [–.44, .43] .988 
 
1.90 [–1.54, 5.34] .280 
Issue (Assisted Suicide) × 
Argument Congruency (Agree) 
 –.43 [–.84, –.02] .039 
 
–1.41 [–4.65, 1.83] .394 
Argument Order × Issue 
(Assisted Suicide) × Argument 
Congruency (Agree) 
 –.01 [–.05, .03] .760 
 
–.01 [–.41, .38] .947 
Argument Order × Issue 
(Assisted Suicide) × Argument 
Congruency (Agree) 
 –.01 [–.05, .03] .681 
 
–.21 [–.59, .16] .260 
Random Effects     
Residual (σ2)  2.78 (SD = 1.67)  350.94 (SD = 18.73) 
Within-participant variance (τ00)  2.59 (SD = 1.61)  97.91 (SD = 9.90) 
Between-participant variance 
(τ11) 
  .01 (SD = .11) 
 
.61 (SD = .78) 
Random-slope-intercept 




Intra-class correlation coefficient 
(ICC) 






Observations  2232  2232 
Marginal R2/Conditional R2   .082/ .518  .025/ .413 
 
Figure S1 
Argument Quality Ratings and Argument Generation Time as a Function of Argument Order 
and Argument Congruency in Study 1 Based on the Linear Mixed Effects Regression 
 
Note. The solid line represents pro-attitudinal arguments, and the dotted line represents 
counter-attitudinal arguments. The shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
Study 2 
Results 
Eighteen participants were excluded from the analyses. Sixteen of those either failed 
the data quality checks or failed to generate 12 arguments. One participant did not follow the 
instructions and provided arguments against assisted suicide, rather than in favor of it. One 
participant participated twice, and their second responses were excluded. Thus, 93 




in the analyses. Seventy-three participants initially supported the legalization of assisted 
suicide, while twenty were against it. 
Similar to Study 1, subjective argument quality ratings, argument generation time, and 
the new measure of subjective difficulty were entered in linear mixed-effects (LME) 
regressions, with argument order (1st to 12th) and argument congruency (Pro-attitudinal versus 
Counter-attitudinal) as the fixed effects, participants as a random intercept and also argument 
order as a by-participant random slope (see Table S2). As in Study 1, there was a significant 
negative linear relationship between argument order and argument quality (Figure S2a), 
suggesting that later-generated arguments were worse than the earlier ones. Also, participants 
perceived their arguments to be better when generating the arguments supporting their initial 
position, than against it. Moreover, consistent with the results in Study 1, participants spent 
increasingly more time generating later arguments, than earlier ones, and more time 
generating arguments against, than in support of, their initial attitude position (Figure S2b). 
For the analysis of subjective difficulty, the fixed effects showed that it was increasingly 













Table S2  
The Effect of Argument Order and Argument Congruency on Subjective Argument Quality, Argument Generation 
Time, and Subjective Difficulty in Study 2 Based on the Linear Mixed Effects Regressions 
  Argument Quality  Argument Generation Time  Subjective Difficulty 
Predictors  Estimates CI95% p  Estimates CI95% p  Estimates CI95% p 





  6.80 [6.39, 7.22] < .001 
 
29.35 [23.57, 35.13] < .001 
 




  –.13 [–.17, –.08] < .001 
 
.88 [.34, 1.42] .002 
 





  .98 [.56, 1.39] < .001 
 
–6.16 [–11.94, –.38] .037 
 







  –.02 [–.06, .03] .514 
 
–.40 [–.94, .14] .149 
 
–.02 [–.06, .03] .426 
 








 1.33 (SD = 1.15) 
 
296.33 (SD = 17.21) 
 




  .01 (SD = .08) 
 
.21 (SD = .46) 
 





































Argument Quality Ratings, Argument Generation Time and Subjective Experience of 
Difficulty as a Function of Argument Order and Argument Congruency in Study 2 Based on 
the Linear Mixed Effects Regression 
 
Note. The solid line represents pro-attitudinal arguments and the dotted line represents 
counter-attitudinal arguments. The shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
Study 3 
Results 
Fifty-five participants’ data were excluded from the analyses (26 from the 3-argument 
condition and 29 from the 12-argument condition). Thirty-six failed the data-quality checks. 
Sixteen did not generate the required number of arguments (either three or twelve), with 3 
could not generate 3 arguments and 13 could no generate 12 arguments. Three took the study 
twice (their second sets of data were excluded). Thus, 274 participants (M age = 38.70, SD 
age = 11.94; 120 females, 153 males, 1 “other”) were included in the final analyses. One 
hundred and seventy-one participants listed three arguments, with 129 initially agreed with 
the legalization of assisted suicide and 42 disagreed, while one hundred and three listed 






Subjective difficulty and quality 
For the analyses of both subjective difficulty and argument quality, we employed 
linear mixed-effects (LME) regressions with argument number (3 versus 12) and argument 
congruency (Pro-attitudinal versus Counter-attitudinal) as fixed effects and participants a 
random intercept (see Table S3).  
As expected, participants generating 12 arguments perceived the task to be more 
difficult than participants generating 3 arguments (Figure S3b). Participants also found it 
more difficult to generate arguments against than in support of their initial attitude. There, 
however, was also an interaction, such that the argument congruency effect was stronger in 
the 3-argument condition, than in the 12-argument conditions. The results, thus, indicated that 
the few versus many manipulation of difficulty was effective.  
Of more theoretical interest, the analysis of argument quality showed that participants 
found the quality of their self-generated arguments to be better in the 3-argument condition, 
than the 12-argument condition (Figure S3a). Also, participants found the quality of their 















The Effect of Argument Number and Argument Congruency on Argument Quality and Subjective Difficulty 
in Study 3 Based on the Linear Mixed Effects Regression 
  Argument Quality  Subjective Difficulty 
Predictors  Estimates CI95% p  Estimates CI95% p 
Fixed Effects     
Intercept (Argument number = 
Twelve, Argument Congruency 
= Disagree) 
  6.45 [6.26, 6.64] < .001 
 
3.88 [3.63, 4.12] < .001 
Argument Number (Three)   .32 [.13, .51] .001  –.32 [–.57, –.08] .010 
Argument Congruency (Agree)   .91 [.73, 1.10] < .001  –.68 [–.92, –.43] < .001 
Argument Number (Three) × 
Argument Congruency (Agree) 
  .08 [–.11, .27] .404 
 
–.27 [–.52, –.03] .029 
Random Effects     
Residual (σ2)  3.48 (SD = 1.86)  3.64 (SD = 1.91) 
Within-participant variance (τ00)  1.12 (SD = 1.06)  2.31 (SD = 1.52) 
Intra-class correlation coefficient 
(ICC) 
  .24 
 
.39 
Observations  1749  1749 






Argument Quality Ratings and Subjective Experience of Difficulty as a Function of Argument 
Number and Argument Congruency in Study 3 Based on the Linear Mixed Effects Regression 
 
Note. The dot symbols represent pro-attitudinal arguments and the triangle symbols represent 
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Chapter 3: Difficulty Disrupts the Detection of Argument Quality 




























While previous research on persuasion has largely focused on the independent roles of 
argument content and argument “experience,” the causal relationship between the two has 
received less attention. In two studies, we examined whether and how experienced difficulty 
might influence the perceived persuasiveness of arguments for university comprehensive 
exams. In both studies, participants perceived less differentiation between strong and weak 
arguments, such that when the arguments were difficult to comprehend, strong arguments 
were less persuasive, and weak arguments more persuasive, than when they were easy, 
regardless of the relationship between the arguments and participants’ preexisting attitudes. 
The results are consistent with an account in which processing difficulty compromises 
participants’ ability to elaborate on the arguments, and are inconsistent with claims that 
difficulty serves as a cue for greater argument elaboration, or as a source of negative affect 
that is misattributed to argument quality.  





A fundamental question in social psychology – not to mention civil society – is 
whether and how people’s attitudes change in light of new information. While normative 
models of persuasion, and our common sense, implicate the content of arguments for a 
proposition (e.g., how many supporting arguments are presented and how persuasive those 
arguments are; Bem, 1972; Higgins, 1989; Maddux & Rogers, 1980; Pelham et al., 1994), 
more recent research has shown that subjective experience associated with processing such 
information plays an important role, sometimes over and above information content (e.g., see 
for reviews Schwarz, 1998, 2004). 
For example, in a now-classic series of studies, Schwarz et al. (1991) found that 
participants rated themselves as less assertive after generating twelve (versus six) instances of 
their assertiveness, apparently because they interpreted the effort of recalling assertive 
behaviors as evidence of their scarcity. This finding suggests that people may conclude that 
the evidence for a proposition (“I am assertive”) is weak, not because of a dearth of such 
evidence, but because their experience in obtaining the evidence is difficult, leading to the 
apparent paradox of believing a proposition less strongly after generating more arguments in 
support of it. Subsequent studies demonstrated a similar phenomenon in many other 
judgment domains, such as attitudes toward social policies (e.g., Briñol et al., 2006; Haddock, 
2002), product evaluations (Wänke & Bless, 2000; Wänke et al., 1997), and risk assessments 
(Grayson & Schwarz, 1999; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998), among others. 
However, the attribution of attitude change to subjective experience is complicated by 
the fact that not all evidence is equally probative: twelve arguments generated for a 
proposition may not be as good, on average, as six would have been, and it could be this 
decline in perceived quality that accounts for observed changes in attitudes. Previous research 
has attempted to tease apart the relative influence of these two sources, for example, by 




(Briñol et al., 2006; Hansen & Wänke, 2008; Schwarz et al., 1991; Tormala et al., 2007; 
Tormala et al., 2002; Wänke et al., 1996; Weick & Guinote, 2008). Wänke and colleagues 
(1996), for example, found that participants’ arguments in support of public transportation 
were no more compelling, as rated by a second, yoked group, when they listed three 
arguments than when they listed seven. In our own work (Thongpaibool & Halberstadt, 
2020), however, we have found that participants evaluating their own arguments rated later-
generated arguments as more difficult to produce, but also less persuasive, than ones they 
generated earlier. Moreover, it was argument quality, rather than difficulty, that uniquely 
predicted attitudes. That is, people listing “too many” reasons for a proposition appeared to 
disfavor that proposition not only because they had trouble listing them, but also because the 
arguments they listed were relatively weak.  
Although previous research has tended to view subjective experience and argument 
content as competing factors in attitude change, we consider the possibility here that they are 
in fact causally related. That is, the perceived effort required to generate or process an 
argument might influence the perception of how persuasive that argument is. To understand 
why, we must first consider what makes an argument “persuasive.” According to the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), one of the most influential 
cognitive models of persuasion, attitude change occurs via one of two processing routes, 
depending on the motivation and/or cognitive resources available to process (“elaborate on”) 
the arguments. In the “central route” (when both motivation and cognitive resources are 
relatively high and argument elaboration is possible), attitude change is the product of the 
valence and amount of the elaborations elicited in response to those arguments, with “strong” 
and “weak” arguments defined as those eliciting predominantly positive and negative 
thoughts, respectively, toward the advocated issue. In contrast, the “peripheral route” is used 




various superficial cues, such as the persuader’s attractiveness (e.g., Pallak et al., 1983; 
Puckett et al., 1983), expertise (e.g., Hovland et al., 1953; Petty et al., 1981), likability (e.g., 
Petty et al., 1983), or number of arguments (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). Thus, when 
circumstances compromise the receiver’s ability or motivation to elaborate on the persuasive 
message, the strength of the arguments become less relevant. 
In these terms, there are at least three mechanisms by which the subjective difficulty 
of processing an argument, a presumably negative phenomenal state, might influence the 
persuasiveness of that argument. First, arguments that are difficult to generate or think about 
might interfere with the ability and/or motivation to elaborate on them, reducing or 
potentially eliminating their impact. Such a process would be evidenced by a tendency to be 
less influenced by otherwise strong arguments, and more influenced by otherwise weak 
arguments; that is, people struggling to process arguments should find it harder to 
discriminate between strong and weak ones. Indeed, several previous studies that have made 
argument processing more difficult (e.g., via reduced readability, enhanced argument 
complexity, or visual distraction) have reported results consistent with a reduced ability to 
discriminate argument quality (e.g., Chebat et al., 2003; Eagly, 1974; see also Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986, p. 76; Petty et al., 1976; Regan & Cheng, 1973). For example, Petty and 
colleagues (1976) presented university students with pretested strong and weak arguments 
supporting a tuition increase (Study 1) and a tuition decrease (Study 2), while manipulating 
distraction (by flashing the letter “X” on the computer screen). Distracted participants 
reported fewer positive thoughts about strong arguments, as well as fewer negative thoughts 
about weak arguments, compared to controls.  
However, a different line of research suggests the opposite effect, that the experience 
of difficulty might enhance people’s ability/motivation to discriminate good and bad 




has been implicated in enhanced argument elaboration, in theory because such difficulty 
serves as a cue that more careful information processing is required (e.g., Alter et al., 2007; 
Hernandez & Preston, 2013; Song & Schwarz, 2008; Yang et al., 2013). For example, Alter 
et al. (2007, Study 2) presented participants with a fake review of a new MP3 player, 
containing either highly relevant (e.g., price) or irrelevant (e.g., popularity with celebrities) 
features, together with either a picture of a competent-looking or incompetent-looking person 
presenting them. When the review was written in a disfluent, difficult-to-read font, 
participants favored the MP3 player with important features, indicating reliance on more 
elaborative (i.e., central route) processing. In contrast when the review was written in a 
fluent, easy-to-read font, participants preferred the MP3 player reviewed by the competent-
looking presenter. If the difficulty of generating arguments prompts more systematic and 
effortful elaboration of them, we would expect more positive thoughts and more negative 
thoughts elicited following strong and weak arguments, respectively, and thus greater 
differentiation between them. 
There is also a third possibility: rather than prompting more or less scrutiny of 
argument quality, experiential difficulty might bias elaborations directly via a carryover 
effect of fluency-related affect. The literature on cognitive fluency is replete with adverse 
effects of effortful processing (for reviews, Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Oppenheimer, 
2008). Oppenheimer (2006), for example, reported that participants judged the authors of 
hard-to-understand graduate school entrance essays to be less intelligent and less suitable for 
graduate school, compared to authors of more comprehensible essays. Of particular relevance 
in the current context, Wänke and Bless (2000) presented participants with an advertisement 
containing supporting arguments for a coffeemaker, and then asked them to recall the 
arguments with either helpful or unhelpful cues (an easy or difficult task, respectively). 




they were easy. Similarly, if individuals find arguments difficult to process or understand, 
they may be less persuaded by them. Such an effect would be evidenced by a main effect of 
difficulty on persuasiveness, regardless of the a priori strength of an argument. 
The current studies were thus designed to directly examine the causal relationship, if 
any, between the experience of difficulty and the perceived persuasiveness of an argument, as 
well as the mechanism(s) underlying any relationship. In two studies, a priori strong and 
weak arguments were presented in support of, or against, a proposal to institute 
comprehensive exams as a prerequisite to a university degree, a proposition used in previous 
research (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Following Oppenheimer (2006), processing difficulty 
was manipulated by increasing the complexity of the vocabulary used in the arguments. We 
predicted that the judged quality of the arguments for the proposition would depend on the 
how difficult they were to process, but we did not make a priori predictions about the nature 
of the relationship. To the extent that difficulty makes elaboration difficult, the distinction 
between a priori strong and weak arguments should narrow; strong arguments should be 
judged as less persuasive, and weak arguments as more persuasive, when they are difficult to 
comprehend than when they are easy. To the extent that difficulty prompts a closer scrutiny 
of the arguments, the differentiation between a priori strong and weak arguments should 
widen; strong arguments should be judged as more persuasive, and weak arguments as less 
persuasive, when they are difficult to comprehend than when they are easy. Finally, to the 
extent that negative affect associated with disfluent processing is misattributed to the 











Two hundred and sixteen residents of the United States completed the study via 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk; M age = 34.87, SD age = 10.15; 88 females, 126 males, 2 other). 
All participants had a history of providing good-quality responses with an approval rate of 
higher than 99%. Data from participants who did not complete the entire study were 
discarded prior to any analysis. Sample size was chosen to exceed a recently recommended 
minimum of 100 participants per between-participants condition required to achieve 80% 
power to detect an effect size of d = .4, a reasonable estimate for a “theoretically meaningful” 
effect (Brysbaert, 2019). 
Stimuli 
Eight “strong” arguments and eight “weak” arguments in support of “senior 
comprehensive exams” – a policy in which students would be required to pass a general exam 
in their major area of study in order to graduate – were adapted, based on pretesting, from 24 
arguments used by Petty et al. (1980; see Supplemental Materials for full pretest results and 
stimulus selection procedure; see Table 1 in the Appendix for final stimulus materials).  
Processing difficulty was manipulated between participants, following Oppenheimer 
(2006), by varying their linguistic complexity. In the “simple” condition, we used the 
arguments without modification. In the “complex” condition, we increased language 
complexity such that for each argument, where possible without altering meaning, some 
words were replaced with their longer and more complex synonyms. For example, a strong 
argument, “Graduate and professional schools show a preference for undergraduates who 
have passed comprehensive exams” was changed to, “Graduate and professional academic 




comprehensive exams.” A weak argument, “Many people outside the university support 
comprehensive exams” was changed to, “An abundance of individuals outside academic 
institutions champion the implementation of comprehensive exams.”  
Procedure 
After providing informed consent to take part in a study on “people’s opinions toward 
university policies,” participants read a description of the proposed comprehensive exams, 
and then indicated their initial opinions (“I support comprehensive exams,” “I am against 
comprehensive exams,” or “I have no opinion at the moment.”). Participants then rated either 
the simple or complex versions of all sixteen arguments twice over, in different random 
orders, on 9-point scales, first in terms of “how good/convincing each argument was for the 
senior comprehensive exams to be implemented” (anchored at “this reason is very poor” and 
“this reason is very good”), and then in terms of “how difficult it was to understand” 
(anchored at “extremely easy” and “extremely difficult”). Next, participants indicated post-
test attitude toward the exams (“the extent to which you agree with the policy that senior 
comprehensive exams should be instituted”) on a 9-point scale anchored at 1 (“strongly 
disagree”), 5 (“neither agree nor disagree”), and 9 (“strongly agree”), and also, as an 
exploration of the relationship between specific and general ratings of subjective difficulty,  
rated “how difficult it was to read the list of arguments presented, anchored at 1 “extremely 
easy” and 9 “extremely difficult.” Finally, participants answered a few demographics and 
data-quality check questions (“Were the reasons you just read in support of, or against, the 
implementation of comprehensive exams?” and “Did you honestly answer the questions in 
this survey?”), before being debriefed, thanked and provided an email contact for further 







Forty-five participants were excluded from the analyses: 28 because they did not pass 
the data-quality check questions, 15 because they spent less than one minute reading and 
evaluating the persuasiveness of the sixteen arguments, and 2 who had already participated in 
the study (their first responses were included in the dataset). Thus, 171 participants (M age = 
35.17, SD age = 10.24; 75 females, 94 males, 2 other) were included in the final analyses, 
with 85 participants in the simple condition and 86 in the complex condition. A plurality of 
participants (48.5%) initially supported the exams, and 28.7% were opposed to the exams; 
22.8% had no opinion. 
To check whether our manipulation of language complexity increased subjective 
processing difficulty, average difficulty ratings were submitted to a 2 (A priori argument 
strength: Strong versus Weak) × 2 (Complexity: Simple versus Complex) mixed model 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the first factor treated as repeated measure. A main 
effect of complexity verified that the manipulation was successful, F(1, 169) = 3.94, p = 
.049, partial η2 = .02. Arguments with complex vocabularies (M = 3.49, SD = 1.35) were 
indeed more difficult to understand than arguments with simpler vocabularies (M = 3.09, SD 
= 1.31). Weak arguments (M = 3.63, SD = 1.53) were also judged as more difficult to 
understand than strong arguments (M = 2.95, SD = 1.41), F(1, 169) = 55.70, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .25. The interaction was not significant.2 
To examine the primary hypothesis that processing difficulty would impact perceived 
argument persuasiveness, the analysis above was repeated on average persuasiveness ratings. 
All follow-up pairwise comparisons were Bonferroni adjusted. Unsurprisingly, the main 
 
2 Similar results emerged when using the general measure of (reading) difficulty, with 
complex arguments rated as more difficult (M = 3.73, SD = 2.07) than simple ones (M = 2.14, 
SD = 1.38), t(169) = 5.90, p < .001, 95% CI of difference = [1.06, 2.12]. This measure was 




effect of argument strength was significant, F(1, 169) = 522.22, p < .001, partial η2 = .76, 
such that strong arguments (M = 5.98, SD = 1.58) were judged as more persuasive than weak 
arguments (M = 3.49, SD = 1.50). Of most relevance to our primary experimental question, a 
significant interaction emerged between argument strength and complexity, F(1, 169) = 
19.84, p < .001, partial η2 = .11, such that the relative difference between strong and weak 
arguments was reduced when the arguments were more difficult to process, compared to 
when they were easier (see Figure 1). Strong, complex arguments (M = 5.69, SD = 1.57) were 
judged as significantly less convincing than strong, simple arguments (M = 6.28, SD = 1.54), 
p = .014. In contrast, weak, complex arguments (M = 3.68, SD = 1.51) were judged as 
marginally more convincing than weak, simple (M = 3.30, SD = 1.48), p = .099. A sensitivity 
analysis performed in G-Power (assuming α = .05, power = .80, and ε = 1.00, Erdfelder et al., 
1996) indicated that our design permitted the detection of a minimum effect size of partial η2 
= .01 (with a correlation among repeated measures of .53), suggesting that this effect was 
unlikely to represent a Type 1 error. No other effects were significant. There was no effect of 







3 Final attitudes were submitted to a 2 (Complexity: Simple versus Complex) × 2 (Initial 
opinion: support versus oppose comprehensive exams) ANOVA, with both as between-
participant factors (a priori argument strength was not included because participants saw both 
strong and weak arguments). Only a main effect of initial opinion emerged, F(1, 128) = 
357.72, p < .001, partial η2 = .74, such that participants who initially supported the exams 
reported more positive attitudes at the end of the study (M = 7.71, SD = 1.34) relative to those 





Perceived Argument Persuasiveness as a Function of Language Complexity and Argument 
Strength in Study 1 
   
Note. Error bars show standard errors. All arguments were, ostensibly, in favor of 
comprehensive exams. 
Discussion 
Study 1 provided initial evidence that experience of difficulty, manipulated via 
language complexity, influenced the perceived persuasiveness of arguments. Moreover, the 
pattern of effects was most consistent with an account in which difficulty disrupts the 
elaboration of arguments assumed to mediate the impact of argument content (i.e., central 
route processing), such that strong arguments were less persuasive, and weak arguments more 
persuasive (albeit marginally). In other words, the distinction between strong and weak 
arguments was reduced when they were difficult to comprehend. In contrast, there was no 
evidence that difficulty enhanced argument elaboration, or of misattribution of disfluency-
driven affect.   
The thought disruption account is consistent with other dual-process theories of social 




1994), in which motivation and/or cognitive ability are required to engage in relatively 
effortful processing. However, it is not clear in Study 1 which of these factors – motivation or 
ability – mediated the effects. Participants may have been unwilling to engage deeply with 
complexly worded arguments, or they may have been unable to do so, regardless of 
motivation; either would theoretically impair argument elaboration, and in turn 
persuasiveness.  
One way to gain insight into the role of cognitive and motivational mechanisms in 
Study 1 is to consider the effect of attitude-argument congruency. Extensive research has 
shown that individuals find it difficult to judge arguments independent of their prior beliefs 
(e.g., Edwards & Smith 1996; Festinger, 1957). For example, according to the Discrepancy 
Motives Model (Clark & Wegener, 2013), individuals generally are more motivated to 
effortfully process arguments that are incongruent with their existing beliefs, because they are 
more threatening than attitude-congruent ones (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; also see for 
reviews Cacioppo & Petty, 1981). Because the arguments presented in Study 1 were 
primarily attitude-congruent (i.e., participants tended to support the exams), participants 
generally had little reason to overcome the challenge that the difficult versions of the 
arguments posed. Although including initial attitudes (support versus oppose the exams, with 
participants with “no opinion” omitted) did not influence the observed pattern of results 
described above,4 relatively few participants opposed the exams, such that congruency effects 
may be statistically suspect. Study 2, therefore, added a second set of arguments opposing 
comprehensive exams in order to replicate the effects of Study 1 in a more balanced sample, 
 
4 There was a significant main effect of congruency, F(1, 128) = 43.28, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.25, such that participants who initially supported the proposed exams (M = 5.28, SD = 1.09) 
judged the arguments for as more persuasive than those who initially opposed them (M = 
3.84, SD = 1.34). More importantly, however, there was no interaction effect involving 




and to test the moderating role of argument-attitude congruency more reliably. If the effects 
in Study 1 are at least partly due to relatively low motivation to elaborate attitude-consistent 
arguments, the “narrowing” effect of difficulty observed in that study should be reduced or 
eliminated (or even reversed) among participants evaluating attitude-incongruent arguments. 
If, however, participants are simply less able to elaborate or counterargue complexly worded 
arguments effectively, then effect should be observed independent of participants’ pre-




Two hundred and sixteen residents of the United States completed the study via 
Mechanical Turk (M age = 37.02, SD age = 12.03; 90 females, 122 males, 4 other). As in 
Study 1, we aimed to recruit 100 participant per between-participant condition (i.e., pro 
versus con arguments); for additional power, language complexity and argument strength 
were manipulated within-participant.   
Stimuli 
To create a novel set of arguments opposing comprehensive exams, we modified the 
stimuli used in Study 1 (see Appendix) by replacing, for each argument, key words with their 
antonyms, and/or by adding negation (see Lord et al., 1979; see Table 2 in Appendix). For 
example, the strong pro argument, “The quality of undergraduate teaching has improved at 
schools with comprehensive exams” was modified to, “The quality of undergraduate teaching 
has worsened at schools with comprehensive exams” (without italics). The weak pro 
argument, “Many people outside the university support comprehensive exams” was modified 






The procedure and instructions were similar to that of Study 1, with the following 
exceptions. First, half of the participants were presented with the pro arguments from Study 
1, and the other half with the con arguments. Second, language complexity was manipulated 
within participants, such that each participant rated the simple versions of four randomly 
selected strong and four randomly selected weak arguments, and the complex versions of the 
remainder. Third, the final attitude question was framed to be consistent with the argument 
type, such that participants receiving the con arguments indicated post-test attitude against 
the exams (“the extent to which you agree with the policy that senior comprehensive exams 
should NOT be instituted”). 
Results and Discussion 
Thirty participants were excluded from the analyses: 23 because they did not pass the 
data-quality check questions, and 7 because they spent less than one-minute reading and 
evaluating the persuasiveness of the sixteen arguments. Of the remaining 186 participants, 97 
(52.2%) indicated initial support for comprehensive exams, 53 (28.5%) indicated opposition 
to them, and 36 (19.4%) stated they had “no opinion. Participants were, then, recoded into an 
attitude-congruent group if they received arguments consistent with their initial position 
(53.3% of participants), and into an attitude-incongruent group if they received arguments 
inconsistent with their initial position (46.7%); those with no opinion were not included in the 
following analyses, although including them does not qualitatively change any results.  
As a manipulation check, average ratings of subjective difficulty were submitted to a 
2 (Argument strength: Strong versus Weak) × 2 (Complexity: Simple versus Complex) × 2 
(Attitude-argument congruency: Attitude-congruent versus Attitude-incongruent) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), with the first two factors treated as repeated measures. All follow-up 




the manipulation was successful, F(1, 148) = 112.66, p < .001, partial η2 = .43. It was more 
difficult to understand complexly worded arguments (M = 3.93, SD = 1.46) than simply 
worded arguments (M = 2.75, SD = 1.54). In addition, there was, again, a main effect of 
argument strength, such that weak arguments (M = 3.55, SD = 1.51) were more difficult to 
understand than strong arguments (M = 3.13, SD = 1.40), F(1, 148) = 18.03, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .11. No other effects were significant. 
Argument persuasiveness was analyzed with a similar approach. As expected, the 
main effect of argument strength was significant, F(1, 148) = 307.45, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.68, such that strong arguments (M = 5.93, SD = 1.69) were perceived to be more persuasive 
than weak arguments (M = 3.70, SD = 1.49). Replicating Study 1, the interaction between 
argument strength and complexity was significant, F(1, 148) = 32.27, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.18 (see Figure 2). Strong, complex arguments (M = 5.76, SD = 1.70) were judged as less 
persuasive than strong, simple arguments (M = 6.11, SD = 1.98), p = .006. In contrast, weak, 
complex arguments (M = 3.99, SD = 1.59) were judged as more persuasive than weak, simple 
(M = 3.41, SD = 1.72), p < .001. In other words, as in Study 1, the relative difference 
between strong and weak arguments was reduced when the arguments were more difficult to 
process, compared to when they were easier. A sensitivity analysis suggested the detection of 
a minimum effect size of partial η2 = .01 (assuming a correlation among repeated measures of 
.37, the smallest and most conservative correlation), suggesting that this effect was unlikely 
to represent a Type 1 error. Importantly, this interaction was not conditioned on attitude-
argument congruency, F(1, 148) = 108, p = .300, partial η2 = .01 (see Figure 2), although a 
main effect of attitude-argument congruency was observed, F(1, 148) = 58.15, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .28, such that participants evaluating attitude-congruent arguments (M = 5.50, SD 




incongruent arguments (M = 4.03, SD = 1.34). No other effects were significant. There was 
no effect of congruency on final attitudes. 
Figure 2 
Perceived Argument Persuasiveness as a Function of Language Complexity, Argument 
Strength, and Attitude-argument Congruency in Study 2 
 
Note. Error bars show standard errors. 
In sum, Study 2 fully replicated Study 1’s finding that the strong and weak arguments 
were less differentiated – strong arguments were less persuasive and weak arguments were 
more persuasive – when they were difficult to process. In addition, Study 2 found no 
evidence for a moderating effect of attitude-argument congruency, as would be expected 
from a motivational account, and also suggesting that the effects in Study 1 were not an 
artefact of differential motivation (e.g., participants’ disinterest in reading difficult text). A 
null effect of attitude-argument congruence does not, of course, rule out motivational factors 
entirely; it is possible that university comprehensive exams are sufficiently irrelevant to 
MTurk participants that any motivation to defend initial attitudes on this issue is too 




personal relevance (e.g., Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979) or personal 
responsibility (Petty et al., 1977; Petty et al., 1980), might prompt participants to elaborate 
even difficult-to-process arguments. In the context of our experimental paradigm, however, 
the evidence is more consistent with a cognitive impairment account: processing difficulty 
interferes with participants’ ability to generate positive and negative responses that determine 
the perception of argument persuasiveness. It is also worth noting that the effect of the 
difficulty manipulation was much larger in this study (partial η2 = .43) compared to Study 1 
(partial η2 = .02). The discrepancy might be due to differences in experimental design: 
difficulty, via language complexity, was manipulated between-participants in Study 1, but 
within-participants in Study 2. This pattern is similar to that found by Forster et al. (2015), 
who also reported stronger effects of disfluency in a within-participant design compared to a 
between-participant design.  
General Discussion 
While previous research on attitude and persuasion has largely focused on the 
competing roles of argument content and argument “experience,” the possible causal 
relationship between the two has received less attention. In two studies, we examined 
whether and how experienced difficulty might influence the perceived persuasiveness of 
arguments for university comprehensive exams. In both studies, participants perceived less 
differentiation between strong and weak arguments, such that when the arguments were 
difficult to comprehend, strong arguments were less persuasive, and weak arguments more 
persuasive, than when they were easy, regardless of the relationship between the arguments 
and participants’ preexisting attitudes. The results are most consistent with a “thought 
disruption” account, such that difficult processing interferes with participants’ ability to 
elaborate on arguments. At the same time, the results are inconsistent with two other 




perceiver that more argument elaboration is required (e.g., Alter et al., 2007), or by 
negatively biasing reactions via misattribution of disfluency-driven affect to reactions to the 
arguments (e.g., Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Oppenheimer, 2008). Indeed, the “narrowing” 
interaction effect, replicated across both studies, is inconsistent with any proposal that 
assumes a main effect of subjective experience, whether positive or negative. For example, it 
could be argued that complex vocabularies serve as a cue for intelligence (Spearman, 1904; 
Pennebaker & King, 1999) or expertise (e.g., Hovland et al., 1953; Petty et al., 1981), and in 
turn for more persuasive argumentation, especially when the motivation to elaborate is 
relatively low. If so, however, the effect of complex vocabulary should not depend on a priori 
argument strength; both strong and weak arguments written with complex vocabularies 
should be perceived as more persuasive, compared with their simple counterparts. 
Although we found no support for the misattribution of perceived difficulty to 
argument persuasiveness, our results do not necessarily contradict previous research linking 
processing fluency to truth. For example, with a different manipulation of processing 
difficulty, Reber and Schwarz (1999) asked participants to judge whether statements, such as 
“Lima is in Peru,” were true, manipulating processing difficulty by varying the contrast of 
text in which the statements were written. Participants judged the statements as more likely to 
be true when the statements were easy to process (e.g., dark texts with a white background) 
than when they were difficult to process (e.g., light blue texts with a white background). It is 
not clear, however, whether statements need be perceived as “true” to be perceived as 
“persuasive,” and the relation between the two is beyond the scope of the current studies. 
Future research would benefit from examining the connections between fluency mechanisms 
and traditional persuasive cues, such as communicator expertise, trustworthiness, and 




There are some obvious limitations of the current work. First, the effect of processing 
difficulty through a thought disruption mechanism could be rather specific to our paradigm. It 
is possible, for example, that our experimental design, which asks participants to explicitly 
judge argument persuasiveness, artefactually enhances the salience of argument quality in 
persuasiveness, at the expense of affective cues or other heuristics. Thus, changes in framing 
of the experimental design might yield different patterns, such that priming the importance of 
communicator intelligence (for example) may produce positive (e.g., Spearman, 1904) or 
negative (e.g., Oppenheimer, 2006) main effects on all arguments, or that reliance on 
“intuition” facilitates misattribution of negative affect (e.g., see Slovic et al., 2002). 
Second, although our results in both studies consistently supported the “thought 
disruption” account, we have no direct evidence of that disruption, and we cannot rule out 
additional mediating factors, such as differential weighting of positive and negative thoughts 
(Levine et al., 1996), or confidence (e.g., Alter et al., 2007; Petty et al., 2002; Tormala et al., 
2002). Collecting such data in our paradigm was both practically and methodologically 
prohibitive (e.g., because additional measures introduce artefactual causal links among them), 
but a more extensive replication focusing specifically on alternatives to, and/or the 
constituent components of “disruption” would be a valuable next step, even if it is beyond the 
scope of the current work. 
Furthermore, the boundary conditions of the effects were unclear. While difficult 
processing evidently influences perceived persuasiveness, other factors, such as literacy or 
motivation, likely play a role as well (see a similar discussion in Oppenheimer, 2006). For 
example, it could be argued that the effect of complexly worded arguments is contingent on 
comprehension, that is, that the results were due to participants not fully understanding the 
reasons they read. Although we have no evidence that participants were familiar with all the 




between strong and weak arguments even in the complex conditions. Thus, potential 
ignorance of some words did not prevent participants from interpreting the semantics of those 
reasons as a whole. Nonetheless, it is conceivable, for example, that difficulty processing 
complex language would matter less for people with high language literacy or high 
motivation to scrutinize information. Future research investigating potential moderating 
variables are, thus, important to examine the conditions for the effects.   
In sum, while most previous research has implicitly assumed independent roles of 
experience and content, we show here that the two are causally related. Specifically, the 
difficulty of processing arguments appears to disrupt argument elaboration, and consequently 
impacts perceived persuasiveness, such that strong arguments are ultimately less persuasive, 
while weak arguments are more so. The results are not only theoretically important for 
understanding how subjective experience influences judgment, but also practically important 
for their implications for public debate. Persuasion and affect are ever more intertwined, and 
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Table 1  
Ratings of Argument Persuasiveness for All Arguments Supporting the Comprehensive Exam from Study 1 




Argument Supporting the Comprehensive Exam M(SD) 
1 Strong Simple Prestigious universities have comprehensive exams to maintain academic 
excellence. 
6.14(2.30) 
  Complex Prestigious academic institutions have implemented comprehensive exams 
to perpetuate academic preeminence. 
4.91(2.31) 
2 Strong Simple Institution of comprehensive exams has led to a reversal in the declining 
scores on standardized achievement tests at other universities. 
5.76(2.33) 
  Complex Implementation of comprehensive exams has contributed to an overturning 
in the deteriorating scores on standardized achievement examinations at 
other academic institutions. 
5.44(2.25) 
3 Strong Simple Graduate and professional schools show a preference for undergraduates 
who have passed comprehensive exams. 
6.79(2.08) 
  Complex Graduate and professional academic institutions demonstrate a predilection 
for undergraduate students who have succeeded in comprehensive exams. 
5.94(2.16) 
4 Strong Simple Average starting salaries are higher for graduates of schools with 
comprehensive exams. 
6.75(2.32) 
  Complex Average baseline salaries are superior for students who graduate from 
academic institutions that implement comprehensive exams. 
6.42(2.20) 
5 Strong Simple Schools with comprehensive exams attract larger and more well-known 





  Complex Academic institutions that implement comprehensive exams attract more 
substantial and more prominent business organizations to recruit students 
for employment. 
6.53(2.15) 
6 Strong Simple The quality of undergraduate teaching has improved at schools with 
comprehensive exams. 
6.93(1.96) 
  Complex The quality of undergraduate instruction has been enhanced at academic 
institutions that implement comprehensive exams. 
6.45(2.08) 
7 Strong Simple University alumni would increase financial support if comprehensive exams 
were instituted, allowing a tuition increase to be avoided. 
5.55(2.39) 
  Complex Alumni of the academic institution would augment their financial 
contribution if the academic institution implemented comprehensive exams, 
enabling a tuition escalation to be circumvented. 
4.65(2.20) 
8 Strong Simple Universities that institute comprehensive exams subsequently receive 
higher ratings on international surveys. 
5.72(2.28) 
  Complex Academic institutions that implement comprehensive exams subsequently 
receive more favorable assessments on internationally recognized surveys. 
5.15(2.26) 
9 Weak Simple Adopting comprehensive exams would allow a university to be at the 
forefront of a national trend. 
4.19(2.55) 
  Complex Implementing comprehensive exams would create an opportunity for an 
academic institution to position itself at the vanguard of a national trend. 
4.43(2.35) 
10 Weak Simple Graduate students complain that since they have to take comprehensive 
exams, undergraduates should take them as well. 
3.14(2.47) 
  Complex Graduate students express their dissatisfaction that since they are obligated 
to complete comprehensive exams, undergraduate students should be 





11 Weak Simple By not administering comprehensive exams, a tradition dating back to the 
ancient Greeks would be violated. 
2.02(1.63) 
  Complex If academic institutions do not administer comprehensive exams, a 
traditional educational practice antedating to the immemorial Greeks would 
be contravened. 
2.56(1.85) 
12 Weak Simple Parents often write to university administrators in support of comprehensive 
exams. 
3.32(2.29) 
  Complex Parents often communicate with administrators of academic institutions 
expressing their support of the implementation of comprehensive exams. 
3.98(2.27) 
13 Weak Simple Comprehensive exams would increase student fear and anxiety enough to 
promote more studying. 
4.14(2.83) 
  Complex Implementation of comprehensive exams would exacerbate student fear and 
anxiety enough to stimulate more devotion and attention to acquiring 
knowledge. 
3.71(2.37) 
14 Weak Simple Many people outside the university support comprehensive exams. 3.51(2.36) 
  Complex An abundance of individuals outside academic institutions champion the 
implementation of comprehensive exams. 
4.17(2.36) 
15 Weak Simple Requiring students from some schools to take comprehensive exams, but 
not students from other schools, is analogous to racial discrimination. 
2.93(2.20) 
  Complex Necessitating students from some academic institutions to undertake 
comprehensive exams, while not requiring this of students from other 
academic institutions, can be seen as analogous to racial discrimination. 
3.09(2.45) 






  Complex The perilousness of failing to reach the required standard of comprehensive 




Ratings of Argument Persuasiveness for All Arguments Supporting and Against the Comprehensive Exam from Study 2 






Argument Supporting the Comprehensive Exam M(SD) 
1 Strong Pro Simple Prestigious universities have comprehensive exams to maintain 
academic excellence. 
6.56(2.18) 
   Complex Prestigious academic institutions have implemented 
comprehensive exams to perpetuate academic preeminence. 
5.70(2.24) 
  Con Simple Prestigious universities do not use comprehensive exams to 
maintain academic excellence. 
5.35(2.58) 
   Complex Prestigious academic institutions have not implemented 
comprehensive exams to perpetuate academic preeminence. 
4.07(2.33) 
2 Strong Pro Simple Institution of comprehensive exams has led to a reversal in the 
declining scores on standardized achievement tests at other 
universities. 
6.63(2.02) 
   Complex Implementation of comprehensive exams has contributed to an 
overturning in the deteriorating scores on standardized 
achievement examinations at other academic institutions. 
6.00(2.25) 
  Con Simple Institution of comprehensive exams has led to a reversal in the 






   Complex Implementation of comprehensive exams has contributed to an 
overturning in the strengthening scores on standardized 
achievement examinations at other academic institutions. 
5.09(2.24) 
3 Strong Pro Simple Graduate and professional schools show a preference for 
undergraduates who have passed comprehensive exams. 
7.04(1.95) 
   Complex Graduate and professional academic institutions demonstrate a 
predilection for undergraduate students who have succeeded in 
comprehensive exams. 
6.33(1.83) 
  Con Simple Graduate and professional schools show no preference whether 
undergraduates have passed comprehensive exams. 
5.77(2.55) 
   Complex Graduate and professional academic institutions demonstrate no 
predilection whether undergraduate students have succeeded in 
comprehensive exams. 
5.31(2.78) 
4 Strong Pro Simple Average starting salaries are higher for graduates of schools with 
comprehensive exams. 
7.20(2.00) 
   Complex Average baseline salaries are superior for students who graduate 
from academic institutions that implement comprehensive exams. 
6.49(2.23) 
  Con Simple Average starting salaries are higher for graduates of schools 
without comprehensive exams. 
5.73(2.74) 
   Complex Average baseline salaries are superior for students who graduate 
from academic institutions that have not implemented 
comprehensive exams.  
5.35(2.56) 
5 Strong Pro Simple Schools with comprehensive exams attract larger and more well-





   Complex Academic institutions that implement comprehensive exams 
attract more substantial and more prominent business 
organizations to recruit students for employment. 
7.26(1.77) 
  Con Simple Schools without comprehensive exams attract larger and more 
well-known corporations to recruit students for jobs. 
5.75(2.65) 
   Complex Academic institutions that do not implement comprehensive 
exams attract more substantial and more prominent business 
organizations to recruit students for employment. 
5.60(2.47) 
6 Strong Pro Simple The quality of undergraduate teaching has improved at schools 
with comprehensive exams. 
7.52(1.57) 
   Complex The quality of undergraduate instruction has been enhanced at 
academic institutions that implement comprehensive exams. 
7.24(1.33) 
  Con Simple The quality of undergraduate teaching has worsened at schools 
with comprehensive exams. 
5.54(2.64) 
   Complex The quality of undergraduate instruction has deteriorated at 
academic institutions that implement comprehensive exams. 
5.84(2.53) 
7 Strong Pro Simple University alumni would increase financial support if 
comprehensive exams were instituted, allowing a tuition increase 
to be avoided. 
6.52(2.20) 
   Complex Alumni of the academic institution would augment their financial 
contribution if the academic institution implemented 
comprehensive exams, enabling a tuition escalation to be 
circumvented. 
5.62(1.97) 
  Con Simple University alumni would decrease financial support if 





   Complex Alumni of the academic institution would decrease their financial 
contribution if the academic institution implemented 
comprehensive exams, effectuating a tuition escalation. 
5.29(2.49) 
8 Strong Pro Simple Universities that institute comprehensive exams subsequently 
receive higher ratings on international surveys. 
6.31(2.35) 
   Complex Academic institutions that implement comprehensive exams 
subsequently receive more favorable assessments on 
internationally recognized surveys. 
5.96(1.93) 
  Con Simple Universities that institute comprehensive exams subsequently 
receive lower ratings on international surveys. 
4.37(2.54) 
   Complex Academic institutions that implement comprehensive exams 
subsequently receive less favorable assessments on 
internationally recognized surveys. 
5.10(2.34) 
9 Weak Pro Simple Adopting comprehensive exams would allow a university to be at 
the forefront of a national trend. 
4.66(2.39) 
   Complex Implementing comprehensive exams would create an opportunity 
for an academic institution to position itself at the vanguard of a 
national trend. 
5.19(2.46) 
  Con Simple Rejecting comprehensive exams would allow a university to be at 
the forefront of a national trend. 
3.24(2.28) 
   Complex Repudiating comprehensive exams would create an opportunity 
for an academic institution to position itself at the vanguard of a 
national trend. 
3.45(2.01) 
10 Weak Pro Simple Graduate students complain that since they have to take 





   Complex Graduate students express their dissatisfaction that since they are 
obligated to complete comprehensive exams, undergraduate 
students should be required to undertake them as well. 
4.22(2.29) 
  Con Simple Graduate students argue that since they already take 
comprehensive exams, so undergraduates should do something 
different. 
3.20(2.14) 
   Complex Graduate students propound that since they already undertake 
comprehensive exams, undergraduate students should be required 
to accomplish something dissimilar. 
3.52(2.06) 
11 Weak Pro Simple By not administering comprehensive exams, a tradition dating 
back to the ancient Greeks would be violated. 
2.52(2.07) 
   Complex If academic institutions do not administer comprehensive exams, 
a traditional educational practice antedating to the immemorial 
Greeks would be contravened. 
2.85(1.99) 
  Con Simple By not administering comprehensive exams, a tradition dating 
back to the ancient Greeks would be maintained. 
1.95(1.68) 
   Complex If academic institutions do not administer comprehensive exams, 
a traditional educational practice antedating to the immemorial 
Greeks would be perpetuated. 
2.23(1.75) 
12 Weak Pro Simple Parents often write to university administrators in support of 
comprehensive exams. 
3.63(2.07) 
   Complex Parents often communicate with administrators of academic 






  Con Simple Parents often write to university administrators opposing 
comprehensive exams. 
2.71(1.98) 
   Complex Parents often communicate with administrators of academic 
institutions expressing their disapproval of the implementation of 
comprehensive exams. 
3.23(2.02) 
13 Weak Pro Simple Comprehensive exams would increase student fear and anxiety 
enough to promote more studying. 
3.36(2.47) 
   Complex Implementation of comprehensive exams would exacerbate 
student fear and anxiety enough to stimulate more devotion and 
attention to acquiring knowledge. 
4.80(2.46) 
  Con Simple Comprehensive exams would increase student fear and anxiety 
enough to stop them from studying. 
4.69(2.77) 
   Complex Implementation of comprehensive exams would exacerbate 
student fear and anxiety enough to cripple students’ devotion and 
attention to acquiring knowledge. 
5.35(2.69) 
14 Weak Pro Simple Many people outside the university support comprehensive 
exams. 
4.28(2.35) 
   Complex An abundance of individuals outside academic institutions 
champion the implementation of comprehensive exams. 
4.65(2.46) 
  Con Simple Many people outside the university are against comprehensive 
exams. 
2.82(1.84) 
   Complex An abundance of individuals outside academic institutions 






15 Weak Pro Simple Requiring students from some schools to take comprehensive 
exams, but not students from other schools, is analogous to racial 
discrimination. 
2.83(2.18) 
   Complex Necessitating students from some academic institutions to 
undertake comprehensive exams, while not requiring this of 
students from other academic institutions, can be seen as 
analogous to racial discrimination. 
3.24(2.11) 
  Con Simple Requiring students from some schools to take comprehensive 
exams, when the exams cannot be given to students from other 
schools, is analogous to racial discrimination. 
3.11(2.58) 
   Complex Necessitating students from some academic institutions to 
undertake comprehensive exams, when the exams cannot be 
given to students from other academic institutions, can be seen as 
analogous to racial discrimination. 
3.52(2.21) 
16 Weak Pro Simple The risk of failing comprehensive exams is a challenge most 
students would welcome. 
3.90(2.47) 
   Complex The perilousness of failing to reach the required standard of 
comprehensive exams is an adversity a majority of students 
would embrace. 
4.91(2.43) 
  Con Simple The risk of failing comprehensive exams is a pressure that 
undergraduate students should not have to face. 
5.36(2.50) 
   Complex The perilousness of failing to reach the required standard of 
comprehensive exams is an adversity that undergraduate students 








We adapted 24 arguments from Petty et al. (1980) in support of “senior 
comprehensive exams,” a policy in which students would be required, in addition to passing 
their individual courses, to pass a general exam in their major area of study in order to 
graduate. Although this policy is robustly unpopular in previous research on students (e.g., 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty et al., 1980; see also Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Tormala et al., 
2002) no studies have examined it in a more general population. Thus, before using them in 




One hundred residents of the United States completed the pretest via MTurk (M age = 
35.78, SD age = 11.03; 48 females, 52 males). All participants participated via MTurk had a 
history of providing good-quality responses with an approval rate of higher than 99%. Data 
from participants who did not complete the entire study were discarded prior to analysis.  
Procedure and Materials 
After providing written informed consent, all participants were told that the study 
investigated opinions toward university policies. They received a brief description of the 
comprehensive exams, and then indicated their initial opinion about the exams, by selecting 
one of three statements: “I support comprehensive exams,” “I am against comprehensive 
exams,” or “I have no opinion at the moment.” After that, all participants received twenty-
four arguments, purportedly acquired from anonymous surveys, in support of the 
comprehensive exam, adapted from Petty et al. (1980). Of twenty-four, there were eight 




by Petty et al. (see Table S1). Participants rated each argument, in random order, in terms of 
“how good/convincing each argument was for the senior comprehensive exams to be 
implemented,” using a 9-point scale anchored at 1 (this reason is very poor) and 9 (this 
reason is very good). Finally, all participants answered a few demographics questions and a 
data-quality check (“Did you honestly answer the questions in this survey? You’ll be paid 
regardless of how you answer.”), before being thanked and provided an email contact for 
further inquiries about the study.  
Table S1 
Twenty-four Arguments Adapted from Petty et al. (1980) 
# A Priori 
Strength 
Argument Supporting the Comprehensive Exam 
1 Strong Prestigious universities have comprehensive exams to maintain academic 
excellence. 
2 Strong Institution of comprehensive exams has led to a reversal in the declining 
scores on standardized achievement tests at other universities. 
3 Strong Graduate and professional schools show a preference for undergraduates 
who have passed comprehensive exams. 
4 Strong Average starting salaries are higher for graduates of schools with 
comprehensive exams. 
5 Strong Schools with comprehensive exams attract larger and more well-known 
corporations to recruit students for jobs. 





7 Strong University alumni would increase financial support if 
comprehensive exams were instituted, allowing a tuition increase to be 
avoided. 
8 Strong Universities that institute comprehensive exams subsequently receive 
higher ratings on international surveys. 
9 Weak Adopting comprehensive exams would allow a university to be at the 
forefront of a national trend. 
10 Weak Graduate students complain that since they have to take comprehensive 
exams, undergraduates should take them as well. 
11 Weak By not administering comprehensive exams, a tradition dating back to the 
ancient Greeks would be violated. 
12 Weak Parents often write to university administrators in support of 
comprehensive exams. 
13 Weak Comprehensive exams would increase student fear and anxiety enough to 
promote more studying. 
14 Weak Comprehensive exams would help cut costs by eliminating the necessity 
for other tests. 
15 Weak Comprehensive exams would allow students to compare their 
performance with that of students at other schools. 
16 Weak Job prospects might be improved. 
17 Very 
weak 
Many people outside the university support comprehensive exams. 
18 Very 
weak 







Graduate students say they benefit from comprehensive exams, and the 
same benefits might accrue to undergraduates. 
20 Very 
weak 
Requiring students from some schools to take comprehensive exams, but 
not students from other schools, is analogous to racial discrimination. 
21 Very 
weak 




The difficulty of comprehensive exams would prepare a student for later 
competitions in life. 
23 Very 
weak 








One participant indicated that their data were not reliable and was, thus, excluded, 
leaving a total of 99 online participants (M age = 35.85, SD age = 11.07; 48 females, 51 
males) in the analyses. A plurality (47.5%) supported the exams, while 28.3% had no opinion 
and 24.2% were opposed the exams. This was opposite from previous research that university 
students are usually opposed to the exams (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), suggesting that, 
unlike in previous research, for our online MTurk sample the arguments were attitude-
congruent, instead of attitude-incongruent. 
Average ratings of argument persuasiveness were analyzed in a 3 (A priori argument 
strength: Strong versus Weak versus Very weak) repeated measure analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). All followed-up pairwise comparisons were applied Bonferroni adjustment. 




and the degrees of freedom were consequently corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates 
(ε = .80). As expected, the results revealed a significant main effect of a priori argument 
strength, F(1.59, 155.75) = 143.77, p < .001, partial η2 = .60. Strong arguments (M = 6.38, 
SD = 1.32) were more convincing than both weak arguments (M = 4.40, SD = 1.51), p < .001, 
and very weak arguments (M = 4.56, SD = 1.68), p < .001. However, surprisingly, there was 
no significant difference between weak and very weak arguments, p = .208. 
From these results, we selected for use in the main studies all eight strong arguments 
and the eight weakest arguments from the combined set of “weak” and “very weak” 
arguments as a new set of weak arguments for the main study (see Table S2). For both 
samples, all the eight weakest arguments received the lowest ratings, relative to other 
arguments. 
Table S2 
Pretest Ratings of the Newly Selected 16 Argument Persuasiveness 
# A Priori 
Strength 
Argument Supporting the Comprehensive Exam M(SD) 
1 Strong Prestigious universities have comprehensive exams to maintain 
academic excellence. 
6.23(2.15) 
2 Strong Institution of comprehensive exams has led to a reversal in the 
declining scores on standardized achievement tests at other 
universities. 
6.19(1.98) 
3 Strong Graduate and professional schools show a preference for 
undergraduates who have passed comprehensive exams. 
6.68(1.70) 






5 Strong Schools with comprehensive exams attract larger and more well-
known corporations to recruit students for jobs. 
6.75(1.89) 
6 Strong The quality of undergraduate teaching has improved at schools with 
comprehensive exams. 
6.99(1.82) 
7 Strong University alumni would increase financial support if 
comprehensive exams were instituted, allowing a tuition increase to be 
avoided. 
5.78(2.30) 
8 Strong Universities that institute comprehensive exams subsequently receive 
higher ratings on international surveys. 
5.42(2.33) 
9 Weak Adopting comprehensive exams would allow a university to be at the 
forefront of a national trend. 
4.41(2.45) 
10 Weak Graduate students complain that since they have to take 
comprehensive exams, undergraduates should take them as well. 
3.36(2.41) 
11 Weak By not administering comprehensive exams, a tradition dating back to 
the ancient Greeks would be violated. 
2.44(2.21) 
12 Weak Parents often write to university administrators in support of 
comprehensive exams. 
3.62(2.29) 
13 Weak Comprehensive exams would increase student fear and anxiety 
enough to promote more studying. 
3.84(2.67) 
14 Weak Many people outside the university support comprehensive exams. 3.91(2.36) 
15 Weak Requiring students from some schools to take comprehensive exams, 
but not students from other schools, is analogous to racial 
discrimination. 
3.56(2.60) 







Similar to Study 1, we pretested the persuasiveness of a priori eight strong and eight 
weak con arguments.  
Method 
Participants  
One hundred and eight residents of the United States completed the pretest via MTurk 
(M age = 35.39, SD age = 11.04; 41 females, 65 males, 2 other).  
Procedure and Materials 
To create a novel set of con arguments, we used the same set of arguments in Study 1 
and, for each argument, replaced certain words with their antonyms and/or by adding 
negation (see Lord et al., 1979) (see Table S3).  
Similar to Study 1, after providing written informed consent, all participants were told 
that the study investigated opinions toward university policies. They received a brief 
description of the comprehensive exams, and then indicated their initial opinion about the 
exams. Then, all participants received 16 arguments (eight strong and eight weak) against the 
exams and rated the persuasiveness of each argument in a random order (i.e., how 
good/convincing each argument was for the senior comprehensive exams to be implemented) 
using a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (this reason is very poor) to 9 (this reason is very good). 
Finally, all participants answered a few demographics questions and data-quality check 
questions (“Were the reasons you just read in support of, or against, the implementation of 
comprehensive exams?” and “Did you honestly answer the questions in this survey?”). 








Twenty-two participant did not pass the attention check questions and were, thus, 
excluded, leaving a total of 86 online participants (M age = 36.26, SD age = 11.02; 32 
females, 52 males, 2 other) in the analyses. Consistent with the results from Study 1, a 
plurality (46.5%) supported the exams, while 27.9% had no opinion and 25.6% were against 
the exams, suggesting that the con arguments here were predominantly attitude-incongruent. 
A paired sample t-test suggested that a priori strong arguments (M = 5.73, SD = 1.56) were 
significantly more convincing than weak arguments (M = 3.89, SD =1.67), t(85) = 10.33, p < 
.001, 95%CI of the difference = [1.49, 2.19].  
Table S3 
Pretest Ratings of the Persuasiveness of Arguments Against the Comprehensive Exam  
# A Priori 
Strength 
Argument Against the Comprehensive Exam M(SD) 
1 Strong Prestigious universities do not use comprehensive exams to maintain 
academic excellence. 
5.40(2.65) 
2 Strong Institution of comprehensive exams has led to a reversal in the 
increasing scores on standardized achievement tests at other 
universities. 
5.74(2.27) 
3 Strong Graduate and professional schools show no preference whether 
undergraduates have passed comprehensive exams. 
6.10(2.48) 
4 Strong Average starting salaries are higher for graduates of schools without 
comprehensive exams. 
5.79(2.52) 
5 Strong Schools without comprehensive exams attract larger and more well-





6 Strong The quality of undergraduate teaching has worsened at schools with 
comprehensive exams. 
6.28(2.38) 
7 Strong University alumni would decrease financial support if 
comprehensive exams were instituted, causing a tuition increase. 
5.71(2.34) 
8 Strong Universities that institute comprehensive exams subsequently receive 
lower ratings on international surveys. 
5.21(2.34) 
9 Weak Rejecting comprehensive exams would allow a university to be at the 
forefront of a national trend. 
3.48(2.34) 
10 Weak Graduate students argue that since they already take comprehensive 
exams, so undergraduates should do something different. 
3.83(2.45) 
11 Weak By not administering comprehensive exams, a tradition dating back to 
the ancient Greeks would be maintained. 
2.78(2.30) 
12 Weak Parents often write to university administrators opposing 
comprehensive exams. 
3.29(2.70) 
13 Weak Comprehensive exams would increase student fear and anxiety 
enough to stop them from studying. 
5.07(2.7) 
14 Weak Many people outside the university are against comprehensive exams. 3.65(2.44) 
15 Weak Requiring students from some schools to take comprehensive exams, 
when the exams cannot be given to students from other schools, is 
analogous to racial discrimination. 
3.86(2.66) 
16 Weak The risk of failing comprehensive exams is a pressure that 
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Chapter 4: This is Important! Motivation Mitigates the Effect of Processing Difficulty 
on Persuasiveness 



























While previous research mainly examined the independent impacts of argument content and 
argument “experience” on attitudes, the causal relationship between the two has received less 
attention. In two studies, we report direct evidence of the disruptive impact of processing 
difficulty, operationalized as language complexity, on perceived argument persuasiveness, 
and attitude change. In Study 1 (N = 438), participants (recruited online from the United 
States) differentiated between strong and weak arguments less effectively when the 
arguments were difficult to understand, though the indirect effect was limited to strong 
arguments. In Study 2 (N = 433) we conjectured that motivation played a moderating role, 
and showed that difficulty affected perceived persuasiveness and attitude change only in 
unmotivated participants; highly motivated participants were not affected. Moderated 
mediation results supported that argument persuasiveness mediated the effect of difficulty on 
attitude change. The results demonstrate the relationship between information and processing 
experience and how both ability and motivation influence one’s perception of quality and 
subsequent attitude change. 












Underlying a wide array of phenomena, from political campaigns to commercial 
sponsorships to dating apps, lies one of the most fundamental questions in social psychology: 
by what mechanism(s) do attitudes change in response to new information? Researchers’ 
answers generally concentrate on the use of arguments to persuade people (see Albarracín & 
Vargas, 2010; Maio & Haddock, 2010; Visser & Cooper, 2007), asking what makes for 
“good” ones (e.g., Ranganath et al., 2010), and when good arguments even matter (e.g., 
Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
According to one of the most influential models of persuasion, the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), attitude change occurs via one of two 
processing routes, depending on the motivation and/or cognitive resources available to 
process (“elaborate on”) the argument content. In the “central route,” when people are 
capable and/or motivated to expend their cognitive effort to elaborate and scrutinize the 
quality of arguments, attitude change is the product of the relative valence of thoughts 
elicited in response to them. “Strong” and “weak” arguments, in terms of the ELM, are those 
eliciting predominantly positive and negative thoughts, which in turn (if cognitive and 
motivational conditions are right) persuade or dissuade the audience, respectively, toward the 
advocated issue. In contrast, in the “peripheral route” argument quality is less relevant, as 
people are unable or unmotivated to attend the arguments, and instead rely on superficial 
persuasive cues such as the persuader’s attractiveness (e.g., Pallak et al., 1983; Puckett et al., 
1983), expertise (e.g., Hovland et al., 1953; Petty et al., 1981), likability (e.g., Petty et al., 
1983), or number of arguments (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1984).  
However, another line of research has shown that not only are people’s attitudes 
influenced by what information they process, but also how they experience processing it (for 
reviews see Schwarz, 1998, 2004, 2018). For example, in Schwarz et al.’s (1991) seminal 




less assertive than those who retrieved six examples, a paradoxical effect from the 
perspective of the ELM, given that the former had twice as many “arguments” as the latter to 
support their assertiveness. The paradox is resolved by considering the experience of 
argument generation: twelve arguments are more difficult to generate than six, which may be 
taken as metacognitive evidence that good arguments are not readily available. These effects 
have been replicated and extended in other judgment domains, including attitudes (Briñol et 
al., 2006; Haddock et al., 1999; Haddock et al., 1996; Tormala et al., 2007; Tormala et al., 
2002; Wänke et al., 1996), product evaluations (Wänke & Bless, 2000; Wänke et al., 1997), 
and risk assessments (Grayson & Schwarz, 1999; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998), among others. 
The general conclusion of this body of work is that people sometimes base their judgments 
on their subjective experience of the process of argumentation, rather than (or in addition to) 
the output of it. 
However, while most of this work treats argument content and experienced difficulty 
as independent (albeit sometimes competing) factors (e.g., Briñol et al., 2006; Schwarz et al., 
1991; Tormala et al., 2007; Tormala et al., 2002; Wänke et al., 1996), their causal 
relationship has received less attention. Yet several related lines of research suggest that 
evidence and arguments should be less influential when perceivers experience difficulty 
evaluating them. In the terms of the ELM, processing difficulty, if sufficiently severe, might 
interfere with perceivers’ ability to elaborate on arguments, thereby reducing their impact. 
Indeed, research employing various forms of distraction has illustrated the disruptive effect of 
difficult processing (e.g., Petty et al., 1976; Harkins & Petty 1981; Jeong & Hwang 2012; Lee 
& Cappella 2013). Petty and colleagues (1976), for example, presented university students 
with a priori strong and weak arguments supporting a tuition increase (Study 1) and a tuition 
decrease (Study 2), while varying the level of distraction (by flashing the letter “X” on the 




arguments, reported fewer favorable thoughts about strong arguments, as well as fewer 
unfavorable thoughts about weak arguments, compared to controls, causing those arguments 
to have correspondingly less impact on attitudes. Similarly, arguments that are difficult to 
process might interfere with the receiver’s ability to generate the internal responses that 
mediate attitude change, thereby mitigating the arguments’ effectiveness. 
The literature on cognitive fluency – the subjective ease with which a stimulus is 
perceived or processed (for reviews, see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Oppenheimer, 2008; 
Reber & Unkelbach, 2010) – also suggests a causal role for argument experience on 
argument persuasiveness, but via a different mechanism. Specifically, because disfluency is 
experienced as negative, perceivers may misattribute their negative affective reaction to 
argument content. Oppenheimer (2006), for example, found that participants were less 
“persuaded” by English Literature graduate school applications (i.e., they thought the 
applicants were less well suited to graduate school) when the applicants’ essays were written 
with complicated vocabulary than with simpler vocabulary, presumably because the negative 
affect experienced when having difficulty processing the essays was misattributed to their 
content. In a conceptually related paradigm, Reber and Schwarz (1999) found that statements, 
such as “Lima is in Peru,” were less likely to be judged true when they were difficult to 
process (e.g., printed in a light blue font on a white background) than when they were easy 
(e.g., printed in a dark font on a white background). Similarly, in the context of attitude 
change, arguments that are difficult to perceive or understand may elicit negative affect that 
is misattributed to their quality, leading in turn to relatively less positive attitudes. 
The goals of the current research were, first, to directly examine the causal role of 
processing difficulty on subjective argument quality and, in turn, attitude change; and second, 
to consider the mechanism and conditions under which difficulty effects occur. In two 




arguments for controversial propositions using relatively easy or relatively difficult-to-
understand language, then measured participants’ evaluations of those arguments, as well as 
any attitude change resulting from them. Our paradigm permits the contrast of two 
mechanisms: if difficulty disrupts argument elaboration, strong arguments should be judged 
as worse arguments, and weak arguments should be judged as better arguments, when the 
arguments are difficult (versus easy) to understand, resulting in a relatively smaller advantage 
for strong over weak arguments (i.e., an argument strength × processing difficulty 
interaction). On the other hand, if difficulty affects argument evaluation and persuasion via 
misattribution, both strong and weak arguments should be judged as worse arguments, and 
both should produce less attitude change, when the arguments are difficult (i.e., a main effect 




Four hundred and thirty-eight residents of the United States completed the study via 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (M age = 37.86, SD age = 11.54; 212 females, 224 males, 2 
“other”). All participants had a history of providing good-quality responses, with an approval 
rate greater than 99%. Sample size was set to exceed a recently recommended minimum of 
one-hundred participants per between-participants condition required to achieve 80% power 
to detect an “theoretically meaningful” effect size of d = .4 (Brysbaert, 2019). 
Materials and Procedure 
All participants were told, truthfully, that this study examined opinions toward 
university policies. After providing written informed consent, they received a brief 
description about “senior comprehensive exams” – a policy (widely used in previous research 




pass a general exam, on top of completing their individual courses, in their major area prior to 
graduation. They then indicated their initial attitude toward the exams on a continuous sliding 
scale, anchored at 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 100 (“strongly agree”).  
Next, participants were presented with a list of either eight strong or weak arguments 
in favor of the comprehensive exams, written with either simple or complex vocabularies 
(with both factors manipulated between participants; see Tables 1 and 2). The arguments 
were drawn from Petty et al. (1980) and adapted via a processing difficulty manipulation 
developed by Oppenheimer (2006). Specifically, arguments were made more difficult to 
process by increasing the linguistic complexity of the arguments such that for each argument, 
where possible and without altering meaning, some words were replaced with their longer 
and more complex synonyms. Participants were instructed to read and rate the persuasiveness 
of each argument (“how good/convincing each argument is for the senior comprehensive 
exams to be implemented”) in a random order using a 9-point scale anchored at 1 (“this 















Table 1  
Strong Arguments Supporting the Comprehensive Exam Used in Study 1 
# Simple Condition Complex Condition 
1 Prestigious universities have 
comprehensive exams to maintain 
academic excellence. 
Prestigious academic institutions have 
implemented comprehensive exams to 
perpetuate academic preeminence. 
2 Institution of comprehensive exams has led 
to a reversal in the declining scores on 
standardized achievement tests at other 
universities. 
Implementation of comprehensive exams has 
contributed to an overturning in the deteriorating 
scores on standardized achievement 
examinations at other academic institutions. 
3 Graduate and professional schools show a 
preference for undergraduates who have 
passed comprehensive exams. 
Graduate and professional academic institutions 
demonstrate a predilection for undergraduate 
students who have succeeded in comprehensive 
exams. 
4 Average starting salaries are higher for 
graduates of schools with 
comprehensive exams. 
Average baseline salaries are superior for 
students who graduate from academic 
institutions that implement comprehensive 
exams. 
5 Schools with comprehensive exams attract 
larger and more well-known corporations 
to recruit students for jobs. 
Academic institutions that implement 
comprehensive exams attract more substantial 
and more prominent business organizations to 
recruit students for employment. 
6 The quality of undergraduate teaching has 
improved at schools with 
comprehensive exams. 
The quality of undergraduate instruction has 
been enhanced at academic institutions that 




7 University alumni would increase financial 
support if comprehensive exams were 
instituted, allowing a tuition increase to be 
avoided. 
Alumni of the academic institution would 
augment their financial contribution if the 
academic institution implemented 
comprehensive exams, enabling a tuition 
escalation to be circumvented. 
8 Universities that institute 
comprehensive exams subsequently receive 
higher ratings on international surveys. 
Academic institutions that implement 
comprehensive exams subsequently receive 
more favorable assessments on internationally 
recognized surveys. 
 
Table 2  
Weak Arguments Supporting the Comprehensive Exam Used in Study 1 
# Simple Condition Complex Condition 
1 Adopting comprehensive exams would 
allow a university to be at the forefront of a 
national trend. 
Implementing comprehensive exams would 
create an opportunity for an academic institution 
to position itself at the vanguard of a national 
trend. 
2 Graduate students complain that since they 
have to take comprehensive exams, 
undergraduates should take them as well. 
Graduate students express their dissatisfaction 
that since they are obligated to complete 
comprehensive exams, undergraduate students 
should be required to undertake them as well. 
3 By not administering 
comprehensive exams, a tradition dating 
back to the ancient Greeks would be 
violated. 
If academic institutions do not administer 
comprehensive exams, a traditional educational 
practice antedating to the immemorial Greeks 




4 Parents often write to university 
administrators in support of comprehensive 
exams. 
Parents often communicate with administrators 
of academic institutions expressing their support 
of the implementation of comprehensive exams. 
5 Comprehensive exams would increase 
student fear and anxiety enough to promote 
more studying. 
Implementation of comprehensive exams would 
exacerbate student fear and anxiety enough to 
stimulate more devotion and attention to 
acquiring knowledge. 
6 Many people outside the university support 
comprehensive exams. 
An abundance of individuals outside academic 
institutions champion the implementation of 
comprehensive exams. 
7 Requiring students from some schools to 
take comprehensive exams, but not 
students from other schools, is analogous 
to racial discrimination. 
Necessitating students from some academic 
institutions to undertake comprehensive exams, 
while not requiring this of students from other 
academic institutions, can be seen as analogous 
to racial discrimination. 
8 The risk of failing comprehensive exams is 
a challenge most students would welcome. 
The perilousness of failing to reach the required 
standard of comprehensive exams is an adversity 
a majority of students would embrace. 
 
After reading and evaluating each argument, participants were asked, “now that you 
have read reasons that people have offered for these exams,” to indicate if their attitude had 
changed, using the same sliding scale, with the slider set to their previous response (if their 
attitude was unchanged, they were told, they could leave the slider where it was, and proceed 




Next, as a manipulation check, participants rated how difficult overall it was to 
understand the arguments, using a 9-point scale anchored at “extremely easy” and “extremely 
difficult.” Finally, participants answered a few demographics and data quality check 
questions (“Were the reasons you just read in support of, or against, the implementation of 
comprehensive exams?” and “Did you honestly answer the questions in this survey?”). 
Results 
Seventy-four participants were excluded from the analyses based on a priori criteria, 
56 because they could not pass the attention-check questions and 18 because they spent less 
than thirty seconds in total reading and evaluating the quality of the eight arguments. Thus, a 
total of 364 participants (M age = 38.50, SD age = 11.28; 174 females, 188 males, 2 “other”) 
was included in the analyses.  
As a manipulation check, difficulty ratings were submitted to a 2 (Argument strength: 
Strong versus Weak) × 2 (Language complexity: Simple versus Complex) analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA), with both factors treated as between-participant variables and prior 
attitude as a covariate. The main effect of language complexity verified that the manipulation 
was successful, F(1, 359) = 78.27, p < .001, partial η2 = .18. Complexly worded arguments 
(M = 3.66, SD = 2.09) were more difficult to understand than simply worded arguments (M = 
2.02, SD = 1.36). No other effects were significant. 
Average ratings of argument persuasiveness were analyzed in the same way. The 
covariate, prior attitude, was significantly related to perceived argument persuasiveness, F(1, 
359) = 114.16, p < .001, partial η2 = .24; the more participants initially agreed with the 
institution of the exams, the better they perceived the arguments to be, independent of their 
strength. Unsurprisingly, the main effect of argument strength was also significant, F(1, 359) 
= 269.30, p < .001, partial η2 = .43, such that strong arguments (M = 5.92, SD = 1.61; 




difference = [.69, 1.15]) were perceived as more persuasive than weak arguments (M = 3.50, 
SD = 1.51; significantly lower than the scale midpoint, t(171) = –13.03, p < .001, 95% CI of 
the difference = [–1.72, –1.27]). Most importantly, in line with the account that difficulty 
disrupts argument elaboration, the interaction between argument strength and language 
complexity was significant, F(1, 359) = 6.20, p = .013, partial η2 = .02, such that the 
difference between strong and weak arguments narrowed when the arguments were hard 
versus easy to process (see Figure 1a). Follow-up analyses indicated that strong, complex 
arguments (M = 5.63, SD = 1.62) were perceived as less persuasive than strong, simple 
arguments (M = 6.22, SD = 1.56), p = .011, but weak, complex arguments (M = 3.61, SD = 
1.51) were nonsignificantly more persuasive than weak, simple arguments (M = 3.40, SD = 
1.50), p = .311. The main effect of language complexity was not significant, F(1, 359) = 
1.03, p = .310, partial η2 < .01, providing no evidence for the operation of a misattribution 
mechanism. 
Final attitude ratings were also submitted to the same analysis. Unsurprisingly, most 
of the variance in final attitudes was accounted for by prior attitudes, F(1, 359) = 1510.50, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .81. However, independent of this stability, a main effect of argument 
strength, F(1, 359) = 30.94, p < .001, partial η2 = .08, confirmed that participants reported 
more positive attitudes toward the exams after evaluating strong arguments (M = 64.47, SD = 
29.02) than weak arguments (M = 53.54, SD = 33.49) (see Figure 1b). Additional t-tests 
suggested that participants reported positive attitude change (i.e., the difference between pre- 
and post-argument attitudes; M = 2.77, SD = 14.99) after reading strong arguments, t(191) = 
2.56, p = .011, 95% CI of the difference = [.63, 4.90], but negative attitude change (M = –
4.92, SD = 12.67) after reading weak, ostensibly supportive, arguments, t(171) = –5.09, p < 
.001, 95% CI of the difference = [–6.83, –3.01]. The main effect of complexity was not 




argument strength and complexity was also not significant, F(1, 359) = .12, p = .726, partial 
η2 < .01.  
Figure 1 
Argument Persuasiveness Ratings and Post-argument Attitude Ratings as a Function of 
Language Complexity and Argument Strength with Prior Belief in Study 1 
 
Note. The covariate was evaluated at 60.17. Error bars show standard errors. 
Mediation 
To test the full model, in which processing difficulty impacts attitudes via perceived 
argument persuasiveness, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis, with language 
complexity (dummy coded) as an independent variable, argument strength (dummy coded) as 
a moderator, perceived argument persuasiveness as a mediator, and prior attitude as a 
covariate, using PROCESS v3.3, model 8 (see Hayes & Rockwood, 2017), with 10,000 
bootstrap resamples (see Figure 2). Consistent with the previously reported analyses, prior 
attitude was positively related to perceived argument persuasiveness, B = .02, SE = .002, 
t(359) = 10.68, p < .001, and strong arguments were rated as more persuasive than weak 




arguments were difficult to process, B = –.71, SE = .28, t(359) = –2.49, p = .013. Conditional 
effects suggested that language complexity had influence on perceived persuasiveness only in 
strong arguments, B = –.50, SE = .20, t(359) = –2.55, p = .011, but not weak arguments, B = 
.21, SE = .21, t(359) = 1.01, p = .311. Furthermore, as above, both prior attitude and 
argument persuasiveness independently predicted final attitude, B = .84, SE = .03, t(358) = 
32.52, p < .001, and B = 3.07, SE = .51, t(358) = 6.03, p < .001. The interaction between 
language complexity and argument strength on attitudes was not significant, B = 3.19, SE = 
2.77, t(358) = 1.15, p = .251.  
Importantly, the index of moderated mediation was significant, B = –2.18, SE = .97, 
95% CI = [–4.27, –.44]. Inspection of the conditional indirect effects showed that, for strong 
arguments, the indirect effect through argument persuasiveness was significant, B = –1.53, SE 
= .69, 95% CI = [–3.04, –.32]; strong but difficult arguments were seen as less persuasive 
than easier ones, which in turn predicted less extreme attitudes. The converse effect was not 
















Conceptual and Statistical Moderated Mediation Models of Data from Study 1 
 
Note. The mediating effect of argument persuasiveness on attitude, conditioned on a priori 
argument strength (strong or weak), with language complexity as an independent variable and 
prior attitude as a covariate. The values represent unstandardized regression coefficients 






Previous research has established that both the content of arguments and the 
experience of thinking about them can influence attitudes and has also suggested multiple 
mechanisms by which these two factors might themselves be causally related. In Study 1, we 
found direct evidence that the difficulty with which arguments can be comprehended affects 
their perceived quality – presumably via interference with their elaboration (and 
counterarguments) – and in turn their impact on post-argument attitudes. An alternative 
account in which difficulty-driven negative affect is misattributed to argument quality was 
not supported.  
Although a narrowing of strong and weak arguments’ impact is predicted by the 
interference account, a closer inspection of the data revealed that the effect of difficulty was 
only evident in strong arguments; weak arguments were more persuasive when difficult than 
when easy to understand, but not significantly so. A possible explanation for this asymmetry 
might be the fact that, according to the ELM, in addition to the ability to elaborate, the extent 
to which people are motivated to attend to arguments also matters (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986; Wegener et al., 1995). Given that individuals are more motivated to process arguments 
that are incompatible with their existing beliefs (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; Edwards & 
Smith 1996; Festinger, 1957), and that most participants in the current study initially 
supported the proposed comprehensive exams, participants might have been more motivated 
to elaborate and counterargue weak arguments (which were functionally counter-attitudinal, 
as evidenced by the overall negative attitude change they produced; Clark & Wegener, 2013; 
Festinger, 1957). It is possible, then, that this relatively enhanced argument elaboration might 
compensate for the interference of processing difficulty, accounting for the observed null 






To replicate and extend our previous findings, Study 2 investigated whether 
motivation plays a moderating, compensatory role in how difficulty impacts perceived 
argument quality and subsequent persuasion. Previous research has shown several 
motivational factors that heighten elaboration, such as issue relevance (e.g., Haugtvedt & 
Wegener, 1994; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979), personal responsibility (Petty et al., 1977; Petty et 
al., 1980), and individual differences (e.g., Need for Cognition; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). For 
example, Petty et al. (1980) led student participants to believe that they were either the only 
person (high personal responsibility) or one of ten people (low personal responsibility) 
responsible for evaluating arguments supporting comprehensive exams, and found that 
favorable thoughts increased and unfavorable thoughts decreased in response to strong and 
weak arguments, respectively, when responsibility was low versus high. Similarly, we 
predicted that the effects in Study 1 would also depend on the motivation to elaborate 
(operationalized as the importance attributed to participants’ responses). In particular, if the 
null effect in weak arguments was due to heightened motivation, we predicted that the 
disruptive impact of difficulty on argument persuasiveness, and in turn attitude change, 
should be attenuated even in strong arguments when the motivation to elaborate is high.  
Method 
Participants  
Four hundred and thirty-three residents of the United States completed the study via 
MTurk (M age = 38.12, SD age = 12.18; 206 females, 226 males, 1 “other”). Rationale for the 
sample size and data exclusion criteria were the same as in Study 1. 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants volunteered for a study investigating “opinions toward online research 




Cognitive Skills test” – a hypothetical “standardized test of memory, attention, self-control, 
and response speed.” The test was proposed to be administered to “all current and prospective 
participants in online research to improve online data quality, and users who scored too low 
on this test would be unable to take part in any research until they retested and reached the 
minimum standards.” Eight novel arguments (see Table 3) were developed in support of the 
test, which we considered strong based on their likelihood of eliciting positive thoughts, 
sound logic, and reliance on (hypothetical) data (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty et al., 
1980). As in Study 1, a separate set of difficult arguments was created by systematically 
manipulating the language used in each argument, while retaining its meaning.  
Table 3  
Strong Arguments Supporting the Basic Cognitive Skills Test Used in Study 2 
# Simple Condition Complex Condition 
1 Requiring people to pass the BCS test 
would allow researchers to design shorter 
and more engaging studies for those people. 
Necessitating individuals to succeed at the BCS 
test would enable researchers to formulate more 
succinct and more fascinating experiments for 
those individuals. 
2 The BCS test can block scam bots, giving 
more chances for real people to earn money. 
The BCS test can forestall scam bots, presenting 
more opportunities for actual individuals to 
procure remuneration. 
3 Researchers will pay higher rates to people 
who have passed the BCS test. 
Researchers will provide greater remuneration to 
individuals who have succeeded at the BCS test. 
4 Studies using people who have passed the 
BCS test will have a bigger impact on 
science. 
Experiments employing individuals who have 
succeeded at the BCS test will be more impactful 




5 If the BCS test is used to set high standards, 
researchers will run more studies online. 
If the BCS test is utilized to establish elevated 
benchmarks, researchers will implement more 
experiments online.  
6 People can put good BCS scores on their 
resumes, improving their job prospects. 
Individuals can cite proficient BCS scores on 
their curriculum vitaes, enhancing their 
employment opportunities. 
7 Setting high standards using the BCS test 
will improve the reputation of all online 
research and online workers.   
Establishing high-level benchmarks by means of 
the BCS test will ameliorate the reputation of all 
online experiments as well as online research 
participants. 
8 Because everyone will have to take the 
same test, the BCS will prevent any national 
or cultural biases in choosing participants. 
Because every individual will be obligated to 
participate in the identical assessment, the BCS 
will pre-empt any national or cultural partialities 
in participant recruitment.  
 
To manipulate participants’ motivation, we varied the importance of their opinions, 
by highlighting their personal responsibility for the test’s implementation (e.g., Petty et al., 
1977; Petty et al., 1980), as well as the time frame in which the cognitive skills test would be 
implemented (see Petty et al., 2001). Specifically, in the motivated condition, participants 
were told that the test was proposed to be implemented within a year and, thus, were 
instructed to “read and evaluate each argument carefully” because “your opinions would help 
inform decisions about the BCS test.” In the low motivation condition, participants were told 
that the test would not be implemented for at least another five years, and no mention was 




The procedure was similar to that of Study 1, with three additional motivation-related 
measures. First, after rating subjective difficulty of processing the arguments, participants 
were then asked to indicate on 9-point scales: (1) “Overall, how much effort did you put into 
evaluating the arguments?,” using a 9-point scale anchored at “very low effort” and “very 
high effort” as the main measure of motivation/elaboration (Petty et al., 1977; also see 
Wegener et al., 1995); (2) “Overall, how much do you think the implementation of the Basic 
Cognitive Skills (BCS) test will likely affect you?” (“will not affect me” versus “will affect 
me”); and (3) “Overall, how important would you say the implementation of the Basic 
Cognitive Skills (BCS) test is to you personally?” (“not important at all” versus “extremely 
important.”)  
Results 
Sixty-six participants were excluded from the analyses: 21 because they could not 
pass the attention-check questions, 45 because they spent less than thirty seconds reading and 
evaluating the quality of eight arguments, and 2 because they participated in the study more 
than once (their first responses were included). A total of 364 participants (M age = 38.90, SD 
age = 12.38; 184 females, 179 males, 1 other) was thus included in the analyses.  
As a manipulation check of experienced difficulty, overall difficulty ratings were 
submitted to a 2 (Language complexity: Simple versus Complex) × 2 (Motivation level: Low 
versus High) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), with both factors treated as between-
participant variables and prior attitude as a covariate. A main effect of language complexity 
verified that the manipulation was successful, F(1, 359) = 40.94, p < .001, partial η2 = .10. 
Complexly worded arguments (M = 3.22, SD = 2.00) were more difficult to understand than 
simply worded arguments (M = 2.01, SD = 1.60). Other effects were not significant. 
To check the motivation manipulation, overall effort ratings were submitted to the 




not significant, F(1, 359) = .90, p = .345, partial η2 < .01, and no other significant effects 
emerged.5 Upon looking at the distribution of effort ratings, a majority of participants 
(86.2%) rated their effort to be high (at least 7 out of 9), while nearly half of participants 
(45.3%) reported putting in “very high effort” (i.e., 9). It is possible that participants 
interpreted this question as a credibility-check question and inferred that their MTurk 
credibility ratings might be at stake (see Hauser et al., 2018), leading to the null effect 
observed. Given that previous studies have used the same manipulation to enhance 
elaboration successfully (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Wegener et al., 1995), we proceeded 
to the main analyses, but the data from the manipulation check remain a caveat to the results 
and a caution in their interpretation.  
A one-sample t-test confirmed that the arguments were, overall, considered “strong” 
(i.e., rated above the scale midpoint; M = 6.78, SD = 1.46), t(363) = 23.26, p < .001, 95% CI 
of the difference = [1.63, 1.93]. As in Study 1, prior attitude predicted perceived argument 
persuasiveness, F(1, 359) = 163.53, p < .001, partial η2 = .31; the more participants initially 
agreed with the BCS test, the better they perceived the arguments to be. A main effect of 
language complexity was also significant, F(1, 359) = 11.35, p = .001, partial η2 = .03, such 
that complex arguments (M = 6.52, SD = 1.47) were perceived as less persuasive than their 
simple counterparts (M = 7.06, SD = 1.41). More importantly, consistent with our predictions, 
this effect was conditioned on motivation level, F(1, 359) = 13.48, p < .001, partial η2 = .04. 
Conceptually replicating Study 1, in the low motivation condition, complex arguments (M = 
6.40, SD = 1.32) were judged less persuasive than simple arguments (M = 7.32, SD = 1.13), p 
< .001, but, as predicted, there was no difference between complex and simple arguments in 
 
5 Personal importance and personal relevance ratings were also submitted to the same 




the high motivation condition (M = 6.63, SD = 1.61 versus M = 6.78, SD = 1.61), p = .835 
(see Figure 3a). No other effects were significant. 
Final attitude ratings were also submitted to the same analysis. Prior attitude was 
positively associated with final attitude, F(1, 359) = 862.65, p < .001, partial η2 = .71. As 
with argument persuasiveness, the predicted interaction between language complexity and 
motivation level was also significant, F(1, 359) = 8.97, p = .003, partial η2 = .02. In the low 
motivation condition, participants reported significantly less extreme attitudes after reading 
complex arguments (M = 76.52, SD = 23.80) than simple arguments (M = 83.61, SD = 16.16), 
p = .001, but there was no difference between complex and simple arguments in the high 
motivation condition (M = 72.46, SD = 24.03 versus M = 75.12, SD = 27.36), p = .333 (see 
Figure 3b). The main effects of complexity, F(1, 359) = 2.59, p = .109, partial η2 = .01, and 
motivation level were not significant, F(1, 359) = 2.09, p = .149, partial η2 = .01. 
Figure 3 
Argument Persuasiveness Ratings and Attitude Ratings as a Function of Motivation Level 
and Language Complexity with Prior Belief as a Covariate in Study 2 
 






To test the full model, in which processing difficulty impacts attitudes via perceived 
argument persuasiveness, depending on motivation, we conducted a moderated mediation 
analysis, with language complexity (dummy coded) as an independent variable, motivation 
(dummy coded) as a moderator, argument persuasiveness as a mediator, and prior attitude as 
a covariate, using PROCESS v3.3, model 8 (see Hayes & Rockwood, 2017), with 10,000 
bootstrap resamples (Figure 4). Consistent with the analyses reported above, prior attitude 
was positively related to perceived argument persuasiveness, B = .03, SE < .01, t(359) = 
12.79, p < .001. Highly motivated participants rated arguments as worse than those with low 
motivation, B = –.44, SE = .18, t(359) = –2.46, p = .014, and complexly worded arguments 
were rated as worse than simply worded arguments, B = –.88, SE = .17, t(359) = –5.03, p < 
.001. The interaction between motivation level and language complexity was also significant, 
B = .91, SE = .25, t(359) = 3.67, p < .001. In line with our prediction, conditional effects 
suggested that for highly motivated participants language complexity had no influence on 
perceived argument persuasiveness, B = .04, SE = .18, t(359) = .21, p = .835; whereas, 
participants with low motivation rated complexly worded arguments as less persuasive than 
simply worded arguments, B = –.88, SE = .17, t(359) = –5.03, p < .001. 
Importantly, the index of moderated mediation was significant, B = 5.85, SE = 1.86, 
95% CI = [2.47, 9.77]. Inspection of the conditional indirect effects showed that, for the high 
motivation condition, 95% confidence intervals indicated no indirect effect through argument 
persuasiveness, B = .24, SE = 1.25, 95% CI = [–2.04, 2.89]. On the other hand, for the low 
motivation condition, the indirect effect through argument persuasiveness was significant, B 







Conceptual and Statistical Moderated Mediation Model in Study 2 
 
Note. The mediating effect of argument persuasiveness (of strong arguments) on attitude, 
conditioned on motivation level (low or high), with language complexity as an independent 
variable and prior attitude as a covariate. The values represent unstandardized regression 






Previous research has demonstrated impacts of both argument content and subjective 
experience on attitudes (see Schwarz, 1998, 2004), but the causal relationship between the 
two factors has received less attention. Here, we reported two studies providing direct 
evidence of the disruptive impact of processing difficulty on perceived argument 
persuasiveness, and on subsequent attitude change. In Study 1, participants distinguished 
strong and weak arguments for undergraduate comprehensive exams less effectively when 
the arguments were difficult to process, though closer inspection revealed that the effects of 
difficulty were limited to strong arguments. We conjectured that, in a context in which most 
participants favored the proposed comprehensive exams, weak arguments were de facto 
counter-attitudinal arguments – they were, in essence, so specious that they had the effect of 
undermining the proposition they ostensibly favored – and thereby prompted greater 
elaboration and counterargument (see e.g., Clark & Wegener, 2013). This interpretation was 
supported in Study 2, in which we manipulated motivation directly with respect to a new 
proposition to introduce a “cognitive skills test” for online participants. Analogous to Study 
1, processing difficulty only affected perceived argument quality, and in turn attitude change, 
when participants were relatively unmotivated. When the introduction of the test was 
imminent, and participants were given high personal responsibility for evaluating it, 
participants were insensitive to the difficult experience processing the arguments, presumably 
because their heightened motivation compensated for their reduced ability to elaborate. In 
both studies, moderated mediation analyses supported the conclusion that perceived argument 
persuasiveness mediated the effect of difficulty on attitude change. 
Taken together, our findings provide converging evidence that processing difficulty 
impairs the receiver’s ability to elaborate (and counterargue), thereby reducing their ability to 




attitude change. They also suggest, consistent with many information processing-oriented 
models of persuasion (e.g., Andrews, 1988; Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 
81), that motivation and cognitive ability are both important antecedents to argument 
processing and that impairment is not inevitable, able to be overcome with sufficient 
motivation and effort (e.g., Chen et al., 1992). In the current Study 2, difficult (strong) 
arguments were less persuasive only under conditions of relatively low motivation; when 
participants were given some responsibility for the evaluation of the cognitive test under 
consideration, processing difficulty was irrelevant to their assessment of the arguments for, 
and ultimate evaluation of, the test. 
An alternative mechanism by which hard-to-process arguments could impact their 
persuasiveness – fluency-driven negative affect – was not supported. As noted in the 
Introduction, such an account predicts a negative effect on argument persuasiveness and 
attitude change regardless of a priori argument strength, but no main effect was observed in 
either study. Nevertheless, this hypothesis should not be discarded entirely, for several 
reasons. First, while weak arguments did not, as predicted by the misattribution account, 
decrease in perceived quality, they did not significantly increase either. Although we provide 
an empirically supported account of this result, it would be more direct, and particularly 
interesting in our view, to demonstrate that with low motivation weak arguments are 
unambiguously more convincing when difficult to process – that poor argument can be 
disguised by obfuscation.  
Second, elaboration disruption and misattribution are not mutually exclusive, and it is 
likely that their relative roles depend on context. (Indeed, our experimental paradigm, in 
which participants were instructed to evaluate argument quality, may have artifactually 
lowered their direct use of experience in their judgments.) For example, in apparent contrast 




ease with which arguments could be retrieved) weakened the persuasiveness of both a priori 
strong and weak arguments, because (they argued) hard-to-retrieve information “may seem 
less valid and less compelling” (p. 149). However, methodological differences may at least 
partially explain the difference between these findings and the current ones (also see Tormala 
et al., 2002, p. 1703). For example, Wänke and Bless (2000) manipulated difficulty by 
varying the helpfulness of retrieval cues after all arguments had been presented, perhaps 
making the experience of recall more salient than the content of the argument itself, and 
thereby increasing reliance on the former. Other, more explicit task framing (e.g., describing 
a problem as “intuitive” versus emphasizing the importance of logic and reasons) might also 
influence the relative weight given the affect associated with processing experience.  
In sum, argument content and argument experience are functionally related. Among 
likely other mechanisms, experience can disrupt, be confused with, and/or serve as 
metacognitive input into, argument evaluation and subsequent attitude change. Here, we have 
traced some of the pathways under experimental conditions, but a full model of when and 
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Chapter 5: Excessive Reasoning and Post-choice Satisfaction 



























In Chapters 2 - 4, I examined the roles of experience of difficulty and perception of 
reason quality on attitude judgments, as well as the causal relationship between these two 
factors. The findings in Chapter 2 showcased how (excessive) reasoning about one’s attitude 
could backfire: the difficulty of reason generation increases, and the perceived quality of the 
generated reasons declines, as more reasons for an attitude are considered, and quality in 
particular was predictive of post-test attitudes. Chapters 3 and 4 addressed the causal 
relationship between these two factors, showing that difficulty, operationalized via language 
complexity, leads to less differentiation between strong and weak reasons, presumably 
because it hinders their cognitive elaboration. In this chapter, I begin to examine the practical 
implications of these effects. Given that reasoning can change attitudes, and that attitudes 
drive choices (and vice versa), one obvious question is whether people are ultimately better 
or worse off for having reasoned about their options before (or after) choosing one. 
While there are a number of perspectives on why one choice might be better than 
another (e.g., the choice that yields the best outcome, the choice with the best motivational 
fit, the choice with higher gains than losses, etc.; for reviews see Abelson & Levi, 1985; 
Ajzen, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1990; Higgins, 2000), I focus here on a less contentious 
and relatively easily quantified criterion: subjective satisfaction; a decision is a good one to 
the extent that the decision maker is happy with it. Previous research suggests that, 
independent of objective decision quality, decision makers tend to be more positive about 
their choices after they make them, essentially because they “synthesize” their own 
satisfaction (Gilbert, 2006; Gilbert & Ebert, 2002): they become more satisfied with their 
choices, at least when the options are relatively equally matched (e.g., Brehm, 1956; Gerard 
& White, 1983; Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002). 
For example, in the seminal study of the “spreading of alternatives” effect, Brehm 




between two of the available options, and then to rate the desirability of each one a second 
time. The results showed that participants rated their chosen option as more desirable and 
their unchosen option as less desirable than they did prior to the decision when the original 
options were equally liked. This post-decisional attitude change is typically explained in 
terms of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) or self-perception theory (Bem, 1967, 
1972). In terms of the former, a choice, especially between equally desirable alternatives, 
creates uncomfortable arousal associated with entertaining conflicting cognitive or behavioral 
elements (for a review, see Harmon-Jones & Mills, 2019): in this case, liking the unchosen 
alternative but failing to select it. To alleviate this uncomfortable tension, people are 
motivated to seek supporting reasons to justify their decision (e.g., Simonson, 1989) and to 
adjust their attitude to match their decision accordingly. In terms of self-perception theory, 
the effect is explained as a result of people rationalizing their attitude from their overt 
behavior (e.g., “since I chose it, I must have liked it”), and not necessarily because of the 
motivation to reduce discomfort (also see Chen & Risen, 2010; Izuma & Murayama, 2013). 
Although the tendency for people to manufacture their own satisfaction based on their 
choice behavior is well-established, the findings in Chapters 2 - 4 suggest a limit to this 
effect: when people struggle to rationalize their decisions, they may become less satisfied 
with them. As shown in those studies, excessive or difficult reasoning can lead to the 
production of subjectively poor reasons, and, I predict, a reversal of the post-choice 
satisfaction effect. There is already some evidence for the disruptive effects of reasoning on 
post-decisional satisfaction. Although the studies cited above have not necessarily 
conceptualized the process of rationalization as explicit or conscious (see Lieberman et al., 
2001), studies on the reasons analysis effect, discussed in previous chapters, have shown that 
reasoning prior to a decision can cause dissatisfaction, by temporarily shifting attitudes and 




In one representative study, Wilson et al. (1993) presented participants with a mix of 
famous Impressionist paintings and “humorous” scenes, showing that those who explained 
reasons for why they liked or disliked the posters reported liking the humorous posters more 
than people who did not provide reasons. They were also more likely to choose those posters 
(i.e., as a reward for participation in the study), even though the Impressionist artwork was, 
overall, the overwhelming favorite among participants. Most important for the present 
purposes, reasoners expressed lower satisfaction with their choice than controls when 
questioned several weeks later. Using a similar paradigm, Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006) 
showed that people were even more satisfied with their chosen artwork over time when they 
were prevented from (consciously) reasoning about their preference, compared to when they 
carefully reasoned or immediately chose between options without the opportunity to think. 
As discussed in previous chapters, Wilson’s explanation for the decline in choice 
satisfaction over time is that explicit reasoning temporarily changes attitudes (and subsequent 
decisions) by causing people to focus on a subset of information, and in particular salient, 
primed, and/or easily verbalizable information (see Halberstadt & Wilson, 2008; Wilson et 
al., 1989), and to overweight that information in the attitudinal calculations on which their 
choices are based. Later, however, when people are reflecting on their satisfaction, those 
biased reasons are no longer salient, thereby creating a mismatch between their current 
attitudes and their previous choices and, in turn, decisional regret.  
While the “information shift” mechanism provides a plausible account of why 
thinking about reasons consequently leads to temporary preference change and post-choice 
regret over time, it does not necessarily predict dissatisfaction immediately after reasoning. In 
fact, although reasoners in both Wilson et al. (1993) and Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006) 
regretted their choice several weeks later, they reported short-term, post-choice satisfaction 




neither manipulated nor measured the difficulty participants experienced when generating 
their reasons. Indeed, since participants in these studies presumably reasoned only to the 
extent they were comfortable, reasoners should have generated only easy, subjectively good 
evidence in support of their choices (e.g., Slovic, 1975), so it is unsurprising that their 
immediate satisfaction was higher than if they had not generated that evidence.  
I propose, however, based on the insights from Chapters 2 - 4, that people’s post-
choice (dis)satisfaction after reasoning depends on their reasoning experience and/or the 
perceived quality of those reasons. People should like their choice insofar as the reasoning 
experience justifying their decision feels easy and/or the generated reasons are perceived as 
cogent and valid. When people “over-reason,” however, they should come to dislike their 
decision due to the negative experience associated with excessive reasoning and/or the 
perception that it is based on a poor rationale. In this chapter, I tested these hypotheses by 
asking participants to choose between two abstract artworks and to rate how much they liked 
their chosen alternative, either (a) after providing reasons for their choice (free reasoning); (b) 
after providing reasons for their choice and then being asked to generate more reasons 
(excessive reasoning); or (c) without providing any reasons (control). Note that, unlike in the 
“few-versus-many” paradigm often used to manipulate ease of retrieval (Schwarz, 1998, 
2004, 2018; Weingarten & Hutchinson, 2018), my novel methodology allows for 
idiosyncratic manipulation of difficulty (since participants presumably exhaust the easily 
generated reasons when first asked), thereby partially controlling for individual differences in 
participants’ motivation, ability, and knowledge (e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Schwarz & 
Schuman, 1997). I predicted that free reasoners would like their choices more than controls, 
but that excessive reasoners would like their choices less than controls, because explaining 
extra reasons would be feel difficult, and be perceived as poorer quality, than those in the free 






Three hundred and fifty-nine residents of the United States completed the study via 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk; M age = 39.74, SD age = 12.95; 192 females, 164 males, 3 other). 
All participants had a history of providing good-quality responses with an approval rate of 
higher than 99%. Data from participants who did not complete the entire study were 
discarded prior to any analysis. Sample size was chosen to exceed a recently recommended 
minimum of 100 participants per between-participants condition (plus 20% for possible 
exclusion of bad-quality data) required to achieve 80% power to detect an effect size of d = 
.4, a reasonable estimate for a “theoretically meaningful” effect (Brysbaert, 2019). 
Procedure and Materials 
After providing informed consent to participate in a study on “attitudes toward art,” 
participants saw two images of abstract art (“Image A” and “Image B”), side by side on the 
computer screen, for 30 seconds, and then chose which one they liked better. The particular 
images shown were randomly selected from 6 different artworks (Figure 1), which received 
equivalent liking ratings in pretesting.  
In the “free reasoning” condition, participants were provided with 12 black boxes and 
were asked to “list as many of your reasons as you can why you like Image A [B] over Image 
B [A]. Afterwards, they rated on 1 to 9 scales “Overall, how good the reasons you came up 
with were” (anchored at “very poor” and “very good”) and “Overall, how difficult it was to 
come up with your reasons” (anchored at “extremely easy” and “extremely difficult”), before 
indicating the extent to which they liked one image over the other) on a continuous scale 
from 0 (“like image A the most”) to 100 (“like image B the most”), with the values hidden. 
To operationalize post-choice (dis)satisfaction, final liking ratings were calculated as the 




if the participant chose image B and 80 was indicated, the final liking rating would be 30). 
Thus, a positive score indicates how much the participant liked the image they chose, while a 
negative score would indicate a preference reversal. The order of overall difficulty and 
overall reason quality measures was also counterbalanced.  
The “excessive reasoning” condition was similar to the “free reasoning” condition, 
except that after being asked to “list as many of your reasons as you can,” participants arrived 
on a new page with information that “…attitudes are sometimes based on factors that don’t 
initially come to mind, and that there are always more reasons for an attitude than first 
appears,” and were asked to list two more reasons (i.e., they were unable to continue unless 
they provided two reasons), before indicating overall difficulty, reason quality, and liking for 
their choice. In the control condition, participants indicated their liking immediately after 
choosing an artwork.6 Next, to control for differences in art knowledge among participants, 
which might affect the ease of generating and/or perceived quality of reasons, participants 
indicated “how knowledgeable are you about art?” on a 1 to 9 scale (anchored at “not 
knowledgeable at all” and “extremely knowledgeable”). Finally, participants answered a few 
demographics and data-quality check questions (“How many images were you asked to 
evaluate?”; “What type of artwork were the images you were asked to evaluate?”; and “Did 
you honestly answer the questions in this survey?”), before being debriefed, thanked, and 





6 Note that afterwards, to ensure that all participant has a similar experience in the study, 
control participants also listed their reasons and completed difficulty and quality measures; 



























Nine participants were excluded from the analyses: 8 who did not pass the data-
quality check questions, and 1 who gave the same reasons more than once. Thus, 350 
participants (M age = 39.86, SD age = 12.99; 188 females, 159 males, 3 other) were included 
in the final analyses, with 120 (34.3%), 116 (33.1%), and 114 (32.6%) participants in the free 
reasoning, excessive reasoning, and control conditions, respectively. There was no difference 
in participants’ self-reported art knowledge between conditions (free reasoning: M = 4.03, SD 
= 2.10; excessive reasoning: M = 3.76, SD = 1.97; control: M = 3.82, SD = 2.11), F(1, 347) = 
.59, p = .557, partial η2 < .01. 
To test the assumption of increased difficulty in the excessive reasoning condition, 
overall difficulty ratings (excluding the nonreasoning condition) were submitted to a 2 
(Condition: Free reasoning versus Excessive reasoning) between-participant analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). A main effect of condition verified that the manipulation was successful, 
F(1, 234) = 13.40, p < .001, partial η2 = .05 (see Figure 2a). Participants in the excessive 
reasoning condition (M = 5.40, SD = 2.21) found it overall more difficult to generate reasons 
than those in the free reasoning condition (M = 4.30, SD = 2.39). Furthermore, while 
participants found free reasoning relatively easy (i.e., lower than the scale midpoint of 5), 
t(119) = –3.21, p = .002, 95% CI of the difference = [–1.13, –.27], they found it marginally 
difficult (above the scale midpoint) to list reasons beyond what they initially provided, t(115) 
= 1.94, p = .055, 95% CI of the difference = [–.01, .80]. 
The analysis above was repeated on overall reason quality ratings. Again, validating 
the manipulation, a significant main effect of condition was observed, F(1, 234) = 4.06, p = 
.045, partial η2 = .02 (see Figure 2b), such that participants in the excessive condition (M = 




condition (M = 6.38, SD = 1.83). Participants in both conditions, however, rated their reasons 
significantly above the scale midpoint (free reasoning: t(119) = 8.30, p < .001, 95% CI of the 
difference = [1.05, 1.71]; excessive reasoning: t(115) = 4.90, p < .001, 95% CI of the 
difference = [.53, 1.25]). 
To examine my primary hypothesis that free reasoners would like their choices more 
than controls, but excessive reasoners would like their choices less than controls, liking 
ratings were submitted to a 3 (Condition: Control versus Free reasoning versus Excessive 
reasoning) between-participant ANOVA. The main effect of condition was significant, F(1, 
347) = 3.68, p = .026, partial η2 = .02 (see Figure 2c). Follow-up pairwise comparisons with 
Bonferroni adjustment suggested that participants liked their preferred choice of abstract art 
significantly more when they freely reasoned about their choice (M = 32.54, SD = 15.70) than 
when they did not reason (M = 27.61, SD = 14.54), p = .030. When participants excessively 
reasoned, however, their liking (M = 31.48, SD = 13.39) did not differ from either free 










7 Similar results emerged for both overall difficulty and liking when the number of generated 
reasons was entered as a covariate. However, an effect of the covariate on overall reason 
quality emerged, F(1, 233) = 6.38, p = .012, partial η2 = .03, such that the higher number of 





Overall Difficulty, Reason Quality, and Liking Ratings as a Function of Reasoning 
Conditions 
 







Zero-order correlations indicated that both overall difficulty (r = –.20, p = .002) and 
reason quality (r = .27, p < .001) were significantly associated with participants’ final liking 
ratings. Also, the more difficult participants found the task of reasoning, the worse they 
perceived their reasons to be (r = –.48, p < .001). The number of generated reasons did not 
correlate with any variables (overall difficulty, r = .10, p = .135; overall quality, r = .07, p = 
.278; liking, r = .01, p = .837). 
Parallel Mediation 
As discussed in previous chapters, most research into the role of difficulty assumes 
independent roles of difficult experience and reason quality (see Schwarz, 1998, 2004, 2018). 
That is, people either rely on their experience in reasoning or their available reasons for their 
attitudes. Based on this assumption, I conducted a parallel mediation analysis, with free 
reasoning versus excessive reasoning conditions (dummy coded) as an independent variable, 
and rated difficulty and quality as parallel mediators, using PROCESS v3.3, model 4 (see 
Hayes & Rockwood, 2017), with 10,000 bootstrap resamples (see Figure 3). Confidence 
intervals indicated only a (marginal) indirect effect of reason quality (B = –.85, SE = .58), 
95% CI = [–2.21, .002], but not of difficulty (B = –.69, SE = .69), 95% CI = [–2.22, .54], as 
seen in Figure 3. The direct effect of reasoning condition (B = .47, SE = 1.89), t(232) = .25, p 
= .802, and the total effect (B = –1.06, SE = 1.90), t(234) = –.56, p = .578, were not 
significant. In summary, consistent with Chapter 2’s findings, excessive reasoning was more 
difficult, and resulted in worse perceived reasons quality, but only the latter plausibly 







Parallel Mediation Model of the Effects of Difficulty and Reason Quality Mediating Post-
choice Satisfaction 
 
Note. The values represent unstandardized regression coefficients obtained through 
bootstrapping using 10,000 resamples. The value in parentheses indicates the total effect 
before controlling for the mediators. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Serial Mediation  
Chapters 3 and 4 suggest a causal relationship between reasoning difficulty and 
reason quality, such that the former interferes with reasoners’ ability to evaluate the latter. To 
test for this effect in the current study, I conducted a serial mediation analysis, with free 
reasoning versus excessive reasoning conditions (dummy coded) as an independent variable, 
and difficulty and quality as serial mediators, using PROCESS v3.3, model 6 (see Hayes & 
Rockwood, 2017), with 10,000 bootstrap resamples (see Figure 4). Confidence intervals 
indicated that the serial mediating effect through the association between difficulty and 
quality was significant (B = –.71, SE = .36), 95% CI = [–1.57, –.16]. The indirect effects of 
difficulty (B = –.69, SE = .69), 95% CI = [–2.20, .57], and of quality (B = –.13, SE = .40), 




and the total effect (B = –1.06, SE = 1.90), t(234) = –.56, p = .578, were also not significant. 
In summary, the results are consistent with the interpretation that excessive reasoning was 
more difficult relative to generating reasons freely, which in turn reduced the overall 
perceived quality of those reasons, and it was this decline in quality that predicted post-
choice satisfaction.  
Figure 4 
Serial Mediation Model of the Causal Effect of Difficulty and Reason Quality Mediating 
Post-Choice Satisfaction 
 
Note. The values represent unstandardized regression coefficients obtained through 
bootstrapping using 10,000 resamples. The value in parentheses indicates the total effect 
before controlling for the mediators. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
General Discussion 
While the spreading of alternatives phenomenon suggests that people seek to bring to 
mind reasons for (i.e., rationalize) their choices, leading to greater satisfaction with them, at 
least in the short term, I propose that this well-documented effect should be conditioned on 
the ease with which those reasons can be generated and their perceived quality. Applying 




operationalized here as generating reasons beyond those generated readily, would like their 
decisions less than controls, due to the difficulty and/or perceived weakness of adding in the 
extra reasons they generated. The results partially supported this prediction. Participants did 
find excessive reasoning more difficult, and perceived those reasons as poorer relative to 
participants in the free reasoning condition. Reasoners also liked their chosen artwork more 
than those who did not reason, consistent with the findings of Wilson et al. (1993) as well as 
Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006). However, excessive reasoning did not increase liking for 
the chosen option further, though it also did not decrease liking relative to either free 
reasoners or controls.  
In addition, while the correlational analyses showed the predicted relationships among 
difficulty, quality, and post-choice satisfaction, the parallel mediation (with the assumption 
that difficulty and reason quality operate as distinct, competing sources of information) 
suggested that only reason quality, but not difficulty, uniquely explained satisfaction, in line 
with the findings from Chapter 2. Moreover, as shown in Chapters 3 and 4, the two factors 
may be causally related, such that the experience of difficulty impairs the assessment of 
quality, leading otherwise good reasons to be judged less favorably; a test of serial mediation 
provided indirect evidence for the same causal path in the current study as well. However, as 
reviewed in Chapter 3, there are several mechanisms by which difficulty may affect 
perceived quality, and the current study cannot tease these apart; further research is required.  
In sum, the results partially support my hypothesis that classic demonstrations of post-
decision satisfaction are conditional on the experiential difficulty of justifying the decision 
and the perceived validity of the justification, and also replicate the correlational relationships 
among attitudes, difficulty, and quality uncovered in Chapter 2. At a minimum, it appears that 
post-choice rationalization effects are not monotonic, and may only operate while reasons are 




On the other hand, while excessive reasoning failed to enhance satisfaction with a 
choice relative to free reasoning or no reasoning, neither did it produce dissatisfaction 
relative to those conditions, as hypothesized. There are several possible explanations for this 
finding. One relevant observation is that while reasons were measurably worse in the 
excessive than in the free reasoning condition, they were still judged as “good” reasons (i.e., 
above the midpoint of the scale), and thereby worked against effects associated with the 
difficulty of generating them. Moreover, in the current paradigm (unlike in the Studies 
reported in Chapter 2), it was not possible to partial out the difficulty and quality associated 
with particular reasons, so there is some ambiguity as to whether excessive reasoners’ self-
reports refer to their entire reasoning experience, or only to their “extra” reasons, adding 
additional noise to the data. A replication study should attempt to obtain reason-level data to 
refine the model of when and how attitudes change as reasoning progresses. 
Another possibility is that, since participants in the excessive reasoning condition 
were “forced” to generate more reasons than they initially intended (i.e., they could not 
progress in the study until they had provided two additional reasons), they might have 
attributed their difficult experience and poorer reason quality externally, to the experimenter, 
rather than internally, to their own attitudes (see the misattribution paradigm, Schwarz, 1998, 
2004, 2018). If so, then difficulty and poor quality may have been underweighted when 
assessing satisfaction with their chosen alternative. On the other hand, since participants were 
told that “there are always more reasons for an attitude than first appears,” they might 
actually have expected generating extra reasons to be easy, and ended up experiencing the 
opposite. Previous research shows that people rely more on their experience especially when 
it is discrepant from their initial expectation (e.g., Greifeneder & Bless, 2007; Hansen & 




as hypothesized, but the data do not support this explanation. The mechanisms are not 
mutually exclusive, however.  
Third, the increase in difficulty and decline in reason quality between the two 
conditions in the current paradigm could simply be too minuscule to induce detectable 
change in liking judgment (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and perhaps requesting a higher 
number of additional reasons would prove more effective. Future research should examine a 
boundary or a threshold in which increased difficulty and additional specious reasons (e.g., 
how bad and/or how many) would necessarily lead to dissatisfaction. 
The findings are limited in few other ways as well. First, Chapter 4 illustrated the 
importance of motivation in moderating the relationship between difficulty and reason 
quality, but it is not clear what role it plays in the current results. Although the current 
participants resemble those in the unmotivated condition in Chapter 4, the two paradigms are 
not identical, and arguably the fact that participants were justifying their own choice, rather 
than an abstract policy, may have made the task more relevant (and therefore participants 
more motivated and less likely affected by difficulty in their quality and satisfaction 
assessment). While post-choice satisfaction after excessive reasoning did not differ from the 
other two conditions, the fact that overall reason quality was reduced did not entirely support 
this speculation.  
However, the data do not rule out the role of motivation as an important factor either. 
For example, had a decision been more consequential (than choosing between two abstract 
artworks), participants might be sufficiently motivated to (excessively) justify their choice, 
and also prompted to elaborate more deeply and come up with better, additional reasons 
(assuming there are). If so, the impact of difficulty may be weaker, similar to Chapter 4’s 
results. Moreover, it is also possible that in the contexts where number of reasons is more 




quality, would make people more satisfied. In fact, previous research suggests that the 
relative contributions between the number of reasons and their quality depends on 
motivational levels. Petty and Cacioppo (1984), for example, presented university students 
with either three or nine, strong or weak arguments about a university policy change that 
either likely affected them or not. They found that argument quality mattered more when 
purportedly the policy change was personally relevant to students, but when it was not, the 
number of arguments had greater influence on their persuasion. These possible moderating 
effects provide interesting future research questions, which remain to be investigated.  
It is also important to note that the reasons participants provided were subjectively 
good ones, even though overall reason quality was judged worse in the excessive reasoning 
condition. A reconciliation of these apparently contradictory observations requires 
speculation. For example, assuming an elaboration disruption mechanism (see Chapter 3), the 
difficulty of generating extra reasons may have prevented participants from appreciating their 
quality. If so, the results should be reversed in a situation in which extra reasons are generally 
bad (cf. Chapter 3): the difficulty of coming up with bad, additional reasons would prevent 
elaboration, rendering them more persuasive, as in Chapter 3. In this case, excessively bad 
reasoning may, ironically, enhance post-choice satisfaction.  
Lastly, I note that the current study examines only one, specific aspect of decision 
quality – subjective satisfaction. While it is useful in many contexts to predict how happy 
people are with their decisions, in others it is more important to predict whether those 
decisions are “good” ones, regardless of whether the decision maker themselves thinks so. 
There is some evidence, reviewed in the first chapter of this thesis, that reasoning can 
interfere with objective decision quality, but the mechanisms of the effects are relatively 
opaque. For example, Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) showed that when people consciously thought 




(choosing cars with less positive attributes) than when they did not. In line with Wilson and 
colleagues’ information shift account (Halberstadt & Wilson, 2008; Wilson et al., 1989), the 
researchers further explained their findings in terms of the limits of conscious processing (see 
Dijksterhuis, 2004), preventing people from effectively considering available information and 
causing people to “inflate the importance of some attributes at the expense of others” (p. 
1005).  
These mechanisms, however, are less satisfying at explaining why the biased subset 
of information feeding into people’s decisional calculations would make them worse than if 
all information is considered. In case of choosing between cars, for example, why would 
reasoning make suboptimal decision dimensions, in particular, more salient? The current 
study hints at an alternative, and more cogent account. The difficulty of consciously 
considering many car features might interfere with the evaluation of their values, deflating 
the good ones and inflating the bad ones, thereby leading to worse decisions. 
At the very least, the current study suggests that, assuming people are capable of 
identifying subjectively good reasons, the justification process should be, to some extent, 
beneficial. However, over-reasoning beyond the good reasons that easily come to mind may 
introduce additional information that is subpar, yet incorporated into judgments (also see e.g., 
Bastardi & Shafir, 1998; Redelmeier et al., 2001). Examining the information quality and the 
experience people have during decision making, I hope, will be proven fruitful to further our 
understanding on how reasoning affects the subjective evaluation of it and attitude that 
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 
What about the Paraguayan army’s request for spraying subsidies?... Well, of course, 
their requests for subsidies was not Paraguayan in and of it is as it were the United 
States government would never have if the president, our president, had not and as far 
as I know that’s the way it will always be. Is that clear?  
(Spies Like Us, Landis, 1985, 0:13:44)  
 
The notion that optimal judgments are based on explicit, careful consideration of 
reasons was pervasive in early research on decision making and attitudes (Janis & Mann, 
1977; Koriat et al., 1980; Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002; Slovic, 1982). Challenging this reverence 
for reasons, more recent research has shown that under some circumstances reasoning leads 
to undesirable, suboptimal outcomes (see Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; 
Halberstadt, 2010; Levine et al., 1996; Wilson et al., 1989), which suggests that the 
relationship between reasons and judgment is not simply monotonic, as classically assumed. 
While the traditional theories ascribe the outcomes of reasoned judgment to reason content 
and the way it is cognitively processed (Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), 
subsequent “ease of retrieval” research suggests that the metacognitive experience of 
reasoning also plays a significant role (Schwarz, 1998, 2004, 2018). In this thesis, I examined 
the relationships among these cognitive and experiential factors, the conditions under which 
they predict attitude judgments, and the consequences of reasoning on decision satisfaction. 
In Chapter 2, I introduced an additional, alternative, “cognitive” explanation for ease 
of retrieval effects, which I argued has not been adequately examined: as an individual offers 
more reasons for an attitude, not only do those reasons become more difficult to generate, but 




proposition. Because difficulty and quality should covary, it is not clear whether 
“experiential” effects of reasoning are not due, instead, to the relatively low quality of the 
evidence, and the realization that one’s attitudes are not well supported. These two sources of 
variance – reasoning difficulty and reason quality – were analyzed in three studies, in which 
participants were asked to generate reasons in support of their position on controversial 
issues. In all three, as more reasons were generated, the time and subjective difficulty of 
generating them increased, but the self-perceived quality of the reasons also declined. More 
noteworthy, it was the decline in average reason quality, rather than increased difficulty, that 
uniquely predicted attitudes. That is, while generating many (versus few) reasons was 
difficult, it was the fact that the “many” were overall less persuasive than the “few,” which 
accounted for participants’ subsequently reported attitudes.  
Chapter 3 took the analysis of reason difficulty and quality a step further, by 
considering whether and how the two might be causally related. The question was 
complicated by the fact that, in the previously reported studies, difficulty and reason quality 
both covaried with the number of reasons requested, which makes them empirically difficult 
to tease apart. I attempted to circumvent this dependency by inducing difficulty via language 
complexity (Oppenheimer, 2006), thereby controlling for number and content of reasons. 
Drawing on dual-process models of attitudes (Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), 
and work on cognitive fluency (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Oppenheimer, 2008), I 
considered three possible mechanisms. First, experienced difficulty could interfere with 
people’s ability to elaborate (i.e., to generate supportive and contradictory thoughts; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986, p. 76; Petty et al., 1976), leading to less differentiation between strong and 
weak reasons. Second, difficulty could signal that in fact more elaboration is required (e.g., 
Alter et al., 2007), leading to greater differentiation between strong and weak reasons. Third, 




Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Oppenheimer, 2008), leading reasons to be judged as less 
persuasive, independent of their strength. The results of two studies were most consistent 
with the interference account. Specifically, when they were difficult to comprehend, strong 
reasons were judged as less persuasive, and weak reasons more persuasive, than when they 
were easy to understand.  
Chapter 4 replicated these findings in two additional studies, and linked them to 
attitude change. The first study was an extended replication: participants evaluated either 
strong or weak reasons, written with either simple or complex language, for instituting 
comprehensive exams, rating their attitude both before and after the reason evaluation. The 
results were partially consistent with those reported in Chapter 3, such that strong and weak 
reasons were less distinct, in terms of their perceived persuasiveness, when they were 
difficult to understand. However, a closer examination revealed that the effect was evident 
only for strong reasons. I speculated that effects on weak reasons might be tempered by 
participants’ motivation to counterargue them; previous research has shown that counter-
attitudinal reasons are more likely to elicit counterarguments, and reasons that are sufficiently 
weak may be de facto counter-attitudinal (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; Cacioppo & Petty, 
1981; Clark & Wegener, 2013). The second study examined this possibility, by manipulating 
participants’ motivation directly, via the ostensible importance of their responses (Petty et al., 
1980; Petty et al., 2001). The results showed that, as in the previous study, difficulty 
influenced perceived quality, and in turn attitude change, but only when participants’ 
motivation was relatively low. When participants were highly motivated to evaluate the 
reasons presented, the disruptive influence of difficulty on perceived reason quality and 
subsequent attitude change was mitigated. The results extended those in Chapter 3, 
demonstrating the downstream effect of difficulty, via reason quality, on attitude change, as 




were relatively small for these particular, relatively obscure topics, the variability and 
subjectivity of individuals’ judgments of quality and their subsequent attitude change raise 
important questions about the effects of reasoning in “real life,” consequential contexts, such 
as judicial and medical decision making, which I discuss in the next section.  
Chapter 5 applied the insights from previous chapters to the question of decision 
quality, operationalized in terms of post-choice satisfaction. Previous research suggests that 
people tend to rationalize their choices, such that they come to like their chosen options more 
after, compared to before, choosing them (e.g., Brehm, 1956; Gerard & White, 1983; 
Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002). I examined whether these classic effects are 
influenced by the presence or extent of explicit reasoning, via mechanisms of subjective 
experience, perceived reason quality, and/or their relationship. Participants were asked to 
choose between two abstract artworks and to rate how much they like their choice, either 
without providing any reasons, after providing as many reasons as they wished, or after being 
asked to provide two reasons more than they wished. The results suggested that people were 
more satisfied with their decisions when they could provide reasons freely, than when they 
did not offer reasons at all. However, additional reasons, beyond those that easily came to 
mind, did not improve their satisfaction, though neither did they decrease their satisfaction, 
as initially predicted. Participants generating “extra” reasons also found their task more 
difficult, and perceived their reasons as worse overall, consistent with the results reported in 
previous chapters. I also found that difficulty and quality were negatively correlated, and that 
greater difficulty and poorer quality predicted less satisfaction, but as in Chapter 2, only the 
latter was a unique predictor in a parallel mediation model. However, when a causal path was 
considered, serial mediation showed the downstream effect of difficulty, via reason quality, 
on satisfaction, as in Chapters 3 and 4. These findings suggest that the seemingly 




be due to its effects on perceived reason quality, highlighting the importance, both 
theoretically and methodologically, of the connection between experience and cognition. 
In sum, the current thesis explored the interplay of cognitive and experiential factors 
in reasons-based attitude change, and the downstream effect on decision satisfaction. To 
some extent, the findings challenge the conventional wisdom and classical assumptions, 
exemplified by the opening quote in Chapter 1, that reasons are prerequisite to rational and 
effective information integration, and that attitudes are a monotonic function of the reasons 
that support them (e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977; Koriat et al., 1980; Slovic, 1982). Chapters 2 
and 5 show that reasoning has unforeseen cognitive consequences: providing more 
supporting reasons does not always lead to more extreme or more confident attitudes. Indeed, 
when reasoning is difficult and/or the resulting reasons are perceived as poor, generating 
reasons can have the opposite effect. Moreover, the reasoning experience influences the 
subjective perception of quality, such that individuals may be less able to distinguish good 
from bad reasons, when those reasons are difficult to process, although other mechanisms 
might be at work in different experimental contexts. People are less persuaded by cogent 
reasons (and, more counterintuitively, more persuaded by weak reasons) when they struggle 
to understand them, although the effects may be offset by the motivation they expend on 
reasoning and/or the importance of the attitudinal domain. In sum, the findings show, 
contrary to the normative expectations of objectivity and rationality, how subjective and 
variable judgments based on reasons can be, how reasoning is impacted by an interplay of 
experiential and cognitive factors, and how our (perception of) reasons can be limited, and 
even biased, by our ability and motivation. 
Implications 
The findings have implications for psychological theories about the interplay of 




(in the sense of considering or generating arguments in support of a proposition) is a 
multifaceted process, including not only the generation of reasons per se, but also 
consideration of the quality of those reasons, the subjective experience of generating them, 
and the meaning attributed to these factors.  
Second, these components are not mutually exclusive, and are causally related under 
some conditions. In particular, I have shown in Chapter 2 that the number of reasons 
generated and their perceived quality are related, at least in a context where individuals 
themselves generate those reasons to justify their attitudes. As more reasons are retrieved, the 
perceived quality of those reasons declines. In contrast, most cognitive, dual-process theories 
(Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) predict independent, monotonic effects of 
reason number and reason quality. That is, attitude strength (and the extent of attitude 
change) should depend on the number of reasons supporting the attitude or on the quality of 
those reasons, depending on which route of processing is employed. However, because these 
factors presumably operate in parallel, and are also negatively related, the true relationship 
between reasons and attitudes is likely to be complex and curvilinear. 
As a first attempt to formalize this relationship, I posit a theoretical equilibrium at 
which the quantity of the evidence for a proposition is exactly offset by the quality of that 
evidence, after which additional reasons may produce negative effects (see Figure 1). In this 
(simplified) model, attitude extremity is a function of: (1) the relationship between reason 
number and reason quality (e.g., linear, as in Chapter 2 or curvilinear, Glenberg et al., 1983); 
(2) the weights given to number and quality, which in turn vary depending individual 
differences (e.g., need for cognition, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; need to evaluate, Jarvis & 
Petty, 1995), importance or relevance of the issue (e.g., Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994; Petty & 




1977; Petty et al., 1980); (3) the function relating the two (e.g., additive or multiplicative); 
and (4) the initial attitudinal position.  
Thus, assuming an additive function, these factors can be modelled as follows: 
Attitude𝑛 =  Initial attitude +  ∑ 𝑤𝑛 + 𝑤𝑞𝑓(𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=0 , 
where n is the number of reasons considered or generated, i represents the particular reason 
under consideration, 𝑤𝑛 is the weight given to reason number, 𝑤𝑞 is the weight given to 
reason quality, and 𝑓(𝑖) describes a relationship between reason number and reason quality. 
When this relationship is linear, 𝑓(𝑖) =  𝑅𝑛𝑞𝑖 + 𝑏, where 𝑅𝑛𝑞 is a linear slope between 
reason number and reason quality, and 𝑏 is the intercept. Varying the weights associated with 
reason number and reason quality produces different relationships between number and 
attitude extremity (see Figure 1), which are consistent with both previous findings and the 
data reported in the current thesis. 
For example, if an issue is of personal relevance or great importance, individuals 
should theoretically weight reason quality more heavily than reason number, consistent with 
the ELM. Petty and Cacioppo (1984) showed that students were more influenced by the 
number of reasons presented when the advocated university policy was not significant to 
them but paid more attention to reason quality when it directly impacted them. In their pilot 
study, for example, when the proposal of tuition increase was for another university (low 
personal relevance), students were more convinced of its benefits when presented with a mix 
of three strong and three weak reasons, compared to only three strong reasons, suggesting 
that reason number was weighted higher than reason quality. In contrast, when the issue was 
of high relevance (tuition increase at their own university), students were equally persuaded 
by six mixed reasons and three strong reasons, suggesting that the additional reasons, while 
ostensibly supporting the tuition increase, were discounted as a function of their poor quality 




assuming no attitude toward the exams prior to the study. Individuals in the low relevance 
condition presumably weighted reason number more heavily than reason quality, with the 
result that adding three reason further inclined them toward supporting the exams, even 
though the reasons were weak. On the other hand, for individuals in the high relevance 
condition, who presumably weighted reason quality more heavily, the fact that there was 
more evidence for the exams was offset by the low quality of that evidence, with the net 
result that the additional information had no effect (see Figure 1).  
The results of Chapter 5 can also be understood in terms of the model, by assuming 
the equal weight and additive impacts of reason number and reason quality (also see Figure 
1). With the no-reason condition as a baseline, participants indicated higher satisfaction after 
freely generating reasons to justify their decision. In this case, participants presumably only 
included reasons that (they thought) were good and came easily to mind and, as a result, those 
reasons increased satisfaction. However, when they were asked to add more reasons, 
participants perceived their reasons as worse overall, presumably because they integrated 
those bad, later-generated reasons with the good ones from the outset (cf. Chapter 2). In this 
case, including more, albeit potentially bad, reasons started to become counterproductive, 
trending toward less satisfaction. According to the model, I would speculate that requesting 
even more additional reasons would reduce their satisfaction further, theoretically to a point 
where (over-)reasoning becomes overall detrimental to satisfaction. It is important to note, 
however, that this simplified model, including the connections between reason number and 
reason quality, does not fully describe the consequences of reasoning, as it does not yet 
consider their relationships with experienced difficulty. Although I have shown that difficulty 
can be statistically subsumed by perceived quality, it is also clear that the two factors can 
interact in complicated ways. Clearly, a more extensive model is required to integrate all the 





Plot of Three Relationships Between Reason Number and Attitude Extremity 
 
Note. The depicted relationships assume: (1) a negative linear relationship between reason 
number and reason quality; (2) relative weights given to the two factors vary as described in 
the legend; (3) the two factors combine additively to produce attitude change; and (4) no pre-
reasoning attitude. The dotted lines approximate the effects observed in Petty and Cacioppo’s 
(1984) pilot study, with the effects of three strong reasons on attitude indicated by the letters 
(a) and (b), and the effect of three strong and three weak reasons on attitude indicated by the 
letters (c) and (d). The solid line describes the effects of reasoning observed in Chapter 5, 
assuming equal weight to each factor, with (e) indicating post-choice satisfaction without any 
justification as a baseline, (f) enhanced (possibly, optimal) satisfaction following free 




that the initial attitude (e) would not be zero in this case, or presumably any case in which 
people rationalize about their existing attitudinal positions. 
Relationships between Reasoning Experience and Reason Quality 
The current findings are also consistent with previous research emphasizing the 
experiential aspect of reasoning (e.g., Schwarz, 1998, 2004, 2018), and go further to show 
how such experience causally impacts the subjective perception of quality. Difficulty 
experienced during reason evaluation was found in Chapters 3 and 4 to compromise 
participants’ ability to elaborate and counterargue reason validity, presumably by disrupting 
the spontaneous affective and cognitive reactions that theoretically mediate attitude change. 
Specifically, experienced difficulty interferes with generation of positive, supportive thoughts 
following strong reasons, but prevents counter-argumentation in response to weak, 
functionally counter-attitudinal reasons.  
The findings in Chapter 4, further, show how difficulty, ability, and motivation are 
interrelated. That is, although difficulty interferes with the extent of elaboration, this 
interference is mitigated when individuals are more motivated to scrutinize reason validity, 
presumably enabling generation of more positive thoughts following strong reasons, and 
more negative thoughts following weak ones. This heightened motivation arguably explains 
the null effects on weak reasons in the first study in Chapter 4, on the assumption that 
participants put more effort into counterarguing weak reasons, thereby producing more 
negative thoughts and counteracting the disruptive effects of difficulty.  
The findings also reinforce previous research demonstrating the malleability of 
experiential information in judgment (e.g., Alter et al., 2007; Briñol et al., 2006; 
Oppenheimer, 2008; Unkelbach, 2007). Rather than simply serving as affective input (e.g., 
“the more fluently a perceiver can process an object, the more positive is [their] response,” 




ability and motivation. The findings connect these cognitive and experiential factors to 
contexts in which reasoning influences beliefs and attitudes in complicated ways. 
The use of language complexity as a manipulation of information processing also 
shares some similarities with Information Manipulation Theory (IMT, McCornack, 1992; 
McCornack et al., 1992), which describes different ways in which individuals alter 
information for the purpose of deceit. According to the theory, one of the properties of 
deceptive messages is the use of ambiguous, difficult-to-understand language to confuse and 
deceive the audience. Yoo and Gretzel (2009), for example, compared deceptive hotel 
reviews, written by students who had never been to the properties, to truthful reviews 
obtained from TripAdvisor.com, and found that the writings of fake reviews were more 
complex (e.g., higher average word length) than those of real reviews.  
Interestingly, not only is the use of complex language a characteristic of deceptive 
messages, but it also increases perceived deceptiveness (Levitan et al., 2018) and 
trustworthiness (Markowitz et al., 2021). For example, Markowitz and colleagues (2021) 
showed that companies were rated as less warm, less moral, and less trustworthy when their 
value statements were written in complex language (e.g., “Be Accurate: Keep complete and 
veracious business documentation”) than simple language (e.g., “Be Accurate: Keep the most 
complete and accurate business records”). Since a deceptive or untrustworthy message is 
presumably perceived as less persuasive, such findings are consistent with the current results 
that strong, complexly written arguments are less persuasive, but seem at odds with the 
results that complex language makes bad arguments more convincing. This discrepancy, then, 
suggests that the effects of complexity on perceived deception, observed in previous studies, 
may depend critically on the strength of the information (and the cognitions generated in 




It is important to note, however, that language complexity, and other manipulations of 
difficulty, may involve other cognitive and affective effects than those proposed here. 
Complexity, for example, may not only prevent efficient cognitive processing, but also 
obscure the meaning of a message, or create negative reactions that are misinterpreted as 
(un)trustworthiness (e.g., Silva et al., 2017). These effects may sometimes compete (e.g., 
difficulty from processing complex reasons might render strong reasons even less persuasive 
and prompt more counterarguments from weak reasons, offsetting interfering effects of 
difficulty), and further research is needed to develop a fully inclusive model of complexity on 
argumentation and decision making.  
Judgment Quality 
The insights gained in Chapters 2 - 4 permit a better mechanistic understanding of 
some of the negative effects of reasoning on judgment quality, outlined in the Introduction, 
which initially motivated the thesis. These insights are applied most directly in Chapter 5, 
which explores the classic “spreading of alternatives effect” (e.g., Brehm, 1956; Gerard & 
White, 1983; Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002), such that decision satisfaction is 
greater following a choice between two similar alternatives. These effects are typically 
explained in terms of a motivation to reduce dissonance via a post-hoc search for decision-
consistent information (see Harmon-Jones & Mills, 2019). I predicted, however, that due to 
the interplay of cognitive and experiential mechanisms outlined above, the success of that 
search should be limited, and eventually counterproductive. Consistent with this idea, 
participants indicated greater satisfaction with their choice after they freely provided 
supporting reasons (compared to when they offered no reasons) but were neither more nor 
less satisfied when asked to generate “extra” ones. Presumably, the difficulty experienced 
from over-reasoning reduced overall perceived quality of those reasons, leading to the 




The findings of Chapter 5 also have much in common with previous research on the 
effects of (freely generated) reasons in other domains. When people explain, or even imagine, 
the reasons leading to a (real or hypothetical) event, such as contracting a disease (Sherman et 
al., 1985), an event that occurs during childhood (Garry et al., 1996), or a football team 
victory (Hirt & Sherman, 1985), they tend to be more confident that it is true or plausible 
(e.g., see for a review Koehler, 1991). For example, Sherman and colleagues (1985) asked 
participants to imagine contracting (or in a control group, read about) a disease, “Hyposcenia-
B,” with either three common, easy-to-imagine symptoms (including, lethargy, muscle aches, 
and severe headaches) or three vague, difficult-to-imagine ones (including, a vague sense of 
disorientation, a nervous system malfunction, and an inflamed liver) and to rate their 
likelihood of contracting Hyposcenia-B in the future. They found that participants who easily 
imagined themselves contracting the disease thought they were more likely to contract it in 
the future, whereas participants who experienced difficulty imagining the disease rated it as 
less likely to occur, than controls. It is also worth noting that there was no difference between 
controls who read easy-to-imagine symptoms and those reading difficult-to-imagine 
symptoms in their likelihood judgments, which suggests important roles of thinking about the 
content and the difficulty associated with it.  
Likewise, the results of Chapter 5 suggest that providing reasons to support a 
“proposition” (i.e., that one has made a good choice) improves support for the proposition, as 
long as doing so is easy. However, the demonstrated relationship between difficulty and 
perceived quality presents an alternative (or complementary) interpretation. The ease of 
imagining common symptoms, like muscle aches, might lead participants to subjectively 
overweight their evidentiary value, while the difficulty of visualizing an inflamed liver might 




into likelihood judgments, but rather the perceived strength of the evidence for the event’s 
occurrence.  
The relationship between experienced difficulty and perceived evidential quality may 
inform other effects of reasons analysis as well. In Wilson et al. (1993), for example, the 
researchers found that participants who reasoned why they liked or disliked Impressionist 
paintings and humorous posters indicated liking the posters more and were more likely to 
choose them as rewards for participation, than controls (who did not reason). These decisions 
were interpreted as undesirable because the paintings were the clear favorites among 
participants both in the pretest and main experiments, and also because reasoners ended up 
regretting their decisions a few weeks later, compared to controls. In terms of the interplay 
between difficulty and quality, it is possible that reasoners liked the paintings less (and 
subsequently chose to take the posters home) because they experienced difficulty explaining 
why they liked them, and this difficulty rendered their reasons less persuasive, causing a 
temporary shift in their attitudes and subsequent decisions, and dissatisfaction later on. This 
interpretation is consistent with the researchers’ contention that the positive features of the 
paintings and the negative features of the humorous posters are difficult to verbalize, 
respectively (p. 337). Furthermore, while there was no evidence for effects of reason quality 
per se, the researchers’ finding that the reasoning effects were more pronounced among 
participants with little knowledge of art, is consistent with this interpretation, as less 
knowledgeable people likely found their own reasons less persuasive.  
Satisfaction, of course, is only one aspect of judgment quality. While the question is 
beyond the scope of the thesis, there are reasons to think that difficulty and quality effects 
could predict judgment quality on more objective criteria. For example, a common finding in 
research on legal and medical decision making is that individuals are more likely to rely on 




have shown that experienced judges presiding over parole hearing were more likely to make 
status quo decisions (i.e., denying paroles) after repeated rulings and experiencing mental 
fatigue; however, they were more likely to make lenient judgments at the beginning of the 
day and after breaks, presumably because they had sufficient cognitive capacity. Similarly, 
Linder and colleagues (2014) found that healthcare professionals were more likely to 
unnecessarily prescribe antibiotics (a default option) for common acute respiratory infections 
as their clinical duties wore on and they were progressively more fatigued. Such effects tend 
to be explained in terms of overreliance on heuristics when under cognitive load (in line with 
the dual-process models, e.g., Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), though it is not 
clear why heuristics would favor status quo decisions in this case rather than other more 
novel options. 
The current thesis offers a complementary account in terms of difficulty experienced 
during evidence evaluation and attitude change: it is possible that the judges, for example, do 
not ignore evidence while under cognitive load, but rather change their evaluation of it, as a 
result of difficulty. That is, fatigued judges, framing their decision as whether to deviate from 
the status quo, may find it difficult to elaborate on or counterargue the reasons, and 
consequently be less persuaded to depart from their initial position. Of course, judges, like 
any decision makers in consequential domains, presumably seek to avoid any biases, and 
understanding how difficulty, ability, and motivation interact will eventually provide 
prescriptions for more accurate, or at least more consistent judgments, and point to remedies 
when bias is likely. 
Applications 
In addition to their implications for decision making, the current findings are useful in 
understanding and predicting the effectiveness of persuasive communications, such as 




reasons enhance people’s confidence and beliefs (for a review Koehler, 1991), it also 
increases their compliance (see Sherman et al., 2004). These insights can be applied in 
advertising strategies where customers’ active inputs are encouraged (e.g., Bernritter et al., 
2017; Moore et al., 1986; Sawyer & Howard, 1991). For example, Moore and colleagues 
(1986) presented participants with a radio script which included advertisement for a soft 
drink, “Prime Time,” that either ended with an overt mention of Prime Time, or a question 
that prompted active recall (“Hey, what was the name of that new soft drink again?”). They 
found that, two days after the experiment, participants were more confident that they had 
heard of Prime Time when the advertisement required active recall, than when it relied on an 
overt, but passive, mention. Sawyer and Howard (1991) showed further that advertisements 
that encouraged customers to draw their own conclusions of which brand they should choose 
were more effective (i.e., improved participants’ attitudes toward the products and increased 
their buying intentions) than advertisements that readily provided conclusions only when the 
advertised products were personally relevant (i.e., they were given as a participation gift and 
would be soon released in their cities). More recently, Bernritter and colleagues (2017) 
showed that people in a Dutch lunchroom were more generous with their tips when they self-
generated two reasons why waitresses deserved tips, compared to those who were provided 
with two most popular reasons (“A good, customer-directed service is worth a tip” and 
“Waitresses receive little salary in relation with the workload, for which tipping is a 
compensation”) or no reasons at all. The findings in this thesis are consistent with these 
approaches, but further suggest boundary conditions of the benefits of customers’ active 
engagement, depending on the amount of information requested, the difficulty of processing 
it, and the motivation a customer brings to the task (e.g., Sawyer & Howard, 1991). For 
example, the results from Chapters 2 and 5 suggest that asking people to consider too much 




product or behavior, instead of strengthening it (e.g., preference for BMW vs. Mercedes, 
Wänke et al., 1997). Were Bernritter and colleagues (2017) to ask participants twelve, rather 
than two, reasons for tipping, their results may have looked very different. 
The present results also qualify the well-accepted dictum, both among researchers and 
practitioners, that persuasive messages should be easy to understand: the benefits of enhanced 
ability to process such messages are only realized when the messages are indeed persuasive. 
An ironic implication of the current findings is that weak messages may be more persuasive 
when they are difficult to comprehend, than when they are easy (as observed in Chapter 3). 
Indeed, an implicit (or explicit) understanding of this phenomenon may underlie the result 
that fraudulent scientific findings tend to be more obfuscated than truthful ones. Markowitz 
and Hancocok (2016), for example, compared the writing styles of publications retracted for 
fraudulent data, with legitimate ones, and found that retracted papers, across all sections of 
the paper, had lower readability, used more jargon, and contained more references, than 
truthful work, perhaps to obscure their findings by making them more difficult and 
cognitively taxing to evaluate (Humpherys et al., 2011).  
Highly technical, difficult-to-interpret language can also be seen in political 
argumentation to hide ulterior, potentially nefarious, motives, such as to obscure difficult 
issues of the law. Little (1998), for example, showed that the U.S. Supreme Court opinion 
writers obfuscated more often – such as by obscuring specifics of the topic and/or concealing 
the individuals involved (e.g., “An adjudication of guilt appeared on the record,” versus “The 
record showed that the court adjudicated whether the defendant was guilty”) – in the writings 
of federal jurisdiction cases than other non-jurisdiction cases (p. 98), arguably in order for 
Supreme Court Justices to take license with jurisdictional rulings. The difficulty associated 




cognitive load, as, for example, in a live political debate or press conference (see this 
chapter’s opening quote). 
Examples of advertisement relying on difficulty to comprehend information can also 
be seen in pharmaceutical commercials, in which the benefits of drugs are described in 
comprehensible manners (e.g., simple language spoken in calm, engaging voice), while the 
potential risks are rapidly presented, making it difficult for the audience to understand and 
elaborate on them (see Day, 2006). Day found, for example, that the reading level required to 
understand the benefits of prescription drugs (which are functionally supporting arguments) 
from TV advertisements was around 6th grade, whereas it was 9th grade for the side effects 
(which are functionally opposing arguments), and also that participants remembered the 
benefits of three prescription drugs – Paxil, Nasonex, Orthotricyclen – four times better than 
the side effects. 
Limitations 
Implications for “Intuitive” Judgments 
 One important question, outlined in the introduction, is: when should judgments rely 
on reasons rather than spontaneous intuition or heuristics? The conclusions I can draw from 
the current studies are, in the end, rather limited; although there are downstream effects on 
decision quality implied in Chapters 2 - 4, only in Chapter 5 did I directly compare reasoned 
and unreasoned judgments. In that study, reasoning enhanced people’s post-decisional 
satisfaction when they provided reasons for their choices, compared to when they did not, but 
only to a point where it was easy to do so. Adding “extra” reasons did not improve 
satisfaction, but it is not clear whether further reasoning would have impaired it, or whether 
reasoning would have had disruptive effects earlier, had the judgment domain been more 
consequential (e.g., judicial and medical judgments), or required specific knowledge (e.g., of 




 The ease of justifying one’s own judgments also likely varies across situations. For 
example, it is likely more difficult for individuals to explain reasons in terms of their feeling 
and experiential states, especially in unfamiliar domains with which they have limited 
knowledge and vocabularies (e.g., see Halberstadt & Wilson, 2008; Meissner & Menon 2002; 
Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). For example, in one demonstration of the “verbal 
overshadowing” effect, Melcher and Schooler (1996) asked non-wine drinkers, untrained 
wine drinkers, and trained wine connoisseurs to taste a red wine, then either to describe the 
taste or to solve crossword puzzles, and finally to identify the wine they tasted  They found 
that untrained drinkers who described the taste discriminated the wines less well than 
untrained drinkers who did not, presumably because their knowledge of wine terminologies 
was inadequate relative to their perceptual and aesthetic experiences, and their verbal 
descriptions “overshadowed” their experience. However, because their language ability and 
experience were likely matched, neither non-drinkers’ nor connoisseurs’ performance was 
impaired by verbal descriptions, and in fact non-drinkers better distinguished the wines when 
they described them than they did not. 
Although those studies conceptualize difficulty (and its discrepancy with expertise) as 
a condition in which the effects may occur, the current thesis may further explain how 
difficulty impairs judgments in terms of experience and information quality. For example, 
untrained drinkers might have experienced difficulty when describing wines, and so were less 
confident in their judgments, either because they inferred that their descriptions were 
inaccurate, offering poorer quality information, or because they inferred their confidence 
directly from the experiential state. More studies, however, are needed to distinguish the 
experiential account from the verbal overshadowing account, and to understand more fully 





Objective Decision Quality 
I have focused my attention so far on subjective judgments (e.g., attitude, 
persuasiveness, and satisfaction), and it remains unclear whether reasoning difficulty and 
reason quality would also be predictive of more deterministic judgments, such as 
probability/base rate estimation or problem solving (e.g., Wason selection task, see Evans, 
2017), in which good performance can be measured by objective metrics. Independent of 
how individuals feel about their decisions, do the mechanisms outlined in this thesis – 
quantity, quality, and experience – have implications for whether and when reasons will 
produce objectively better decisions.  
There are several mechanisms examined in this thesis by which reasoning might 
impair objectively verifiable judgments. First, the experience of reasoning might impact 
judgments directly (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), or via the reasons brought to mind. 
Consider Halberstadt and Levine (1999)’s findings, for example: participants who considered 
themselves basketball experts were less accurate at predicting winning teams and margins of 
victory when they provided (at least three) reasons, compared to those who made intuitive 
predictions. Assuming that reasoners base their judgments on all the reasons that come to 
mind, and that the most diagnostic information tends to come to mind first (e.g., Silvera et al., 
2002; Wänke, 2013), as in Chapter 2, (over-)reasoning may lead people to include more 
factors that are less diagnostic into their judgments, thereby reducing the overall 
performance.  
Second, reasoning experience might impact judgments via changes in the perception 
of those reasons; for example, reasoners might subjectively overweight some reasons because 
they come to mind easily, and underweight others that are more difficult to explain, causing a 
miscalculation in their judgments. If so, the efficacy of judgments in this case should depend 




example, in Halberstadt and Levine’s study, reasoners were also provided with several 
illustrative reasons in the instructions, such as “Smith U. has a huge center” and “Jones has 
great 3-point shooters.” Assuming that participants based their judgments on these readily 
available reasons, it is conceivable that they might overweight them as they were easy to 
consider, compared to other, potentially more predictive (but more effortful) reasons (e.g., 
coaches’ offensive and defensive philosophy, players’ matchups, teams and players’ 
advanced statistics, etc.). 
Third, difficulty experienced during reasoning might impair the accuracy of predictive 
judgment because it directly obscures other, more reliable cues to judgments (Halberstadt & 
Wilson, 2008). Empirical evidence has suggested that heuristic cues (e.g., stimulus 
recognition) and experiential states (e.g., mood and fluency) can provide accurate proxies for 
more complex judgments (see Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; 
Monin, 2003; Reber et al., 2004; Reber & Unkelbach, 2010; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Slovic 
et al., 2002). Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002), for example, showed that American 
participants judged which of two German cities was larger more accurately than German 
participants, apparently because they based their choices on the cities they recognized, which 
coincided with the true relative sizes of those cities. (The reverse was also true: German 
participants judged cities in the United States more accurately than American participants.) 
The use of this “recognition heuristic” (and other “fast and frugal heuristics,” as Gigerenzer 
and Todd call them) may be effective in unreasoned contexts. However, when people reason, 
it is possible (though currently untested) that the difficulty of explaining reasons might 
compete with, or override, recognition and other simple strategies, leading to less accurate 
predictions.  
Finally, much like heuristics, past research suggests that quick, basic emotional 




Baron, 1983). For example, research has shown that people usually perform above chance at 
identifying dangerous individuals from faces (see Memon et al., 2003, pp. 38–39; Porter et 
al., 2008), with some exceptions (e.g., Rule et al., 2013). Ruffman and colleagues (2008; 
reported in Halberstadt & Wilson, 2008), for example, found that participants reported 
feeling more threatened when viewing photographs of violent criminals (e.g., imprisoned for 
assault and murder) than when viewing nonviolent criminals, and that the feeling of threat 
predicted over 90 percent of the variance in subjective judgments of how dangerous the 
targets appeared. Such emotional cues, however, are usually difficult to describe (see 
Halberstadt & Wilson, 2008; Schooler, 2002), and consequently when people attempt to 
reason about them, the difficulty experienced in doing so might undermine those feeling 
states, making them appear less diagnostic. 
Limited Manipulation of Difficulty 
The results reported in Chapters 3 and 4 were consistent with an account in which 
difficulty in comprehending reasons disrupts individuals’ ability to elaborate, and 
inconsistent with an account in which difficulty serves as a cue that reasons require greater 
scrutiny, or in which difficulty is misattributed to quality. However, the conclusions were 
based on the manipulation of language complexity, which, while perhaps the most 
ecologically valid, is only one of many situations that produce an experience of difficulty. 
Others, such as varying text-background contrast (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999), reducing 
visual clarity (e.g., Oppenheimer & Frank, 2008), replacing texts (“symbol”) with 
orthographic symbols (“$¥ɱβǑ£”) (e.g., Alter et al., 2007), or manipulating font (e.g., 
Norwick & Epley, 2003; Oppenheimer, 2006, Study 4) should be explored as a means of 
replicating the findings. In particular, these different manipulations may vary in terms of their 
meta-cognitive meaning with regard to interpreting difficulty. Difficulty that appears 




might be more likely to influence elaboration, compared to difficulty attributed to extrinsic 
factors (e.g., font and contrast). 
Replication in this case is particularly important, because it could be argued that 
language complexity is confounded with language interpretation. That is, participants may 
have failed to counterargue reasons not because (or not only because) they experienced 
difficulty, but because they struggled to understand the meaning of those reasons (e.g., if they 
were not familiar with some of the words). Although this explanation is possible, and I have 
no direct evidence that participants were equally familiar with all words, it is unlikely 
considering the current results. First, participants in both Chapters 3 and 4 were still able to 
differentiate between strong and weak reasons when they were difficult to comprehend; they 
only did so less effectively. Thus, potential ignorance of some of the complex words does not 
seem to prevent participants from interpreting the semantics of those reasons as a whole. 
Second, in the first study of Chapter 4, there was no difference in perceived reason quality 
between weak reasons written with simple and complex words, which suggests that the effect 
was unlikely due to the vocabularies per se, and that some additional factor (i.e., motivation) 
was involved. Moreover, if the results were, in fact, due to participants’ unfamiliarity with 
complex words, heightened motivation (i.e., in Study 2 of that chapter) should not have 
mitigated the effects (motivation does not improve one’s vocabulary). Nonetheless, 
distinguishing between these two mechanisms is important because, to the extent that 
comprehension is involved in this particular paradigm, “difficulty” effects may represent just 
a side effect of the manipulation, such that, for example, judgments regress to the mean under 
uncertainty. Replication with other manipulations that do not involve lexical changes will, 
thus, be beneficial.   
It is also important to acknowledge that, even if the results are replicated with 




roles in other contexts. For example, in a context where intelligence (Oppenheimer, 2006; 
Pennebaker & King, 1999; Spearman, 1904) or expertise (e.g., Hovland et al., 1953; Petty et 
al., 1981) is more salient, the use of complex language (and the difficulty that comes with 
understanding it) might be directly used as a heuristic, or metacognitive, cue for evidentiary 
quality, and therefore be less susceptible to the vagaries of cognitive elaboration. It is also 
possible that difficulty of comprehending complex language may signal that more effort is 
required to the extent that it boosts quality judgments (Alter et al., 2007). Furthermore, as I 
argued in Chapter 2, individuals are likely more invested in their own reasons, than those of 
others (Greenwald, 1968; Greenwald & Albert, 1968). The manipulation used in Chapters 3 
and 4, in which reasons were passively presented (to control for the reason content and 
number) possibly rendered participants’ experience of evaluating those reasons less 
diagnostic, thereby prompting more cognitive-driven effects (Schwarz, 1998, 2004, 2018). 
The current findings are, in this sense, limited in terms of generalizability, and it is beneficial 
to further investigate the conditions and contexts under which different mechanisms are more 
influential. 
Mechanical Turk  
It is noteworthy that all participants reported in this thesis were recruited online, via 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). While researchers have raised some concerns about MTurk 
workers, such as inattentiveness and dishonest responding (see for reviews Gosling et al., 
2004; Litman & Robinson, 2020), these concerns can be mitigated, as I did in all reported 
studies, by including data-quality check questions, recruiting only participants with high 
approval rates, prohibiting repeated participation, and scrutinizing qualitative responses (e.g., 
the content of reasons provided). In fact, research has shown that studies employing MTurk 
samples reliably produced high-quality data comparable to those conducted in the laboratory 




arguably offset by unique advantages, such as good diversity in terms of race, age, family 
background, and gender (see Litman & Robinson, 2020) as well as intrinsic motivation 
(Buhrmester et al., 2011; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014).  
Another potential concern associated with online sample has to do with the attitudinal 
topics and language complexity manipulation used in the current thesis. For example, 
research within the ELM literature that has used the topic of comprehensive exams has 
usually been conducted with University students, and thus the topic may appear more 
relevant to them compared to MTurk participants. Considering the role of motivation shown 
in Chapter 4, students, as a group, may be more likely to elaborate on reason quality. 
Furthermore, while research suggests that MTurk workers are more educated than the general 
U.S. population (Litman & Robinson, 2020, p. 140), the absence of data on participants’ 
educational level and language proficiency presents some potential concerns. For example, 
while the observed effects of language complexity are in line with the disruption mechanism, 
the results might have been different had the studies been conducted with university students 
(such as Standford University students, as in the original studies, Oppenheimer, 2006), who 
presumably were overall both well-educated and motivated (p. 152). Thus, it is possible that 
language complexity might invoke different cognitive mechanisms with student samples. 
Directions for Future Research 
As addressed above, the current studies primarily focus on subjective judgments, and 
thus an obvious next step is to examine the impact of reasoning as a function of experiential 
difficulty and the quality of reasoning on objective judgment domains, such as probabilistic 
estimation, risk assessment, financial forecasting, and judicial decision making. 
However, there are other, theoretical avenues to explore as well. One is a 
reexamination of the underlying factors in the availability heuristic research that has not 




(1973) Study 3, for example: some words with r in the third position (e.g., those with a per 
prefix, such as “permute”, “percent”, and “perturb”) are likely more available and easier to 
think of than others (e.g., “curb”, “work”, “term”). According to the typical interpretation of 
availability, in this scenario, individuals should predict higher frequencies when primed to 
think about such words, since they can come more easily to mind than those without 
discernable patterns. However, it is also possible that when taking the perceived quality of 
those instances (e.g., a lack of variability) into consideration individuals would, instead, 
further underestimate the frequency of such words.  
Another line of research that may benefit from consideration of experience and 
quality, among other factors, is the so-called decomposition principle: the idea that the 
effective way to approach a problem is by decomposing it into a series of subproblems, and 
to reason through them step-by-step toward a conclusion (Raiffa, 1968). This algorithmic 
way of reasoning has shown good efficacy in quantity estimation tasks, such as predicting 
population size (e.g., Armstrong et al., 1975; MacGregor et al., 1988). For example, when the 
question “How many cigarettes are consumed in the U.S. in a year?” was broken down into 
“What is the population of the U.S.?”, “About what proportion of the population smokes?”, 
“How many cigarettes does the average smoker consume per day?”, and “How many days are 
there in a year?”, participants were more accurate than those who answered the question 
without reasoning. However, most studies employing this technique have paid little attention 
to the quality of the decomposed constituents (see MacGregor, 2001). As most previous 
studies provided participants with an accurate and informative structure of reasoning, it is 
understandable that decomposition would facilitate better overall performance. However, 
when the reasoning structure in support of the estimation is spurious, it is likely that the 
performance following the decomposition would be even less accurate than more intuitive, 




In addition to the limitation of judgment domains, the current thesis also mainly 
concentrates on common cognitive processes, mostly ignoring individual differences, and the 
latter could be a beneficial avenue for future research. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, there 
are several personality factors related to ability and motivation to reason that are relevant to 
individuals’ inclination and emotional reaction to reasoning. However, in addition to the 
moderating effects, these variables might account for affective and cognitive reactions on 
their own. For example, a so-called “intuitive-experiential” individual (Epstein et al., 1996; 
also see Epstein, 1998), who is inclined to trust their own intuition and to construct their 
beliefs based on feelings and emotions, might experience reasoning as difficult not only 
because they are not familiar with it, but also because they are uncomfortable with it. Such 
individuals are likely to struggle to reason, react negatively to the experience, and use this 
experiential information, while disregarding the reasons, in their judgments (e.g., Keller & 
Bless, 2009; Halberstadt & Wilson, 2008). Furthermore, the extent to which an individual is 
willing, or motivated, to reason also depends on their need for cognitive closure: a tendency 
to seek a definite conclusion and to avoid ambiguity. Individuals with a high need for closure 
might be more inclined to generate few rather than many reasons to explain their attitudes, 
compared to those low in need for closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), and this need 
might dictate how difficult, or negative, they feel toward reasoning. 
Individual differences among persuaders (e.g., Alter et al., 2007), such as their 
authority, expertise, or attractiveness (see Pornpitakpan, 2004), might also qualify the current 
studies. Hoogeveen and colleagues (2020, December 1) presented participants across 24 
countries with diverse cultural and religious backgrounds with nonsensical statements 
credited either to a scientist or a spiritual guru, generated from the “New Age Bullshit 
Generator” (e.g., “We are being called to explore the cosmos itself as an interface between 




refining that we are guided”; see http://sebpearce.com/bullshit/). People tended to find such 
obscure statements more important and more credible when they were attributed to scientists 
than to spiritual gurus, regardless of their cultures and religions, showcasing reliance on 
scientific authorities as a cue, presumably without careful deliberation of those nonsensical 
statements.  
Similar effects have also been found in juror decision making (e.g., Cooper et al., 
1996; McKimme et al., 2013; Schuller et al., 2005). Cooper and colleagues (1996), for 
example, asked mock jurors to determine whether workplace exposure to polychlorinated 
biphcnyls (“PCBs”) was a proximal cause of a plaintiff’s cancer, with either complexly 
worded testimony (e.g., “In 1980, McConnell, publishing in the Elsevier Biomedical Press, 
reported a summary of the pathological findings due to the toxicity of PCBs.”) or simply 
worded testimony (e.g., “In 1980, a scientist named McConncll published a summary of the 
diseases that PCBs cause.”), presented by two expert witnesses who either had strong or weak 
credentials. The results showed that expert credentials had less impacts on perceived 
persuasiveness of the testimony when it was presented in simple, lay language; however, 
when the testimony was difficult to evaluate, the jurors relied more on credentials: they were 
more convinced when the testimony was explained by strongly than weakly credentialled 
experts. In a similar vein, it is possible that the rapid warnings in pharmaceutical commercials 
might not only present difficulty for the audience to understand and elaborate on the intended 
message, but also prompt them to rely more on other informative cues, such as actors’ 
attractiveness, or simple heuristics (“the pharmaceutical company should know what they are 
doing.”), rendering information validity less important. Future research could examine these 
possible, more complicated relationships between difficulty, reason quality, reasoners’ 




Lastly, although I focus on persuasiveness as a proxy for reason quality, there are 
other possible dimensions, such as on how true (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999) or believable 
(e.g., Evans et al., 1983) a reason (or a reasoner) is judged, that likely contribute to how 
“good” it is. Ample evidence from cognitive fluency research has shown a link between 
experiential difficulty and these dimensions (see for reviews Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; 
Reber & Unkelbach, 2010), and it is possible that the manipulation of language complexity 
employed in Chapters 3 and 4 may affect cognition processes in more than one way, yielding 
different results depending on the salience of each dimension. For example, in a context 
where the characteristics of reasoners are salient, participants might infer that complexly 
worded reasons are provided by intelligent individuals and thus perceive them as better than 
those simply worded ones because high intelligence is usually correlated with high language 
competency and the use of complex vocabularies (Spearman, 1904). Since persuasive reasons 
do not necessarily have to be true, readily believable, or expressed only by intelligent 
individuals, and vice versa, future research should investigate the relationship among these 















The need to explain and understand the reasons underlying our decisions and 
judgments in life is ubiquitous. Political debates, job applications, advertisements, and the 
current thesis, to name a few, are brimmed with reasons (to vote, to select, to buy, and to 
graduate). Understanding what happens when we reason and how our reasoning experience 
can influence the perception of reasons are critical, and how they can interactively influence 
our judgments even more paramount. The studies in this thesis illustrate how generating and 
processing reasons involve a complicated interplay of cognitive and experiential factors, and 
that their relationships and subsequent impacts on judgments depend on individuals’ 
cognitive capability and motivation, as well as the contexts in which they are applied. The 
findings can also be applied beyond the context of scientific, theoretical formations, such as 
in advertising strategies and political debates. For example, the process of explaining and 
understanding reasons should feel easy, provided one has good, supporting information. On 
the other hand, the potential avenues of recommendations regarding an unfortunate paucity of 
cogent, well-founded reasons on the basis of the present scientific inquiries and the modest, 
yet fruitful, discoveries that follow suit would verily be to endeavor, if you please, to 
articulate and express them with the most convoluted, verbose, erudite vernaculars, and 












Alter, A. L., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2009). Uniting the tribes of fluency to form a 
metacognitive nation. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13(3), 219–
235. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868309341564 
Alter, A. L., Oppenheimer, D. M., Epley, N., & Eyre, R. N. (2007). Overcoming intuition: 
Metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 136(4), 569–576. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.136.4.569 
Armstrong, J. S., Denniston, W. B., & Gordon, M. M. (1975). The use of the decomposition 
principle in making judgments. Organizational Behavior & Human Performance, 
14(2), 257–263. https://doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073(75)90028-8 
Bernritter, S. F., van Ooijen, I., & Müller, B. C. N. (2017). Self-persuasion as marketing 
technique: The role of consumers’ involvement. European Journal of Marketing, 
51(5–6), 1075–1090. https://doi.org/10.1108/EJM-04-2015-0213 
Brehm, J. W. (1956). Postdecision changes in the desirability of alternatives. The Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52(3), 384–389. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0041006 
Briñol, P., Petty, R. E., & Tormala, Z. L. (2006). The malleable meaning of subjective ease. 
Psychological Science, 17(3), 200–206. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2006.01686.x 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A new 
source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 
6(1), 3–5. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610393980 
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1979). Effects of message repetition and position on 
cognitive response, recall, and persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social 




Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1981). Electromyograms as measures of extent and affectivity 
of information processing. American Psychologist, 36(5), 441–
456. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.36.5.441 
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 42(1), 116–131. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116 
Chaiken, S., Liberman, A., & Eagly, A. H. (1989). Heuristic and systematic information 
processing within and beyond the persuasion context. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh 
(Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 212–252). The Guilford Press. 
Clark, J. K., & Wegener, D. T. (2013). Message position, information processing, and 
persuasion. In P. Devine & A. Plant (Eds.), Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology (Vol. 47, pp. 189–232). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-
12-407236-7.00004-8 
Cooper, J., Bennett, E. A., & Sukel, H. L. (1996). Complex scientific testimony: How do 
jurors make decisions? Law and Human Behavior, 20(4), 379–
394. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01498976 
Danziger, S., Levav, J., & Avnaim-Pessoa, L. (2011). Extraneous factors in judicial 
decisions. PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 108(17), 6889–6892. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1018033108 
Day, R. S. (2006). Comprehension of prescription drug information: Overview of a research 
program. Proceedings of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence, 
Argumentation for Consumer Healthcare. 
http://www.aaai.org/Papers/Symposia/Spring/2006/SS-06-01/SS06-01-005.pdf 
Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). Think different: The merits of unconscious thought in preference 
development and decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 




Dijksterhuis, A., & Nordgren, L. F. (2006). A theory of unconscious thought. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 1(2), 95–109. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-
6916.2006.00007.x 
Epstein, S. (1998). Cognitive-experiential self-theory. In D. F. Barone, M. Hersen, & V. B. 
Van Hasselt (Eds.), The Plenum series in social/clinical psychology. Advanced 
personality (pp. 211–238). Plenum Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8580-
4_9 
Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in intuitive–
experiential and analytical–rational thinking styles. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 71(2), 390–405. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.390 
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2017). Wason selection task. In R. F. Pohl (Ed.), Cognitive illusions: 
Intriguing phenomena in thinking, judgment and memory (pp. 150–164). 
Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. 
Evans, J. S. B. T., Barston, J. L., & Pollard, P. (1983). On the conflict between logic and 
belief in syllogistic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 11(3), 295–
306. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196976 
Garry, M., Manning, C. G., Loftus, E. F., & Sherman, S. J. (1996). Imagination inflation: 
Imagining a childhood event inflates confidence that it occurred. Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 3(2), 208–214. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03212420 
Gerard, H. B., & White, G. L. (1983). Post-decisional reevaluation of choice 
alternatives. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 9(3), 365–
369. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167283093006 
Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Fast and frugal heuristics: The adaptive toolbox. In G. 
Gigerenzer, P. M. Todd, & The ABC Research Group, Evolution and cognition. 




Glenberg, A. M., Bradley, M. M., Kraus, T. A., & Renzaglia, G. J. (1983). Studies of the 
long-term recency effect: Support for a contextually guided retrieval 
hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
9(2), 231–255. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.9.2.231 
Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002). Models of ecological rationality: The recognition 
heuristic. Psychological Review, 109(1), 75–90. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
295X.109.1.75 
Gosling, S. D., Vazire, S., Srivastava, S., & John, O. P. (2004). Should we trust web-based 
studies? A comparative analysis of six preconceptions about internet 
questionnaires. American Psychologist, 59(2), 93–104. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-
066X.59.2.93 
Greenwald, A. G. (1968). Cognitive learning, cognitive response to persuasion, and attitude 
change. In A. G. Greenwald, T. C. Brock, & T. M. Ostrom (Eds.), Psychological 
Foundations of Attitudes (pp. 147–170). Academic Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-1-4832-3071-9.50012-X 
Greenwald, A. G., & Albert, R. D. (1968). Acceptance and recall of improvised 
arguments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8(1), 31–
34. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0021237 
Halberstadt, J. (2010). Intuition: Dumb but lucky. Fortuitous affective cues and their 
disruption by analytic thought. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4, 64–
76. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00242.x 
Halberstadt, J. B., & Levine, G. M. (1999). Effects of reasons analysis on the accuracy of 





Halberstadt, J. B., & Wilson, T. (2008). Reflections on conscious reflection: mechanisms of 
impairment by reasons analysis. In L. Rips & J. Adler (Eds.), Reasoning: Studies of 
Human Inference and Its Foundations (pp. 548–565). Cambridge University Press. 
Harmon-Jones, E., & Harmon-Jones, C. (2002). Testing the action-based model of cognitive 
dissonance: The effect of action orientation on postdecisional attitudes. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(6), 711–
723. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167202289001 
Harmon-Jones, E., & Mills, J. (2019). An introduction to cognitive dissonance theory and an 
overview of current perspectives on the theory. In E. Harmon-Jones (Ed.), Cognitive 
dissonance: Reexamining a pivotal theory in psychology (pp. 3–24). American 
Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/0000135-001 
Haugtvedt, C. P., & Wegener, D. T. (1994). Message order effects in persuasion: An attitude 
strength perspective. Journal of Consumer Research, 21(1), 205–
218. https://doi.org/10.1086/209393 
Hirt, E. R., & Sherman, S. J. (1985). The role of prior knowledge in explaining hypothetical 
events. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21(6), 519–
543. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(85)90023-X 
Hoogeveen, S., Altay, S., Bendixen, T., Berniūnas, R., Bulbulia, J., Cheshin, A., … van Elk, 
M. (2020, December 1). The Einstein effect: Global evidence for scientific source 
credibility effects and the influence of religiosity. 
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/sf8ez 
Horowitz, I. A., ForsterLee, L., & Brolly, I. (1996). Effects of trial complexity on decision 





Horowitz, I. A., Bordens, K. S., Victor, E., Bourgeois, M. J., & ForsterLee, L. (2001). The 
effects of complexity on jurors' verdicts and construction of evidence. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 86(4), 641–652. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.86.4.641 
Hovland, C.I., Janis, I.L., & Kelley, H.H. (1953). Communication and persuasion. Yale 
University Press. 
Humpherys, S. L., Moffitt, K. C., Burns, M. B., Burgoon, J. K., & Felix, W. F. (2011). 
Identification of fraudulent financial statements using linguistic credibility 
analysis. Decision Support Systems, 50(3), 585–594. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2010.08.009 
Janis, I. L., & Mann, L. (1977). Decision making: A psychological analysis of conflict, 
choice, and commitment. Free Press. 
Jarvis, W. B. G., & Petty, R. E. (1996). The need to evaluate. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 70(1), 172–194. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.1.172 
Johnson, D. R., & Borden, L. A. (2012). Participants at your fingertips: Using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk to increase student–faculty collaborative research. Teaching of 
Psychology, 39(4), 245–251. https://doi.org/10.1177/0098628312456615 
Keller, J., & Bless, H. (2009). Predicting future affective states: How ease of retrieval and 
faith in intuition moderate the impact of activated content. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 39(3), 467–476. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.586 
Koehler, D. J. (1991). Explanation, imagination, and confidence in judgment. Psychological 
Bulletin, 110(3), 499–519. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.110.3.499 
Koriat, A., Lichtenstein, S., & Fischhoff, B. (1980). Reasons for confidence. Journal of 





Kruglanski, A. W., & Gigerenzer, G. (2011). Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on 
common principles. Psychological Review, 118(1), 97–
109. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020762 
Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: “Seizing” and 
“freezing.” Psychological Review, 103(2), 263–283. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
295X.103.2.263 
Landis, J. (Director). (1985). Spies Like Us [Film]. Warner Bros. Pictures. 
Levine, G. M., Halberstadt, J. B., & Goldstone, R. L. (1996). Reasoning and the weighting of 
attributes in attitude judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(2), 
230–240. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.2.230 
Levitan, S. I., Maredia, A., & Hirschberg, J. (2018, June). Linguistic cues to deception and 
perceived deception in interview dialogues. In Proceedings of the 2018 Conference of 
the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: 
Human Language Technologies (Vol. 1, pp. 1941–1950). 
https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/N18-1176 
Linder, J. A., Doctor, J. N., Friedberg, M. W., Reyes Nieva, H., Birks, C., Meeker, D., & 
Fox, C. R. (2014). Time of day and the decision to prescribe antibiotics. JAMA 
internal medicine, 174(12), 2029–2031. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2014.5225 
Litman, L., & Robinson, J. (2020). Conducting Online Research on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
and Beyond (Vol. 1). SAGE Publications. 
Little, L. E. (1998). Hiding with words: Obfuscation, avoidance, and federal jurisdiction 




MacGregor, D. G. (2001). Decomposition for judgmental forecasting and estimation. In J. 
Scott Armstrong (Ed.), Principles of forecasting: A handbook for researchers and 
practitioners. (pp. 107–123). Kluwer Academic. 
MacGregor, D., Lichtenstein, S., & Slovic, P. (1988). Structuring knowledge retrieval: An 
analysis of decomposed quantitative judgments. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 42(3), 303–323. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(88)90003-9 
Markowitz, D. M., & Hancock, J. T. (2016). Linguistic obfuscation in fraudulent science. 
Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 35(4), 435–445. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X15614605 
Markowitz, D. M., Kouchaki, M., Hancock, J. T., & Gino, F. (2021). The deception spiral: 
Corporate obfuscation leads to perceptions of immorality and cheating behavior. 
Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 40(2), 277–296. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X20949594 
McArthur, L. Z., & Baron, R. M. (1983). Toward an ecological theory of social 
perception. Psychological Review, 90(3), 215–238. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
295X.90.3.215 
McCornack, S. A. (1992). Information manipulation theory. Communication Monographs, 
59(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/03637759209376245 
McCornack, S. A., Levine, T. R., Solowczuk, K. A., Torres, H. I., & Campbell, D. M. (1992). 
When the alteration of information is viewed as deception: An empirical test of 
information manipulation theory. Communications Monographs, 59(1), 17–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03637759209376246 
McKimmie, B. M., Newton, S. A., Schuller, R. A., & Terry, D. J. (2013). It's not what she 




the persuasiveness of expert testimony. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 20(4), 578–
589. https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2012.727068 
Meissner, C. A., & Memon, A. (2002). Verbal overshadowing: A special issue exploring 
theoretical and applied issues. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16(8), 869–872. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.928 
Memon, A., Vrij, A., & Bull, R. (2003). Psychology and law: truthfulness, accuracy and 
credibility. Jossey-Bass. 
Monin, B. (2003). The warm glow heuristic: When liking leads to familiarity. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 85(6), 1035–1048. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.85.6.1035 
Moore, D. J., Reardon, R., & Durso, F. T. (1986). The generation effect in advertising 
appeals. In R. J. Lutz (Ed.), Advances in consumer research (Vol. 13, pp. 117–120). 
Association for Consumer Research. 
Norwick, R.J., & Epley, N. (2003). Experiential determinants of confidence. Poster presented 
at the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Los Angeles, CA. 
Oppenheimer, D. M. (2006). Consequences of erudite vernacular utilized irrespective of 
necessity: Problems with using long words needlessly. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
20(2), 139–156. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1178 
Oppenheimer, D. M. (2008). The secret life of fluency. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(6), 
237–241. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.014 
Oppenheimer, D. M., & Frank, M. C. (2008). A rose in any other font would not smell as 





Paolacci, G., & Chandler, J. (2014). Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as a 
participant pool. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(3), 184–
188. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721414531598 
Pennebaker, J. W., & King, L. A. (1999). Linguistic styles: Language use as an individual 
difference. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(6), 1296–
1312. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1296 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1979). Issue involvement can increase or decrease persuasion 
by enhancing message-relevant cognitive responses. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 37(10), 1915–1926. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.37.10.1915 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1984). The effects of involvement on responses to argument 
quantity and quality: Central and peripheral routes to persuasion. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 46(1), 69–81. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.46.1.69 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In L. 
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 123–205). 
Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60214-2 
Petty, R. E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Goldman, R. (1981). Personal involvement as a determinant 
of argument-based persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41(5), 
847–855. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.41.5.847 
Petty, R. E., Harkins, S. G., & Williams, K. D. (1980). The effects of group diffusion of 
cognitive effort on attitudes: An information-processing view. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 38(1), 81–92. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.38.1.81 
Petty, R. E., Harkins, S. G., Williams, K. D., & Latané, B. (1977). The effects of group size 





Petty, R. E., Tormala, Z. L., Hawkins, C., & Wegener, D. T. (2001). Motivation to think and 
order effects in persuasion: The moderating role of chunking. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 27(3), 332–344. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167201273007 
Petty, R. E., Wells, G. L., & Brock, T. C. (1976). Distraction can enhance or reduce yielding 
to propaganda: Thought disruption versus effort justification. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 34(5), 874–884. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.34.5.874 
Pornpitakpan, C. (2004). The persuasiveness of source credibility: A critical review of five 
decades' evidence. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34(2), 243–
281. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2004.tb02547.x 
Porter, S., England, L., Juodis, M., ten Brinke, L., & Wilson, K. (2008). Is the face a window 
to the soul? Investigation of the accuracy of intuitive judgments of the trustworthiness 
of human faces. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science / Revue canadienne des 
sciences du comportement, 40(3), 171–177. https://doi.org/10.1037/0008-
400X.40.3.171 
Raiffa, H. (1968). Decision analysis: introductory lectures on choices under 
uncertainty. Addison-Wesley. 
Reber, R., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Effects of perceptual fluency on judgments of 
truth. Consciousness and Cognition: An International Journal, 8(3), 338–
342. https://doi.org/10.1006/ccog.1999.0386 
Reber, R., Schwarz, N., & Winkielman, P. (2004). Processing Fluency and Aesthetic 
Pleasure: Is Beauty in the Perceiver's Processing Experience? Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 8(4), 364–382. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0804_3 
Reber, R., & Unkelbach, C. (2010). The epistemic status of processing fluency as source for 





Ruffman, T., Zajac, R., & Halberstadt, J. (2008). Subjective threat predicts the dangerousness 
of convicted criminals. Unpublished data. 
Rule, N. O., Krendl, A. C., Ivcevic, Z., & Ambady, N. (2013). Accuracy and consensus in 
judgments of trustworthiness from faces: Behavioral and neural correlates. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 104(3), 409–
426. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0031050 
Sawyer, A. G., & Howard, D. J. (1991). Effects of omitting conclusions in advertisements to 
involved and uninvolved audiences. Journal of Marketing Research, 28(4), 467–
474. https://doi.org/10.2307/3172786 
Schooler, J. W. (2002). Re-representing consciousness: Dissociations between experience 
and meta-consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(8), 339–
344. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(02)01949-6 
Schooler, J. W., & Engstler-Schooler, T. Y. (1990). Verbal overshadowing of visual 
memories: Some things are better left unsaid. Cognitive Psychology, 22(1), 36–
71. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(90)90003-M 
Schuller, R. A., Terry, D., & McKimmie, B. (2005). The impact of expert testimony on 
jurors’ decisions: Gender of the expert and testimony complexity. Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology, 35(6), 1266–1280. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-
1816.2005.tb02170.x 
Schwarz, N. (1998). Accessible content and accessibility experiences: The interplay of 
declarative and experiential information in judgment. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 2(2), 87–99. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0202_2 
Schwarz, N. (2004). Metacognitive experiences in consumer judgment and decision making. 





Schwarz, N. (2018). Of fluency, beauty, and truth: Inferences from metacognitive 
experiences. In J. Proust & M. Fortier (Eds.), Metacognitive diversity: An 
interdisciplinary approach (pp. 25–46). Oxford University Press. 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: 
Informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 45(3), 513–523. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.3.513 
Shafir, E., & LeBoeuf, R. A. (2002). Rationality. Annual Review of Psychology, 53(1), 491–
517. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135213 
Sherman, S. J., Cialdini, R. B., Schwartzman, D. F., & Reynolds, K. D. (1985). Imagining 
can heighten or lower the perceived likelihood of contracting a disease: The mediating 
effect of ease of imagery. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 11(1), 118–
127. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167285111011 
Sherman, S. J., Crawford, M. T., & McConnell, A. R. (2004). Looking Ahead as a Technique 
to Reduce Resistance to Persuasive Attempts. In E. S. Knowles & J. A. Linn 
(Eds.), Resistance and persuasion (pp. 149–174). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 
Publishers. 
Silva, R. R., Chrobot, N., Newman, E., Schwarz, N., & Topolinski, S. (2017). Make it short 
and easy: Username complexity determines trustworthiness above and beyond 
objective reputation. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 
2200. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02200 
Silvera, D. H., Krull, D. S., & Sassler, M. A. (2002). Typhoid Pollyanna: The effect of 
category valence on retrieval order of positive and negative category 





Slovic, P. (1982). Toward understanding and improving decisions. In W C. Howell & E. A. 
Fleishman (Eds.), Information processing and decision making (pp. 157–183). 
Erlbaum. 
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002). The affect heuristic. In T. 
Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology 
of intuitive judgment (pp. 397–420). Cambridge University 
Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808098.025 
Spearman, C. (1904). ‘General intelligence,’ objectively determined and measured. The 
American Journal of Psychology, 15(2), 201–293. https://doi.org/10.2307/1412107 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and 
probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5(2), 207–232. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-
0285(73)90033-9 
Unkelbach, C. (2007). Reversing the truth effect: learning the interpretation of processing 
fluency in judgments of truth. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, & Cognition, 33, 219–230. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.33.1.219 
Wänke, M. (2013). Almost everything you always wanted to know about ease-of-retrieval 
effects. In C. Unkelbach & R. Greifender (Eds.), The experience of thinking: How the 
fluency of mental processes influences cognition and behaviour (pp. 151–169). 
Psychology Press. 
Wänke, M., Bohner, G., & Jurkowitsch, A. (1997). There are many reasons to drive a BMW: 
Does imagined ease of argument generation influence attitudes? Journal of Consumer 
Research, 24(2), 170–177. https://doi.org/10.1086/209502 
Wilson, T. D., Dunn, D. S., Kraft, D., & Lisle, D. J. (1989). Introspection, attitude change, 
and attitude-behavior consistency: The disruptive effects of explaining why we feel 




(Vol. 22, pp. 287–343). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-
2601(08)60311-1 
Wilson, T. D., Lisle, D. J., Schooler, J. W., Hodges, S. D., Klaaren, K. J., & LaFleur, S. J. 
(1993). Introspecting about reasons can reduce post-choice satisfaction. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19(3), 331–
339. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167293193010 
Yoo, K. H., & Gretzel, U. (2009). Comparison of deceptive and truthful travel reviews. In: 
Höpken W., Gretzel U., Law R. (eds) Information and communication technologies 
in tourism 2009 (pp. 37–47). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-93971-
0_4 
 
 
 
